State v. Hoffman

326 So.3d 232

STATE of Louisiana

v.Jessie D. HOFFMAN, Jr.

No. 2020-OK-00137

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

October 19, 2021

Writ application denied. See per curiam.

PER CURIAM:

Writ denied. In 1998, a St. Tammany Parish jury found Jessie D. Hoffman guilty of the first degree murder of Mary "Molly" Elliot. After finding Hoffman guilty as charged, jurors unanimously agreed to impose a sentence of death, in light of the aggravating circumstances that Hoffman was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery, and aggravated rape; and the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. This Court affirmed. State v. Hoffman , 98-3118 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, cert. denied , Hoffman v. Louisiana, 531 U.S. 946, 121 S.Ct. 345, 148 L.Ed.2d 277 (2000).

The evidence presented at trial showed that on November 27, 1996, while working as a valet at the Sheraton in downtown New Orleans, eighteen-year-old Hoffman kidnapped Ms. Elliot at gunpoint as she was leaving work. The two drove in her car to a bank in New Orleans East where she withdrew cash from an ATM and gave it to Hoffman. Next, they drove to a boat launch on the Middle Pearl River in St. Tammany Parish. There he raped her and fatally shot her once in the head and drove away. A hunter discovered the victim's body on a makeshift dock located near the boat launch the next day. Hoffman confessed to the kidnapping, rape, and murder.

At trial, defense counsel conceded guilt of second degree murder and argued that Hoffman was not guilty of first degree murder because the killing was not intentional. The defense theory was that, consistent with his confession, Hoffman intended to leave the victim alive at the boat launch and drive away, but he accidentally shot her during a struggle over the gun. On the other hand, the State argued that the crime was premeditated and the shooting was intentional. Specifically, the State furthered a "death march" theory: that Hoffman forced the victim at gunpoint to walk naked away from the boat launch area through a debris-covered path to the dock where he shot her execution-style. Ultimately, the jury rejected the defense's theory that Hoffman shot the victim unintentionally and convicted him of first-degree murder.

After his conviction and sentence became final, post-conviction proceedings were initiated in 2001. In his first post-conviction application, Hoffman raised twenty-four claims for relief alleging: racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson, violations of Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), racial bias during jury deliberations, ineffective assistance of counsel, right to fair trial violated by restriction of voir dire, due process rights violation for failure to record bench conferences, constitutional violations during the jury's visit to the crime scene, interference with Sixth Amendment right to counsel, death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because Hoffman is mentally ill, violations of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), juror misconduct, erroneous jury instructions, jury incorrectly considered youth as an aggravating factor, violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), selection of trial venue tainted by racism, violation of Ring v. Arizona , 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), denial of a fair clemency process, lethal injection violates the Eighth Amendment, Eighth Amendment bars execution of incompetent individuals under Ford v. Wainwright , 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), violations of international law, jury failed to consider all mitigating evidence, cumulative error, and violation of Napue v. Illinois , 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Following the hearing, the district court concluded that Hoffman failed to meet his burden of proof under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), having found that trial counsels’ representation was "competent and reasonable." In 2007, the district court summarily dismissed the remaining claims. This Court denied Hoffman's writ application. State v. Hoffman , 07-1913 (La. 12/12/08), 997 So.2d 554. The federal district court denied Hoffman's subsequent habeas application and granted a certificate of appealability. Hoffman v. Cain , CIV.A. 09-3041, 2012 WL 1088832 (E.D. La. 3/30/12). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Hoffman v. Cain , 752 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2014).

On February 22, 2019, Hoffman filed a second application for post-conviction relief, raising seven claims for relief. He asserted the claims were not barred as repetitive pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 because they were "new or different" from previously-raised claims and could not have been included in his appeal or first post-conviction application because they were based upon new law, new science, and/or new facts.

First, Hoffman alleged that racial bias during jury deliberations requires reversal of his death sentence pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado , 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 855, 197 L.Ed.2d 107 (2017). Second, Hoffman argued his death sentence is excessive and violates the Eight Amendment in light of his history of chronic childhood trauma. Third, Hoffman asserted his death sentence is excessive and violates the Eighth Amendment in light of his age at the time of the offense. Fourth, he argued his execution would be cruel due to the length of time he has lived on death row. Fifth, he argued his death sentence is arbitrary and capricious because it was imposed pursuant to Louisiana's capital sentencing scheme, which, he alleges, fails to sufficiently narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty. Sixth, he asserted that the death penalty is unconstitutional in light of a purported national consensus against the practice. Finally, in his seventh claim, Hoffman contended that new evidence establishes that the prosecution withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and elicited misleading testimony in violation of Napue , 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173.

On September 20, 2019, the district court summarily dismissed the application finding each claim was previously litigated, or meritless, or both. We have reviewed Hoffman's arguments and the State's opposition and find no reason to disturb the district court's ruling.

First, Hoffman fails to show the district court erred in summarily denying his application. In addition, as discussed below, we find any procedural error by the district court harmless because Hoffman's claims were nonetheless meritless.

Second, regarding the district court's denial of the racially biased jury claim, Hoffman asserts that the effect of Pena-Rodriguez , 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 855, was to transform previously inadmissible evidence—statements made by jurors during deliberations—into admissible evidence in instances where "there is an indication that racial bias or stereotype may have been considered by the jury." He also alleges that in Buck v. Davis , 580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 759, 197 L.Ed.2d 1 (2017), the Supreme Court held that any race-based considerations in the penalty phase of a capital case requires reversal. Hoffman argues that the decisions in Pena-Rodriguez and Buck rendered the instant racially biased jury claim different—within the meaning of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 —than the claim in his first post-conviction application.

In Pena-Rodriguez , the United States Supreme Court addressed "whether the Constitution requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule when a juror's statements indicate that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in his or her finding of guilt." 137 S.Ct. at 867. The "no-impeachment rule" developed from a centuries-old principle that once a jury's verdict has been entered, "it will not later be called into question based on the comments or conclusions they expressed during deliberations." Id. , 137 S.Ct. at 861. Many states have codified this principle as an evidentiary rule.¹ In Pena-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held

that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror's statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee.

Id ., 137 S.Ct. at 869. The Supreme Court warned that "[n]ot every offhand comment indicating racial bias or hostility will justify setting aside the no-impeachment bar to allow further judicial inquiry." Id . Rather, for a case to warrant further inquiry,

there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to convict.

Id . The Supreme Court did not address what procedure a trial court must follow when confronted with an allegation of juror bias nor did it "decide the appropriate standard for determining when evidence of racial bias is sufficient to require that the verdict be set aside." Id ., 137 S.Ct. at 870.

In Buck , a death-sentenced prisoner raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to his lawyer's decision to call an expert witness whose report reflected that because the defendant was Black, he was disproportionately predisposed to violent conduct. 137 S.Ct. at 775. The Supreme Court found that since future dangerousness was a key point to be decided by the jury during...