State v. Hines

165 Conn.App. 1

138 A.3d 994

STATE of Connecticut

v.Craig HINES.

No. 38002.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 2, 2015.

Decided April 26, 2016.

Katherine C. Essington, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and John P. Doyle, Jr., senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

GRUENDEL, MULLINS and MIHALAKOS, Js.^*

MULLINS, J.

The defendant, Craig Hines, was convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a–54a (a) and one count of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29–35(a). On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred (1) in finding that he had been restored to competency to stand trial and (2) in removing him from the courtroom during jury selection. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The defendant's first claim is that the court abused its discretion when it found at the second of two competency hearings that he had been restored to competency to stand trial. He raises three principal issues with the court's competency determination. First, he argues that the determination was unreasonable because he had not received “treatment” after he initially had been found incompetent by a prior judge. Second, he argues that the court “should have made a further inquiry and/or asked for a third expert opinion regarding [his] competency.” Third, he argues that the court “appeared to” have based its determination exclusively on the competency report prepared during his placement for inpatient treatment for the purpose of restoring him to competency. We disagree.

The following history of the proceedings illuminates our consideration of this claim. On September 27, 2013, defense counsel moved pursuant to General Statutes § 54–56d¹ for a competency evaluation because the defendant recently had been evaluated by Allison Downer, the head psychiatrist at the Department of Correction, who had prescribed the defendant an anti-psychotic drug to lessen his preoccupation with physical complaints resulting from a bat bite he allegedly suffered while in federal custody.² Defense counsel expressed concern that this preoccupation would impair the defendant's competency to stand trial. The court, Vitale, J., ordered that the defendant undergo a competency evaluation.

Pursuant to the court's order, John Bonetti, a psychiatrist, conducted a competency evaluation of the defendant, a report of which he prepared on October 4, 2013. Bonetti reported that during the evaluation the defendant complained of various pains and a chronic cough, which he attributed to the alleged bat bite and for which he claimed he had not received proper medical care; the defendant's fixation on his medical complaints prevented him from focusing on the interview. Bonetti reported that his review of the defendant's medical records, however, revealed no evidence of these conditions.

While preparing the report, Bonetti spoke to Downer, who confirmed the defendant's fixation on the conditions caused by the alleged bat bite and described the defendant as “ ‘delusional at baseline.’ ” Likewise, Bonetti noted that the defendant's “delusional thinking interfered with his ability to answer questions as it permeated the entire interview.” Bonetti concluded that the defendant was not competent to stand trial but that there was a substantial probability that he could be restored to competency by a sixty day inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.

Thereafter, on October 9, 2013, the court, O'Keefe, J., held a competency hearing at which Bonetti testified. Bonetti testified that the defendant's psychiatric records, in which “it was pretty consistently stated that he carries a psychotic diagnosis, either schizophrenia or a delusional disorder,” were significant to his conclusion that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. On the basis of Bonetti's report and testimony, the court found that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial but that there was a substantial probability that he could be restored to competency within sixty days, and the court ordered that he receive inpatient treatment at Connecticut Valley Hospital, Whiting Forensic Division (Whiting) for the purpose of restoring him to competency.

At Whiting, Susan McKinley, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted a second competency evaluation and prepared a report of that evaluation dated December 4, 2013. The second competency report disclosed the following. Neither a physical examination, which was performed on the defendant upon admission, nor blood tests revealed any medical problems that required additional testing or intervention. Nevertheless, the defendant reported that he was in a great deal of pain and complained of a sore throat, difficulty swallowing, “ ‘tissue decay,’ ” spinal pain, and problems with his esophagus, spleen, and pancreas. The defendant alternately attributed these complaints to the bat bite and to his food allegedly having been tampered with.

The report also disclosed that the defendant generally refused to attend therapeutic and competency education group meetings at Whiting, consistently maintaining that he was competent to stand trial and that his problems were exclusively physical. At meal times, he was observed eating with enjoyment and without difficulty. In his free time, he played games, socialized with other patients, and engaged in long telephone conversations with family and friends. He also lifted weights and engaged in vigorous exercise.

In conducting the second competency evaluation, evaluators³ began conducting psychological testing of the defendant but stopped before completion because of his “performance and invalid response style.” Specifically, they noted that his performance on tests was inconsistent, and he “endorsed a high proportion of unusual symptoms that are not seen in patients with genuine psychiatric illnesses,” both of which suggested to evaluators that he may intentionally have been performing poorly. Evaluators diagnosed the defendant with malingering and antisocial personality disorder.

Although the defendant previously had been diagnosed as psychotic, in the second competency report evaluators attributed his behavior to his personality and concluded that there was no indication of a psychiatric disorder, mood disturbance, or cognitive limitation that would prevent him from understanding or emotionally withstanding future court proceedings. They deemed the defendant “capable of engaging in rational, appropriate, and focused discussions when he chooses to do so,” and characterized his behavior as “a willful, deliberate effort to portray himself as seriously ill in an effort to thwart the judicial system.” Accordingly, evaluators recommended that the court find the defendant competent to stand trial.

On December 10, 2013, the court, Clifford, J., held a hearing to determine whether the defendant had been restored to competency. McKinley, who was the only witness at the hearing, testified regarding the procedure that staff followed during the defendant's placement at Whiting. She testified that “[we] evaluated any issues that we thought were pertinent, we're interested in providing any interventions that may be necessary, medical, psychiatric or otherwise, and so on a day-to-day basis we evaluate[d] [his] needs....” As noted in the report, McKinley testified that “[the defendant] tended to avoid the competency education groups and some of the therapeutic groups that were offered, but he was also able to participate in a variety of other activities of his choosing. We certainly can't make anyone do anything that they're interested in declining....”

With regard to the process by which evaluators determined that the defendant had been restored to competency, McKinley acknowledged that the defendant had refused to cooperate with attempts to ask him standardized questions for determining competency, as a result of which the finding of competency was based on “observations on a day-to-day basis with the individual, interactions with [the defendant], information from staff on all shifts, and we completed—or attempted to complete—some psychological testing as well.” According to McKinley, evaluators accepted the validity of the defendant's prior diagnoses with paranoid schizophrenia, which, she acknowledged, is a permanent illness. On the basis of their own observations and evaluation, however, evaluators unanimously rejected schizophrenia as a diagnosis of the defendant's current condition.⁴

On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked McKinley to comment on the defendant's current behavior in the courtroom. The prosecutor asked, “would you agree with me that the moment I got up to start asking you questions [the defendant] started coughing; is that correct?” McKinley replied, “I heard him clearing his throat. Yes.”⁵ McKinley also testified that the defendant's coughing in the courtroom “[was] out of the ordinary from what [she had] known,” and “[i]n general at Whiting [the defendant] appeared to be in excellent health and we saw no indication that he was suffering from any illness.”

At the conclusion of McKinley's testimony, the court invited counsel to present arguments. Defense counsel commented that “[i]t's unique I think to find so many schizophrenic diagnoses, which are permanent and not transient, and then to not have that at all,” but did not argue that the defendant was incompetent, leaving that determination to the court's discretion. The prosecutor, in arguing that the defendant had been restored to competency, emphasized that “there was not one throat clear, not one nose blow, not one cough up until the point that the state got up and started asking [McKinley] questions ... and it kind of got stronger and louder as we got toward the end.”

The court concluded that the defendant had been restored to competency.⁶ The court...