State v. Hightower

1

State of Iowa, Appellee, v. Shannon Paige Hightower, Appellant.

No. 22-1920

Supreme Court of Iowa

June 21, 2024

Submitted March 21, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda Fangman, Judge.

Shannon Hightower appeals her guilty plea, her sentence, and the conditions ordered for her appeal bond.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellee.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

May J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman Mansfield, McDonald, and Oxley, JJ., joined. McDermott, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., joined.

May Justice.

Shannon Hightower pleaded guilty to dependent adult abuse and theft in the second degree. On appeal, Hightower contends that there were defects in her guilty plea, her sentencing, and the conditions set for her appeal bond.

As part of her challenge to her guilty plea, Hightower argues that Iowa Code section 814.29 (2021) is unconstitutional. Section 814.29 regulates judicial review of "challenges [to] a guilty plea based on an alleged defect in the plea proceedings." Id. It prohibits courts from vacating a plea "unless the defendant demonstrates that the defendant more likely than not would not have pled guilty if the [alleged] defect had not occurred." Id. Hightower argues that this prohibition violates due process and the separation-of-powers doctrine.

We reject Hightower's challenges to section 814.29. And we conclude that Hightower has not satisfied section 814.29's requirements by demonstrating that she "would not have pled guilty if the [alleged] defect[s] had not occurred." Id. So, although we agree with Hightower that her plea was defective, section 814.29 prohibits us from vacating her plea.

On the other hand, we agree with Hightower that resentencing is required because the district court relied on an improper sentencing factor. And we agree with Hightower that the district court erred by ordering unauthorized forfeiture requirements for Hightower's appeal bond.

In short, we affirm Hightower's conviction, we vacate her sentence, and we reverse the forfeiture requirements. We remand for resentencing and for lawful disbursement of funds paid for Hightower's release during this appeal.

I. Background.

In 2020, the State charged Hightower with dependent adult abuse and theft in the second degree, both class "D" felonies. The minutes of testimony showed that Hightower had power of attorney over J.S., a dependent adult.

According to the minutes, Hightower misused J.S.'s money, opened new credit cards in J.S.'s name, and misused those cards. J.S. claims that Hightower caused losses of more than $16,000.

Initially, Hightower pleaded not guilty. But two years later, in January 2022, Hightower signed and filed a "Written Guilty Plea and Waiver of Rights," referred to here as the "guilty plea." Through the guilty plea, Hightower pleaded guilty as charged to dependent adult abuse and theft in the second degree. The guilty plea said this about the "plea agreement" between the State and Hightower: "State will follow [the presentence investigation report] or recommend suspended sentence, 5 years concurrent, Defendant may apply to transfer probation to different jurisdiction, and this matter includes charges known on all matters related to [J.S.] an[d] restitution to be determined." This explanation of the plea agreement was initialed by both Hightower and an assistant county attorney.

After Hightower filed the guilty plea, the district court entered an order finding Hightower guilty based on her plea. The same order set sentencing and ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report (PSI).

After multiple continuances, a sentencing hearing was held on November 17, 2022. The State argued that the court should follow the PSI's recommendation of a suspended sentence. Hightower's counsel argued for a deferred judgment.

The court sentenced Hightower to concurrent prison terms. The court gave a thorough statement of its reasons for the sentence. Important for this appeal, one of the court's reasons was Hightower's failure to pay restitution prior to sentencing.

After the court pronounced sentence and advised Hightower of her appeal rights, Hightower's attorney asked the court to withhold mittimus, i.e., to postpone ordering Hightower into custody. And Hightower personally addressed the court about this topic. She claimed that she "was under the assumption" that the plea agreement required probation. She claimed that she had no expectation of going into custody. And so, Hightower claimed, she had made no plans for the care of her children. Hightower asked for additional time to make those arrangements.

The court expressed reservations about withholding mittimus. Ultimately, though, the court gave Hightower until 6:00 p.m. the next day to turn herself in.

The next day, November 18, Hightower filed a motion asking the court to order "a stay of the sentence" and to set a hearing to review concerns about her guilty plea. Alternatively, Hightower asked the court to set an appropriate appeal bond.

On November 21, Hightower filed a notice of appeal. Later that day, the court entered an order denying Hightower's request for a hearing about her guilty plea. In the same order, the court set an appeal bond in the amount of $17,000 cash only. The order also said this:

All parties are advised any appeal bond posted, regardless of who posts it, SHALL be used to satisfy victim restitution. The Clerk of Court shall notify any person posting the appeal bond that it will not be returned, but rather will be used for victim restitution.

Later, Hightower filed a separate notice of appeal from the order "setting the appeal bond and eventual forfeiture of the bond for victim restitution." We consolidated the two appeals into this one case, which we retained.

II. Issues Presented.

Hightower's brief presents five substantive issues for our review:

1. Hightower contends that we should reverse her conviction because her guilty plea was defective.

2. Hightower contends that the district court erred in failing to offer Hightower an opportunity to withdraw her plea during the sentencing hearing.

3. Hightower contends that the district court relied on an improper sentencing consideration.

4. Hightower contends that the district court abused its discretion by setting her appeal bond at $17,000 cash only.

5. Hightower contends that the district court erred by ordering forfeiture of her appeal bond to pay victim restitution.

We address each of these issues below. Before reaching these substantive issues, though, we first address our appellate jurisdiction.

III. Appellate Jurisdiction.

The right to appeal is statutory. State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Iowa 2003); see also Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 134 N.W.2d 916, 917 (Iowa 1965). "Unless an appeal" is authorized by statute, "this court is without jurisdiction" to hear the appeal, and we "must dismiss" the appeal. Ontjes v. McNider, 275 N.W. 328, 339 (Iowa 1937); accord State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 149 (Iowa 2021) ("It is our duty to reject an appeal not authorized by statute." (quoting Crowe v. De Soto Consol. Sch. Dist., 66 N.W.2d 859, 860 (Iowa 1954))).

In criminal cases, the statute that authorizes appeals by a defendant is Iowa Code section 814.6(1). It states:

1. Right of appeal is granted the defendant from:

a. A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:

(1) A simple misdemeanor conviction.

(2) An ordinance violation.

(3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class "A" felony or in a case where the defendant establishes good cause.

Id.

Subsection 814.6(1)(a)(3) sets a general rule that there is no right of appeal from "[a] conviction where the defendant has pled guilty." Id. § 814.6(1)(a)(3). It also specifies two exceptions: one for "a guilty plea for a class 'A' felony" and another for "a case where the defendant establishes good cause." Id. If either exception applies, the defendant has a right to appeal.

Because Hightower's case does not involve a "class 'A' felony," the first exception cannot apply. Id. So Hightower must rely on the second exception, which requires a showing of "good cause." Id. We have held that "good cause" exists when a defendant challenges "a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to." State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020)). And Hightower's appeal includes a challenge to her prison sentence. That prison sentence was neither mandatory nor agreed upon. So good cause exists. See id. And we have jurisdiction to decide all substantive issues raised by Hightower's appeal. State v. Rutherford, 997 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Iowa 2023) ("Once good cause is established . . . as to one issue, we have jurisdiction over the entire appeal ...."); Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66 ("An appellate court either has jurisdiction over a criminal appeal or it does not."). We proceed to those substantive issues now.

IV. Substantive Issues.

A. The Guilty Plea.

Hightower's central argument is her attack on her plea of guilty. As noted, Hightower offered her plea through a written request to plead guilty ("guilty plea" or "plea"). Hightower argues that the guilty plea contains numerous errors and ambiguities. And so, Hightower argues, we should vacate the plea and remand for trial.

But as Hightower acknowledges, there are additional hurdles that she would need to pass before we could vacate her plea. First Hightower acknowledges the general rule that we do not even...