State v. Haskins

477 N.J. Super. 630

309 A.3d 671

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. KHALIL H. HASKINS, A/K/A KHALIL HASKIN, AND ANDREW HAEFELE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

DOCKET NO. A-1767-22

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division

Submitted January 23, 2024—Decided February 7, 2024

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 21-08-2068.

Before Judges Haas, Natali and Puglisi.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

NATALI, J.A.D.

Believing the tinted front side windows of defendant Khalil H. Haskins’ car violated the Motor Vehicle Code, police stopped his vehicle and, after a warrantless search, seized marijuana, a loaded handgun, and drug paraphernalia from the car and suspected heroin from defendant. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress that physical evidence, defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d), and second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). He now appeals the court’s order denying his suppression application, arguing the stop of his car was unlawful because the State failed to establish his car’s tinted windows violated the Motor Vehicle Code under the test set forth in State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 276 A.3d 1114 (2022).

In Smith, our Supreme Court held "reasonable and articulable suspicion of a tinted windows violation arises only when a vehicle’s front windshield or front side windows are so darkly tinted that police cannot clearly see people or articles within the car." Id. at 253, 276 A.3d 1114. When the court denied defendant’s application, our Supreme Court had not yet decided Smith, and it instead relied on our decision in State v. Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. 375, 790 A.2d 202 (App. Div. 2002). In that case, we concluded police must establish the windows are "so darkly tinted as to obstruct [the driver’s] vision" to justify a motor vehicle stop based upon a violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-74. Id. at 380, 790 A.2d 202. In support, we held that statute "prohibits the use of tinted windows which fail to meet the applicable standard now set forth in N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7," a regulation proscribing "tinted spray or plastic material added to previously approved glazing in the front windshield or windows" because of the change to "vision and light transmission properties of the glazing in areas where driver visibility shall not be obscured." Ibid. (quoting N.J.A.C. 13:20-33.7(d)). Because we conclude the holding in Smith constituted a new rule of law for retroactivity purposes, and is further entitled to pipeline retroactivity, we vacate the court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The relevant facts that emerged at the suppression hearing are as follows. On January 19, 2021, Barrington Police Department Corporal Patrick D’Ascenzo observed defendant driving a black Cadillac de Ville with "heavily tinted" front and back windows on both the driver and passenger sides. He stated the rear windshield was not tinted and could not recall whether the front windshield was tinted. Because he understood the Motor Vehicle Code to prohibit tinted front windows, Corporal D’Ascenzo stopped defendant’s car, conducted a warrantless search, and seized as noted.

Defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence, which the court denied. The court found Corporal D’Ascenzo testified credibly and relying on Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. at 380, 790 A.2d 202, found he had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car based on the front window tint which Corporal D’Ascenzo believed violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-75.¹ As noted, our Supreme Court decided Smith on June 28, 2022, approximately four months after the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress.

[1] Defendant entered his plea on March 3, 2022, was later sentenced, and the court entered a Judgment of Conviction on April 1, 2022. At sentencing, and pursuant to Rule 3:21-4(i), the court advised defendant of his right to appeal and the associated forty-five-day deadline set forth in Rule 2:4-1(a). Defendant’s notice of appeal was therefore due on May 16, 2022, but was not filed until February 17, 2023.

Contemporaneous with his February 17 notice, defendant filed an unopposed motion for leave to file a notice of appeal as within time and submitted his certification, in which he stated his family "called [his attorney on his behalf] and left multiple messages requesting an appeal" but received no response. He also stated he "wrote to the criminal case manager around April 20[ ], 2022 requesting assistance" and "to the judge," who responded informing him his letter had been "forwarded to [his] attorney." Finally, defendant noted he wrote to the appellate section of the Office of the Public Defender, who "informed [him] that [his] appeal request was out of time," leading to the filing of his motion, which we granted. See State v. Molina, 187 N.J. 531, 535-36, 902 A.2d 200 (2006) (holding defendant may move to appeal as within time despite failing to prosecute appeal in timely manner and having been advised of appeal rights if defendant "demonstrates, by [their] own certification and by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the defendant did request the filing of an appeal in a timely manner and that counsel failed to prosecute it").

Before us, defendant argues the court erred in denying his suppression motion because the police lacked a reasonable suspicion that the car’s tinted windows violated N.J.S.A. 39:3-74. In support, he contends the State failed to present evidence the tinted windows inhibited Corporal D’Ascenzo’s ability to clearly see inside the vehicle as required under Smith, 251 N.J. at 266, 276 A.3d 1114. In response, the State contends Smith should apply prospectively only, and the court’s reliance on Cohen, 347 N.J. Super. at 380, 790 A.2d 202, was therefore proper. In the alternative, the State requests we remand to permit it to present additional facts and testimony consistent with Smith.

II.

[2] Whether a court decision applies prospectively or retroactively involves a three-step analysis. State v. Dock, 205 N.J. 237, 254,15 A.3d 1 (2011). First, we must initially consider whether the decision announces a new rule of law. Ibid. Our Supreme Court has instructed that a new rule is announced if the decision "breaks new ground," ibid. (quoting State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 97, 875 A.2d 906 (2005)), or involves a "sudden and generally unanticipated repudiation of a long-standing practice," State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 382, 235 A.3d 157 (2020) (quoting State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 308, 944 A.2d 599 (2008)).

[3–5] A decision is also considered a new rule if it "imposes a new obligation on the State." Dock, 205 N.J. at 254, 15 A.3d 1 (quoting Cummings, 184 N.J. at 97, 875 A.2d 906). Finally, a decision announces a new rule "if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final." Ibid. (quoting Cummings, 184 N.J. at 97, 875 A.2d 906). In cases in which "the meaning of a statute as determined by prior decision is changed, the court decision changing it is the equivalent of a new rule of law." State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406, 427 A.2d 525 (1981).

[6, 7] After determining a decision reflects a new rule of law, we then balance three factors to determine if retroactive application is warranted: "(1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice." G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 386, 235 A.3d 157 (quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 300, 27 A.3d 872 (2011)). We also consider "more generally … what is just and consonant with public policy in the particular situation presented." Dock, 205 N.J. at 255, 15 A.3d 1 (quoting Cummings, 184 N.J. at 97, 875 A.2d 906).

[8, 9] With regard to the first factor, a rule intended to remedy a past substantial impairment of the truth-finding function or to "enhance the reliability of the factfinding process" will generally weigh in favor of some form of retroactivity. G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 386-87, 235 A.3d 157. On the other hand, a rule intended "solely to deter illegal police conduct" weighs against retroactivity, because "the deterrent purposes of such a rule would not be advanced by applying it to past misconduct." Burstein, 85 N.J. at 406, 427 A.2d 525. Our Supreme Court has emphasized the factors are "not of equal weight" and the first factor is "often the pivotal consideration," with the others becoming more salient "when the inquiry into the purpose of the new rule does not, by itself, reveal whether retroactive application … would be appropriate." Dock, 205 N.J. at 255, 15 A.3d 1 (quoting Cummings, 184 N.J. at 97, 875 A.2d 906).

[10] The second factor requires an examination of "whether law enforcement agents justifiably relied on the old rule in performing their professional responsibilities." Id. at 256, 15 A.3d 1. Such reliance must have been "in good faith" and consistent with "then-prevailing constitutional norms." G.E.P., 243 N.J. at 388, 235 A.3d 157. "‘The reasoning underlying this inquiry is that state agents should not be penalized for complying in good faith with "prevailing constitutional norms"’ when carrying out their duties." State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 252, 678 A.2d 642 (1996) (quoting State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 582, 404 A.2d 632 (1979) (Pashman, J., dissenting)).

[11] In weighing the third factor, we consider whether the retroactive application of a rule would "undermine the validity of large numbers of convictions." Ibid...