State v. Hill

171 Ohio St.3d 524

218 N.E.3d 891

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.HILL, Appellant.

No. 2021-0913

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted May 11, 2022

Decided December 20, 2022

Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lisa A. Nemes and Vicki L. DeSantis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, Youngstown, for appellant.

VanHo Law and Adam M. VanHo, urging reversal for amicus curiae, VanHo Law.

Fischer, J.{¶ 1} This appeal requires us to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to permit the defendant to enter a plea of no contest on the ground that it did not believe there were any legitimate issues to raise on appeal. In making its decision, the trial court replaced appellate review with its own review and substituted its judgment for that of the court of appeals. Because the Fifth District Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant's request to enter a plea of no contest, we reverse.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

{¶ 2} Appellant, Davis Hill, was indicted in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas on five drug-related counts, with a major-drug-offender specification attached to four of those counts, and two counts of having a weapon while under a disability.

Hill pled not guilty to all charges and filed two motions to suppress evidence. The trial court denied both motions.

{¶ 3} At one of the suppression hearings, the trial court requested that appellee, the state of Ohio, place its sentencing recommendation on the record. The state recommended a minimum sentence of 16 years in prison and a maximum sentence of 21 and a half years. The trial court then asked Hill's counsel if she had informed Hill of the state's recommended sentence. Hill's counsel said that she had and that she had discussed the possibility of a no-contest plea with Hill and the state. Hill's counsel also indicated that the state had strongly opposed such a plea. The state confirmed that it did "heavily object" to a no-contest plea, and the trial court stated, "Yes. I think we all had a discussion regarding that."

{¶ 4} The next day, the trial court held a hearing "to clear up some confusion or misunderstanding regarding the offer that [was] being proposed and the options available to [Hill] at [that] time." It then indicated that it would not permit Hill to enter a no-contest plea:

So it is the Court's practice to basically take pleas for people who are willing to plead guilty. There are rare circumstances when the Court will take a no-contest plea when I believe there is a legitimate—and issues to be raised upon appeal.

In this particular case I feel very confident in the Court's rulings on the various motions to suppress and issues that have been raised prior to trial in this matter, and for that reason I would not be inclined to accept a no-contest plea in this particular case. Certainly you have every right, your constitutional rights to try this case, to preserve these issues for appeal, and I am prepared to go forward with your trial commencing next Wednesday.

* * *

* * * I just wanted to make sure you understood that that's the way we do things. If everybody was allowed to plead no contest and appeal their cases ad infinitum, we'd never get any work done. And I, I have on a rare occasion permitted a no-contest plea if there was a legitimate legal issue that * * * remained in flux or [was] undecided in the State of Ohio, but in this particular case I see none of that.

This, this case was handled, in the Court's view, very appropriately by law enforcement. I know that you're facing a big number here, but the crimes you committed carry, you know, serious consequences, and I don't know what to tell you. There's nothing I can do about that.

On the day his trial was to begin, Hill entered a guilty plea to each of the counts and specifications in the indictment, and the trial court imposed the sentence recommended by the state.

{¶ 5} On appeal to the Fifth District, Hill argued that the trial court abused its discretion by following a blanket policy of refusing to allow defendants to plead no contest contrary to this court's decision in State v. Beasley , 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474. In Beasley , we held that the trial court's blanket policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas was an arbitrary policy that amounted to an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 13, 17. The Fifth District distinguished Beasley , concluding that the trial court in this case did not have a blanket policy of refusing to accept no-contest pleas in all cases. According to the appellate court, the trial court "made clear that it does permit no contest pleas in certain circumstances, such as when a legitimate legal issue remains in flux." 2020-Ohio-1946, ¶ 25. It also noted that the trial court had "looked at the facts and circumstances of the case at bar" and simply determined that it would not accept a no-contest plea. Id. Therefore, the Fifth District determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Hill to plead no contest. Id. at ¶ 26.

{¶ 6} Hill sought review by this court. We agreed to consider a single proposition of law: "If the Trial Court abused its discretion in not allowing a Defendant to enter a plea of no contest, then reversal is appropriate. Here, where the Trial Court refused to allow Defendant to enter a plea of no contest, arbitrarily, reversal is appropriate." See 164 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2021-Ohio-3336, 173 N.E.3d 1237.

II. Guilty Pleas Versus No-Contest Pleas

{¶ 7} A no-contest plea differs from a guilty plea in two ways. First, with a no-contest plea, the defendant preserves the ability to raise more issues on appeal than by entering a guilty plea. "A valid guilty plea by a counseled defendant * * * generally waives the right to appeal all prior nonjurisdictional defects including the denial of a motion to suppress." Beasley at ¶ 15. A no-contest plea, on the other hand, "does not preclude a defendant from asserting upon appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in ruling on a pretrial motion, including a pretrial motion to suppress evidence." Crim.R. 12(I) ; see also Beasley at ¶ 15.

{¶ 8} Second, a no-contest plea avoids the possibility that a guilty plea will be used against the defendant in a future civil suit. A guilty plea is "a complete admission of the defendant's guilt," Crim.R. 11(B)(1), so the plea may be admissible evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding against the defendant. See, e.g. , State v. C.A. , 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 14AP-738 and 14AP-746, 2015-Ohio-3437, 2015 WL 5011700, ¶ 17 ; Evid.R. 803(22). A no-contest plea, by contrast, "is not an admission of defendant's guilt, but is an admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or complaint, and the plea or admission shall not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding." Crim.R. 11(B)(2) ; see also Evid.R. 410(A)(2).

III. Standard of Review

{¶ 9} A plea of no contest may be made only "with the consent of the court," Crim.R. 11(A), and "[i]n felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest," Crim.R. 11(C)(2). Therefore, a trial court's decision whether to permit a defendant to plead no contest is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Jenkins , 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 223, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984). "We have defined an abuse of discretion as conduct that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Beasley , 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, at ¶ 12, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore , 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). A decision is arbitrary if it is made " ‘without consideration of or regard for facts [or] circumstances.’ " (Brackets added in Beasley .) Id. , quoting Black's Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). A decision may also be arbitrary if it is " ‘ "[w]ithout [an] adequate determining principle; * * * not governed by any fixed rules or standard." ’ " (Brackets added; ellipsis added in McGee .) Id. , quoting Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v. McGee , 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 359, 423 N.E.2d 1095 (1981), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 96 (5th Ed.1979).

{¶ 10} Amicus curiae, VanHo Law, urges this court to reconsider the abuse-of-discretion standard in this context, arguing that it leads to negative consequences for the administration of justice. Given this, VanHo Law contends that whenever a defendant seeks to preserve a suppression or statutory issue for appeal, the defendant's "right" to enter a no-contest plea should be "presumed" and consent to enter such a plea should be "freely and liberally granted," similar to the law on motions to withdraw a guilty plea made before trial. See State v. Xie , 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).

{¶ 11} We do not accept the analogy to a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea argued by VanHo Law. Crim.R. 32.1 is silent about the standard by which a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be judged. See Xie at 526, 584 N.E.2d 715. But Crim.R. 11(A) expressly provides that no-contest pleas are permitted only "with the consent of the court," unlike pleas of guilty or not guilty, which do not require the trial court's consent. A presumption that a trial court's consent should be freely and liberally granted to a defendant who seeks to plead no contest would render the consent requirement in Crim.R. 11(A) meaningless.

{¶ 12} In the alternative, VanHo Law contends that we should adopt a standard similar to the one used in federal courts, which provides: "Before accepting a plea of nolo contendere, the court must consider the parties’ views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice," Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(3). However, accepting this standard would require modifying the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we cannot do by way of a decision on appeal. Moreover, even under VanHo Law's proposed standard, the...