State v. Hennings

1

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ASHLEY NICOLE HENNINGS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-0337

Court of Appeals of Iowa

March 8, 2023

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter Judge.

A defendant appeals her convictions for vehicular homicide leaving the scene of an accident, and eluding; she also challenges the sentencing order. AFFIRMED IN PART REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau (until withdrawal) and Maria Ruhtenberg, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Chicchelly, JJ.

TABOR Presiding Judge.

Ashley Hennings challenges her convictions for vehicular homicide, leaving the scene of an accident, and eluding. She raises three issues: (1) Was she entitled to an alternative jury instruction on causation? (2) Should the district court have granted her a new trial? And (3) did the court violate the one-homicide rule? On the first claim, we find the court adequately instructed the jury on causation. For the second, we find the court properly exercised its discretion in ruling that the weight of the evidence supported the verdicts. But turning to the third claim, we remand for entry of a corrected sentencing order.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

"Brace for impact," Erick Richter told his wife Shirlyna as they watched Hennings's Chrysler minivan barrel through a major intersection, ram a red sedan, and come "flying" toward their car. Two police cars were chasing Hennings after she sped away from a traffic stop initiated by Officer Brian Foster. A second officer, Alberto Marquez, clocked her speed at ninety miles per hour on Des Moines city streets.

After ramming the sedan and hitting the Richters' car, Hennings's van flipped over, smashed into a tree, and came to rest on its side, catching fire. Bystanders pulled Hennings from the smoking wreckage. She then fled on foot. But she didn't get far. Witnesses pointed Officer Chase Lohnes in the direction she had run. And he located her about a block from the crash scene. Seeing her injuries, Lohnes took her to a nearby fire station. From there, an ambulance transported her to the hospital where staff drew her blood. It tested positive for methamphetamine.

Meanwhile, Officer Foster raced to the crash scene-finding Kieran Stirling unconscious and struggling to breath inside his badly damaged red sedan. Foster supported Stirling's neck while waiting for medics. But Stirling never regained consciousness and died later at the hospital.

In a four-count trial information, the State charged Hennings with (1) homicide by vehicle-operating while intoxicated, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (2021), a class "B" felony; (2) homicide by vehicle-reckless driving, in violation of section 707.6A(2)(A), a class "C" felony; (3) leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, in violation of sections 321.261(4) and 321.263, a class "D" felony; and (4) eluding in violation of section 321.279(3)(A)(3) and (4), a class "D" felony. After a three-day trial, a jury found Hennings guilty of all four counts. She now appeals.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

We review the refusal to give a requested jury instruction for the correction of legal error. State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 649 (Iowa 2021). We apply this same standard to review a challenge to a merger decision. State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 2015). By contrast, we review the denial of a new-trial motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Linderman, 958 N.W.2d 211, 218 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). And on a weight-of-the-evidence claim, we limit our review to the district court's exercise of discretion-leaving alone the underlying question whether the scales tipped against the verdicts. Id.

III. Analysis A. Causation Instruction

Up first, Hennings contends that the jury received inadequate instructions on the causation element of homicide by intoxicated operation. She faults the district court for rejecting her proposed instruction-borrowed from State v. Hernandez-Mendoza, No. 18-0083, 2019 WL 1932539, at *5 n.6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 1, 2019). To assess her contention, we look first to the marshalling instruction. The second element required the jury to find that Hennings's act of operating while having methamphetamine in her system caused Stirling's death.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12

As it relates to Count I of the Trial Information, the State must prove the following elements of Vehicular Homicide, by Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated:

1. On or about May 13, 2021, the defendant operated a motor vehicle while having any amount of a controlled substance present in her body, as measured in her blood;

2. The defendant's act of operating a motor vehicle while having any amount of a controlled substance present in her body unintentionally caused the death of Kieran Stirling.

If the State has proven all of these elements, the defendant is guilty as charged in Count I of the Trial Information.

If, however, the State has proven element #1, but failed to prove element #2, the defendant is guilty of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Intoxicated.

if the State has failed to prove element #1, the defendant is not guilty as charged in Count I of the Trial Information.

Another instruction clarified that causation element.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17

The conduct of the defendant is a "cause" of death when the death would not have happened except for the conduct.

But Hennings requested yet another instruction on causation, arguing to the district court that "the instructions need to reflect that there should be and must be a substantial causal connection between impairment and Mr. Stirling's death."^[1]The district court rejected Hennings's request, reasoning that it was "nowhere near a model instruction." And that it was "duplicative" of Instructions No. 12 and 17, which accurately conveyed the causation requirement.

Hennings challenges that rejection. She asserts the jury needed more guidance on causation. She points to its question during deliberations: "On Count 1, do we need to prove the presence of the substance had any impact on her driving ability or influence the likelihood of a crash? Does this matter?"^[2]

But Hennings does not explain how the Hernandez-Mendoza instruction would have answered the jury's question. The first paragraph of that instruction, on factual causation-traditionally called but-for causation-was embodied in Instruction No. 17. See id. at *2; see also State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Iowa 2012) (interpreting section 707.6A(1) as requiring proof of causal connection between specific criminal act-"intoxicated driving"-and victim's death, but not proof of "a specific causal connection between the defendant's intoxication and the victim's death"). The second paragraph, on scope of criminal responsibility- traditionally called proximate cause-applies only if the chain of causation is attenuated. See State v. Tyler, 873 N.W.2d 741, 749 (Iowa 2016), superseded by statute on other grounds. And even then, Tyler did not settle whether "criminal causation might still require more than proof of but-for factual causation." Id. at 750.^[3] So with only a passing mention of our supreme court's civil cases on scope of liability, Hennings's brief does not address how her proposed instruction was proper or necessary on these facts.

Without that advocacy, we are left with the district court's well-supported conclusion that the existing instructions tracked Adams and properly conveyed the concept of causation to the jury. Thus, we find no instructional error.

B. Greater Weight of the Evidence

Hennings next contests the district court's denial of her motion for a new trial on the convictions of homicide by intoxicated operation and leaving the scene of a fatal accident. A new trial is appropriate only when the evidence preponderates heavily against the jury's verdicts. State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 60 (Iowa 2021). That standard allows the district court to make its own credibility determinations. Id. The court must decide whether "a greater amount of credible evidence" suggests the verdicts were a miscarriage of justice. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Iowa 1998). We will consider each challenged verdict in turn.

1. Homicide by Intoxicated Operation

To convict Hennings of this offense, the jury had to find two elements: (1) Hennings operated a motor vehicle while having any amount of a controlled substance in her body. See Iowa Code § 707.6A(1). And (2) her criminal act unintentionally caused the death of Kieran Stirling. See id. § 707.6A(1). Hennings does not dispute that she was operating her van and her blood tested positive for methamphetamine. Rather, she claims the State "produced no evidence that she was under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the accident."

Her claim fails for two reasons. First, the State was not required to prove Hennings was "under the influence of a controlled substance" when she was operating the van. "Iowa's homicide-by-intoxicated-operation statute makes it a crime to unintentionally cause someone's death 'by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, as prohibited by section 321J.2.'" State v Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 2020). "The definition of 'intoxicated' . . . means a person is under the influence of alcohol or drugs (or some combination of them), has a blood alcohol content .08 or greater, or has any amount of a controlled substance present as measured in a blood or urine test." Id. (emphasis added). The State prosecuted Hennings using that third definition of intoxication. See Iowa Code § 321J.2...