State v. Harris

227 N.E.3d 510

2023-Ohio-3994

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

v.Terrence E. HARRIS, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 21AP-678, No. 22AP-124

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Rendered on November 2, 2023

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, (C.P.C. No. 20CR-3034).

On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark R. Wilson for State of Ohio.

On brief: Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, and Kort Gatterdam, Columbus, for Terrence E. Harris.

DECISION

EDELSTEIN, J.

{¶ 1} This is a consolidated appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas against Terrence E. Harris after a jury found him guilty of aggravated burglary and the trial court sentenced him to nine years in prison.

{¶ 2} Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, the State of Ohio, asserts on appeal that the definite prison term imposed was contrary to law. Specifically, the state challenges the trial court’s judgment declaring the indefinite sentencing provisions enact- ed through 2018 Am.Sub.S.B. 201 (the "Reagan Tokes Law") to be unconstitutional and argues the trial court committed reversible error when it imposed a definite prison sentence instead.

{¶ 3} On cross-appeal, Mr. Harris argues his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. He also attributes error to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings at his November 2021 jury trial, and further contends he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at that trial.

{¶ 4} Because Mr. Harris’s four-cross assignments of error are not well-taken and the Supreme Court of Ohio recently held the Reagan Tokes Law is constitutional, we vacate Mr. Harris’s nine-year prison sentence and remand the matter for resentencing consistent with the Reagan Tokes Law.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 5} On July 7, 2020, a Franklin County Grand Jury returned a three-count indictment charging Mr. Harris with aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and kidnapping. Because of his prior criminal convictions, repeat violent offender specifications were included with each count. All offenses involved Mr. Harris’s on-again, off-again girlfriend of four years, L.A., and were alleged to have occurred at the home of L.A.’s friend, D.D., in the early morning of June 24, 2020.

{¶ 6} Trial commenced on November 2, 2021. Two days later, the jury returned its verdict finding Mr. Harris guilty of aggravated burglary, and not guilty of felonious assault and kidnapping. (Nov. 4, 2021 Tr. Vol. IV at 638-42.) The trial court ordered Mr. Harris to undergo a pre-sentence investigation and advised trial counsel he would address the repeat violent offender specification included with the aggravated burglary count at sentencing. (Tr. Vol. IV at 643-44.)

{¶ 7} At the December 3, 2021 sentencing hearing, the parties stipulated to Mr. Harris’s prior burglary conviction and, pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(B), the trial court determined Mr. Harris was a repeat violent offender. (Dec. 3, 2021 Tr. Vol. V at 665-67.) In addition to counsel, L.A. and Mr. Harris addressed the trial court before sentence was imposed. (Tr. Vol. V at 670-83.)

{¶ 8} Aggravated burglary qualifies as a first-degree felony offense subject to indefinite sentencing under the Reagan Tokes Law. See 2018 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 201 (effective March 22, 2019). As discussed more below, the Reagan Tokes Law requires a sentencing court to impose an indefinite sentence consisting of a minimum and a maximum prison term on individuals convicted of first- or second-degree felonies for which life imprisonment is not an available sentence. State v. Hacker, — Ohio St.3d —, 2023-Ohio-2535, — N.E.3d —, ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (2)(a). Life imprisonment is not an available sentence for an aggravated burglary offense. See R.C. 2911.11; R.C. 2929.14.

{¶ 9} At the sentencing hearing, however, the trial court noted it had previously found the Reagan Tokes Law to be unconstitutional on the grounds cited in State v. Hursey, Franklin C.P. No. 20 CR 004459, 2021 WL 7081074 (Aug. 6, 2021). (Tr. Vol. V at 686.) And, the court expressly adopted and incorporated that finding into its sentencing determination in this case. (See Jan. 3, 2022 Am. Jgmt. Entry at 2.) The trial court therefore sentenced Mr. Harris to a definite prison term of nine years for the aggravated burglary offense.¹

(Tr. Vol. V at 687. See also Am. Jgmt. Entry.) We note that, at the time of sentencing, neither this court nor the Supreme Court of Ohio had ruled on the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. Thus, at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the state noted its objection to the trial court’s unconstitutionality determination and imposition of a definite prison sentence for the record. (Tr. Vol. V at 689-90.)

{¶ 10} On December 15, 2021, the state timely appealed from the judgment of conviction and asserts the following sole assignment of error for our review:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SENTENCE [MR. HARRIS] IN COMPLIANCE WITH S.B. 201, THE REAGAN TOKES ACT, AS REQUIRED BY ORC 2929.144 AND, THEREFORE, THE SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

{¶ 11} On February 23, 2022, Mr. Harris requested leave from this court to file a delayed cross-appeal pursuant to App.R. 5. We granted the motion on April 14, 2022. Mr. Harris raises the following four cross-assignments of error for our review:

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED [MR. HARRIS’S] RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN IT ENTERED A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF [MR. HARRIS’S] RIGHTS UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED VICTIM’S NARRATIVE STATEMENT TO THE FORENSIC NURSE EXAMINER THEREBY VIOLATING [MR. HARRIS’S] RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.

[III.] THE STATE OF OHIO FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 16(K) OF THE OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE BY FAILING TO TIMELY PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS EXPERT WITNESS, AND THE TRIAL COURT SUBSEQUENTLY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE STATE’S EXPERT TO TESTIFY CONTRARY TO CROSS-APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A FAIR TRIAL.

[IV.] [MR. HARRIS] WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF [HIS] RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND SECTION[S] 10 AND 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

{¶ 12} Mr. Harris’s four cross-assignments of error all pertain to trial-related matters, any of which could, if sustained, render the state’s sole assignment of error challenging the propriety of the definite sentence imposed moot. For this reason, we first address Mr. Harris’s four cross- assignments of error. And because Mr. Harris attributes error to a wide range of trial matters, the relevant facts are summarized within our analysis of each cross-assignment of error.

II. ANALYSIS OF MR. HARRIS’S CROSS-ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

A. First Cross-Assignment of Error

{¶ 13} In his first cross-assignment of error, Mr. Harris contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his aggravated burglary conviction. He also argues his aggravated burglary conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

1. Controlling Law and Standard of Review

[1, 2] {¶ 14} The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction involves a determination of whether the state met its burden of production at trial. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1157, 2004-Ohio-4786, 2004 WL 2008465, ¶ 16; State v. Frazier, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1323, 2007-Ohio-11, 2007 WL 16778, ¶ 7; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We do not weigh the evidence but instead determine " ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. We essentially assume the state’s witnesses testified truthfully and determine if that testimony and any other evidence presented at trial satisfies each element of the crime. State v. Watkins, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-142, 2016-Ohio-8272, 2016 WL 7494358, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-889, 2008-Ohio-4257, 2008 WL 3878363, ¶ 41. Thus, evidence is sufficient to support a conviction where, if believed, that evidence would allow any rational trier of fact to conclude that the state proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Frazier at ¶ 7, citing Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.

[3, 4] {¶ 15} In contrast, a manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence presented and questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. See, e.g., State v. Richey, 10th Dist., 2018-Ohio-3498, 118 N.E.3d 1147, ¶ 50, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-0hio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 11-13, citing Thompkins at 386-87, 678 N.E.2d 541. "Although evidence may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the issue of manifest weight requires a different type of analysis." State v. Walker, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-679, 2003-Ohio-986, 2003 WL 757525, ¶ 43. "[W]eight of the evidence" concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other. State v. Petty, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-950, 2017-Ohio-1062, 2017 WL 1091583, ¶ 60, citing State v. Boone, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-87, 2015-Ohio-2648, 2015 WL 3991172, ¶ 49, citing Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.

[5, 6] {¶ 16} When considering an appellant’s claim that a...