State v. Holt

STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER DANIEL HOLT, JR., Appellant.

No. 53122-4-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

July 20, 2021

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Worswick, J.

Christopher Holt, Jr., who was a juvenile when he committed his crime pleaded guilty in adult court to one count of second-degree murder in December, 2008. Holt agreed to be sentenced to 216 months confinement as part of a plea agreement. The trial court followed the jointly-agreed sentencing recommendation and sentenced him to 216 months. Nine years later, following our Supreme Court's decision in Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) which requires adult courts to consider qualities of youth at sentencing when the defendant committed the crime as a juvenile, Holt filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment. The trial court denied Holt's motion instead of transferring to this court as a personal restraint petition (PRP).

Holt now appeals the trial court's denial of this motion arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to conduct a resentencing hearing and allow him to present witness testimony regarding his youthfulness. The State argues that Holt's CrR 7.8 motion was untimely, because the rule announced in Houston-Sconiers is not material to Holt's case. After the parties submitted their briefs, our Supreme Court decided State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).^[1] Holt now additionally argues that he must be resentenced because a conviction on his criminal history is now void under Blake.

We hold that the trial court erred by not transferring Holt's case to this court as a PRP, and we convert this matter for consideration as a PRP. We further hold that under Holt's Houston-Sconiers argument, he is not entitled to a resentencing hearing that includes witness testimony advocating for a lesser sentence than he agreed to absent a showing that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been properly informed of his rights. However, Holt is entitled to be resentenced with a correct offender score under Blake. We grant Holt's PRP and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

I. Crime and Plea Agreement

In March, 2008, the State charged Holt with two counts of first- and second-degree felony murder for his role as an accomplice in an invasion-style armed robbery that resulted in a homicide. Both counts included firearm sentencing enhancements. Holt was 17 years old at the time of the crimes. His offender score at the time was 1. Under the original charges, Holt faced a sentencing range of 250 to 333 months plus 60 months for the firearm enhancement, for a total of 310 to 393 months.

Holt and the State negotiated a plea agreement to amend his charges to one count of second-degree murder without a firearm sentencing enhancement. The standard range for the amended charges, was 134 to 234 months. Holt agreed to a specific sentencing recommendation of 216 months as part of the plea agreement. In December 2008, Holt pleaded guilty to the amended charge in accordance with his plea agreement. The trial court accepted Holt's plea and sentenced him to the agreed-upon 216 months confinement.

II. Postconviction Procedure

In 2017, our Supreme Court decided State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), which requires adult courts to consider qualities of youth at sentencing when the defendant committed the crime as a juvenile. Later that year, Holt filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment and for resentencing, arguing that Houston-Sconiers was a significant change in the law that was material to his case and applied retroactively, and was thus not time barred under RCW 10.73.100(6). Although Holt cited only CrR 7.8 generally, he quoted CrR 7.8(b)(5), stating, "CrR 7.8 permits this Court to vacate Holt's judgment for any 'reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.'" Clerk's Papers (CP) 46. Holt asked the trial court to schedule a show cause hearing under CrR 7.8(c)(3) and State v. Robinson, 193 Wn.App. 215, 218, 374 P.3d 175 (2016).

In July, 2018, the trial court denied Holt's motion, and on July 3 ordered that the petition be transferred to us as a personal restraint petition (PRP). Because this order did not comply with CrR 7.8, we rejected the trial court's transfer order and remanded the case for further action explaining that "[t]he superior court cannot deny a CrR 7.8 and transfer that motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition under CrR 7.8(c)(2)." CP 72-73. We instructed the trial court that if it "intended to transfer the motion to this court under CrR 7.8(c)(2), it must vacate the July 3, 2018 order and issue a proper transfer order that includes the findings required under State v. Smith, 144 Wn.App. 860 (2008), and CrR 7.8(c)(2)." CP 72.

In October, 2018, the State filed a motion asking the trial court to follow our remand instructions, vacate its July 3 order, and transfer the case to us as a PRP. But instead, the trial court entered a scheduling order setting the matter for "re-sentencing." The parties filed pleadings arguing for and against a change in sentence at the anticipated sentencing hearing.

In January, 2019, the trial court held a hearing. At the hearing, the trial court informed the parties that the hearing was actually a "show cause to determine whether resentencing should be scheduled." 2 Verbatim Tr. of Proceedings at 3. Holt argued that he was entitled to be resentenced, but specifically stated that he was not requesting a lesser sentence, and was again recommending he be sentenced to 216 months. However, he sought a resentencing hearing in which he could present evidence regarding his youthfulness. The trial court refused to set a resentencing hearing, ruling that Holt's presentment of evidence would breach the plea agreement and was prohibited by State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 947 P.2d 1199 (1997).^[2]

The trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, but nonetheless entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on the merits of Holt's argument. The trial court made no determinations under CrR 7.8(c)(2) as to whether Holt's motion was barred by RCW 10.73.090 or whether Holt had made a substantial showing that he was entitled to relief.^[3]

Holt appealed the trial court's order denying his CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment. Subsequent to the parties filing their briefs, our Supreme Court decided two cases discussing retroactivity and materiality of the Houston-Sconiers' rule.^[4] At our request, the parties submitted supplemental briefs.

After the supplemental briefs were filed, our Supreme Court decided State v. Blake. 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). Holt then filed a second supplemental brief, arguing that he is entitled to be resentenced in light of Blake. Second Supp. Br. of Appellant at 5. Holt argues his criminal history stipulated to as part of his plea contained two convictions for unlawful possession of a controlled substance that added two one-half points to his offender score, and thus, his case must be remanded for resentencing with an offender score of zero. Second Supp. Br. of Appellant at 1. The State concedes that Holt's prior drug possession conviction must be vacated and that Holt must be resentenced with a correct offender score. Resp. to Appellant's Second Supp. Br. at 3.

ANALYSIS

I. CrR 7.8 Motion Converted to Personal Restraint Petition

A CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment is a collateral attack subject to statutory time limitations. RCW 10.73.090(1), (2). A CrR 7.8 motion must be brought within one year of judgment becoming final unless one of the exceptions specified in RCW 10.73.100 applies. One such exception is that there has been a significant, retroactive change in the law that is material to the conviction. RCW 10.73.100(6).

A trial court does not have authority to rule on a CrR 7.8 motion in all circumstances. CrR 7.8(c)(2) provides: substantial showing that he or she is entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require

The court shall transfer a motion filed by a defendant to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a personal restraint petition unless the court determines that the motion is not barred by RCW 10.73.090 and either (i) the defendant has made a substantial showing that he or she is entitled to relief or (ii) resolution of the motion will require a factual hearing.

CrR 7.8(c)(2). (Emphasis added).

The trial court here did not transfer this case to us. Nor did it determine that the motion was timely filed, that Holt made a substantial showing that he was entitled either to relief or that the motion could not be resolved without a factual hearing. Instead, the trial court again denied Holt's motion.

This court has the authority to convert this appeal to a PRP although it recognizes that such a conversion may infringe on a defendant's right to choose whether he wanted to pursue a PRP. State v. Smith, 144 Wn.App. 860, 864, 184 P.3d 666 (2008). Indeed, this court previously declined to convert Holt's prior appeal to a PRP for just such a reason.

In the interest of judicial economy, we now convert this case to a PRP, and consider Holt's arguments under the applicable standards of review. To be entitled to relief under this standard, Holt must demonstrate constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice and that there are no other adequate remedies available. RAP 16.4; Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 266.

A collateral attack on a sentence must not be "filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction." RCW 10.73.090(1). A...