State v. Huber

877 N.W.2d 519

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Timothy John HUBER, Appellant.

No. A13–1928.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 6, 2016.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, James B. Early, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, MN; and Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, MN, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, and Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

Appellant Timothy John Huber (Huber) was found guilty by a Kandiyohi County jury of intentionally aiding another in the commission of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder arising out of the death of Timothy Larson on October 8, 2011. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed, concluding that the accomplice-liability instructions given to the jury were plainly erroneous, but that the error did not affect Huber's substantial rights. We reverse and remand for a new trial on the ground that the accomplice-liability jury instructions were plainly erroneous and affected Huber's substantial rights, and that a new trial is required to protect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.

This case is the product of a long-standing animosity between Huber and Timothy Larson (Larson). Larson and his father, N.L., owned adjoining farmland in rural Kandiyohi County. Delbert Huber (Delbert), who was 80 years old at the time of the homicide, is Huber's father. Delbert resided on and farmed land near the Larsons' farmland. Larson and his wife lived in Albertville.

On the evening of October 8, 2011, Delbert called 911 and reported that he had shot Larson earlier that same day. After the police investigation, Huber was indicted for first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2014) ; second-degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2014) ; and second-degree felony murder, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2014). Each of these offenses was charged on an accomplice-liability theory. Delbert was also charged with respect to Larson's death; he pleaded guilty and was convicted of second-degree murder.

At Huber's trial, the State presented testimony that Huber and Larson had known each other for many years, and that their relationship became strained over the past several years. Huber believed that Larson was not providing proper care for Larson's father and that Larson had abused Huber's trust by allowing others to hunt on the Huber family's land without permission. Huber also believed that Larson had punctured Huber's tires with nails, shined flashlights into the Huber family home late at night, and cut wires so their cattle could get out. On the other hand, Larson's wife testified that Huber made numerous phone calls and sent letters harassing the Larson family, which Larson later reported to the police.

The simmering dispute boiled over into violence in October 2011. On the evening of October 7, 2011, Larson arrived at his father's farm planning to duck hunt the next morning. N.L. was out of town that weekend for a wedding and, unbeknown to Larson, had made arrangements to have Huber do his farm chores. Larson was surprised to encounter Huber at N.L.'s farm that evening. During their encounter, Larson asked Huber several times to remove his farm equipment and to leave the property, but Huber refused. Larson told Huber that he would do the chores and demanded that Huber not return the next day. Huber later told police that he believed Larson laughed at him and called him an idiot.

Huber called Delbert that evening and told him they needed to remove their farm equipment from N.L.'s property. Huber stated that Larson was harassing him, and that Larson had threatened them, saying "if we came back on the place again that he was going to kill us." Huber also told Delbert that Larson had stolen money from Huber's wallet and parts from his van. Huber and Delbert, with the help of a neighbor, moved their farm equipment to a nearby farm.

On the morning of the murder, Huber drove to N.L.'s farm with Delbert. Delbert, who did not normally carry a gun, brought a rifle and ammunition with him. When they arrived, no one was at the farm. They then went to a neighbor's house to check on their farm equipment. When they finished, Huber drove them both back to N.L.'s farm. On the way back to the farm, Delbert told Huber to stop the car. Delbert took the rifle out of the trunk and brought it into the car. Huber parked the car so that the front end pointed toward the entrance of the driveway of N.L.'s farm. There was testimony that Huber got out of the car and went to N.L.'s barn to begin the chores, while Delbert remained seated in the car with the door open. Shortly thereafter, Larson arrived at the farm. An altercation ensued between Larson and Delbert. Delbert shot Larson, who was unarmed. Larson died from his injuries.

Delbert testified that he did not tell Huber he planned to shoot Larson. He said that he did not ask Huber whether he should bring a gun to N.L.'s farm, and that Huber never touched the gun. Huber did not inform anyone that Delbert killed Larson, and Delbert did not call the police until several hours after the murder.

The jury found Huber guilty of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder, but acquitted him of first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Huber to 306 months in prison for second-degree intentional murder. A divided court of appeals panel affirmed, concluding that the accomplice-liability instructions given to the jury were plainly erroneous but that the error did not affect Huber's substantial rights. We granted review.

I.

Huber argues that the accomplice-liability instructions given to the jury failed to accurately state the law. According to Huber, the accomplice-liability jury instructions failed to explain the meaning of "intentionally aiding," as required by State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 807–08 (Minn.2012), and failed to use the word "intentionally" in describing aiding and abetting as an element of the crime.

We review a district court's jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn.2007). The district court enjoys considerable latitude in selecting jury instructions and the language of those instructions. State v. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.2014). But the jury instructions must fairly and adequately explain the law of the case and not materially misstate the law. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 144 (Minn.2012) ; State v. Kuhnau, 622 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn.2001). We review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately explain the law. Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 274.

Huber acknowledges that he did not object to the accomplice-liability instructions, and therefore we review the instructions for plain error. Under the plain-error doctrine, the appellant must show that there was (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error affected substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) ). If the appellant satisfies the first three prongs of the plain-error doctrine, "we may correct the error only if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ " State v. Crowsbreast, 629 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Minn.2001) (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 ).

Minnesota Statutes § 609.05 (2014) addresses when an accomplice is liable for a crime committed by someone else. It provides, in part: "A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime." Id., subd. 1. The statute, however, does not define the phrase "intentionally aids."¹

At issue in this case are the jury instructions for second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder. The instructions for each of these offenses described the meaning of "liability for crimes of another" and then set forth the elements of the crime that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the "liability for crimes of another" portion of the instructions for both counts stated: "The defendant is guilty of a crime committed by another person when the defendant has intentionally aided the other person in committing it, or has intentionally advised, hired, counseled or conspired with, or otherwise procured the other person to commit it."

When setting forth the specific elements of the crime hybrid instructions that incorporated the theory of accomplice liability into the instruction for each offense were used.² The hybrid instructions listing the elements of second-degree intentional murder and second-degree felony murder contained 13 references to Delbert being "aided and abetted by" Huber. These instructions omitted the word "intentionally" every time they referred to Huber aiding and abetting Delbert.

We will first discuss our case law regarding jury instructions on accomplice liability. Then, using a plain-error analysis, we will apply that case law to the facts of this case to determine if Huber is entitled to a new trial based on alleged errors in the jury instructions for accomplice liability.

A.

We recently considered whether jury instructions on accomplice liability constituted plain error because they failed to properly instruct the jury on the "intentionally aiding" element of accomplice liability under Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1. See Kelley, 855 N.W.2d at 275 ; Milton, 821 N.W.2d at 806–08. In Milton, we held for the first time that the accomplice-liability instructions given to the jury must explain the "intentionally aiding" element of accomplice liability. 821 N.W.2d at 807. Specifically, the instructions must explain that to be...