State v. Howland

1

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TREVER JOE HOWLAND, Defendant-Appellant

No. 22-0519

Court of Appeals of Iowa

May 24, 2023

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Christopher C Polking (motion for in camera review) and Jennifer Miller (motion in limine and trial), Judges.

Trever Howland appeals his convictions for sexual abuse in the second degree. AFFIRMED.

Angela Campbell of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Heard by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Blane, S.J. ^[*]

AHLERS, PRESIDING JUDGE.

The State charged Trever Howland with multiple counts of sexual abuse in the second degree^[1] based on allegations that he performed sex acts on his former girlfriend's daughter when the daughter was around five years old. A jury found Howland guilty of three counts. The district court sentenced Howland to a prison term not to exceed twenty-five years for each count, with the terms to be served concurrently. Howland appeals his convictions. He raises multiple issues, which we will address separately with additional facts provided as needed.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence^[2]

Howland contends there was not sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Sufficiency-of-evidence claims are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). Jury verdicts bind us if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince a rational factfinder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In assessing whether evidence is substantial, "we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including all 'legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)).

Howland argues that the evidence is insufficient because it is based entirely on the child's testimony. He contends the child's testimony is insufficient to support the convictions because her testimony was not corroborated, her story changed, and her testimony is unbelievable because she testified years later to events that happened when she was as young as three years old.

We make quick work of Howland's lack-of-corroboration argument. Stated simply, corroboration of a victim's testimony is not required. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3) ("Corroboration of the testimony of victims shall not be required."); State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Iowa 1998) (stating that "the alleged victim's testimony is by itself sufficient to constitute substantial evidence of defendant's guilt," and observing that "[t]his court has held that a rape victim's accusation need not be corroborated by physical evidence"). So Howland's claim of error based on lack of corroboration fails.

Howland's arguments based on claimed changes in the child's story and the quality of her memory from years before are credibility arguments properly made to the jury. The jury rejected them by returning a guilty verdict. Howland urges us to accept them on appeal. But doing so would be "inconsistent with the standard of appellate review of jury verdicts, which requires that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict and which requires deference to the jury's resolution of disputed factual issues." State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Iowa 2022). When evaluating sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we do not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass upon the credibility of witnesses, determine the plausibility of explanations, or weigh the evidence, as such matters are for the factfinder to determine. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Iowa 2006).

Sticking to our obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and not weigh the evidence, we find the evidence sufficient to convince a rational factfinder that Howland is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 202. Therefore, we reject Howland's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

II. Access to Privileged Records

Prior to trial, Howland filed a motion requesting an in camera review by the court of the child's therapy records. The district court denied the motion. Howland asserts the court erred in denying the motion. As there is no constitutional challenge to this discovery ruling, we review it for abuse of discretion. See State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 476 (Iowa 2013).

In deciding whether the court abused its discretion by not conducting an in camera review of the child's therapy records, we look to Iowa Code section 622.10 (2021). "Iowa Code section 622.10 generally prevents a mental health professional from disclosing 'any confidential communication properly entrusted to the person in the person's professional capacity' associated with the patient's treatment." State v. Retterath, 974 N.W.2d 93, 98 (Iowa 2022) (quoting Iowa Code § 622.10(1)). There are two exceptions to this general rule: (1) if the holder of the privilege waives privilege or (2) if the records are "likely to contain exculpatory information that is not available from any other source and for which there is a compelling need for the defendant to present a defense in the case."

Iowa Code § 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a). "If the defendant satisfies the threshold showing for the second exception, the district court must review the records 'in camera' (privately, without the parties present) to determine whether the records contain exculpatory information." Retterath, 974 N.W.2d at 99. The child did not waive privilege in this case, so the only exception in play is the second.

Howland asserts that he met the threshold showing needed to trigger the district court's obligation to review the child's therapy records. He bases this assertion on his theory of defense, which was to undermine the child's credibility by showing (1) Howland was not the only paramour of the child's mother during the time Howland is alleged to have committed the sexual abuse; (2) the child appeared to have suffered trauma as a result of her mother's mental-health issues, instability, and inability to parent the child; and (3) the child has a propensity for confusion or untruthfulness.

Howland fails to establish any meaningful nexus between his defense theories and the child's therapy records. See Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 490 (finding the defendant failed to make the necessary showing to gain access to the alleged victim's records because he offered "no evidence showing a nexus between the issues at trial and the mental health treatment received by [the alleged victim]"). We address each of his defense theories in turn.

As to his first claim that the mother had other suitors, there is no evidence suggesting the child knew of any other suitors or confused them as being her abuser rather than Howland. With this lack of evidence, there is no reasonable probability that the child's therapy records would contain exculpatory information. See Iowa Code § 622.10(4)(a)(2)(a) (requiring a defendant to demonstrate "a reasonable probability that the information sought is likely to contain exculpatory information"). Further, to the extent Howland is simply seeking information as to the identity of other men, he has failed to demonstrate that such information is not available from any other source. See id. (requiring a showing that the information sought in the otherwise confidential records "is not available from any other source").

As to his second claim that the child suffered trauma as a result of her mother's issues, there is little question that the mother had dysfunction in her life, which may have negatively impacted the child. However, we fail to see how the mother's dysfunction and any resulting harm to the child leads to the reasonable probability that the child's therapy records would show Howland did not sexually abuse the child. Without a showing of such reasonable probability, Howland was not entitled to a review of the records. See id. We also note that, if this claim was enough to meet the threshold necessary to trigger an in camera inspection, it would effectively eliminate the protections provided by section 622.10(4) because all that would be needed to trigger the review would be proof that the person has undergone therapy. We decline to interpret the section so broadly as to negate its purpose of protecting the confidentiality of records. See State v. Leedom, 938 N.W.2d 177, 189 (Iowa 2020) ("We reiterate the 'importance of maintaining confidentiality in mental health treatment.'" (quoting State v. Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421, 441 (Iowa 2014))); Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 481 (finding the legislature's purpose in adopting section 622.10(4) was to "restore[] protection for the confidentiality of counseling records while also protecting the due process rights of defendants").

As to Howland's third claim that the child has a propensity for confusion or untruthfulness, there is simply no evidence supporting this claim, let alone evidence that demonstrates a reasonable probability that proof of such propensity would be found in the child's counseling records. The lack of evidence supporting Howland's claim lies in sharp contrast to the evidence in another case in which our supreme court found evidence sufficient to trigger an in camera review. In Leedom, the defendant was accused of sexually abusing his granddaughter. 938 N.W.2d at 181. The granddaughter's parents were fighting for custody over her, and the granddaughter admitted having lied about the details of her father's vehicle accident in an effort to secure her preferred placement with her father. Id. at 187....