State v. Hudkins

184 N.E.3d 160

STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.Eli P. HUDKINS, Appellant.

NO. CA2021-07-066

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Twelfth District, Warren County.

January 31, 2022

David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirsten A. Brandt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Mark W. Raines, for appellant.

OPINION

HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Eli P. Hudkins, appeals from a decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas ordering him to be committed to Summit Behavioral Healthcare ("SBH") to undergo treatment to restore him to competency after concluding that an entire new restoration period commenced following the court's second finding of incompetency after a period of competency.¹

{¶2} On May 11, 2020, Hudkins was indicted on one count of menacing by stalking, a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of violating a protection order, a misdemeanor of the first degree. Defense counsel filed a motion for a competency and sanity evaluation, asking the trial court to order an evaluation of Hudkins’ current mental condition as well as his mental condition at the time the offenses were committed. The trial court granted the motion and ordered an evaluation on July 16, 2020.

{¶3} On July 30, 2020, following a hearing in which the trial court considered the report of Dr. Carla S. Dreyer, Psy.D., the trial court found Hudkins incompetent to stand trial. The court determined that there was a substantial probability Hudkins could be made competent to stand trial within six months if provided with a course of treatment and it ordered Hudkins to engage in treatment to restore his competency at SBH. Hudkins entered treatment at SBH on August 13, 2020.

{¶4} On January 14, 2021, Dr. April G. Sutton, Psy.D., issued a report to the trial court following an evaluation of Hudkins. Dr. Sutton's report opined that Hudkins’ treatment had been successful and that Hudkins was competent to stand trial as he was capable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against him and was capable of assisting in his own defense. The trial court held a competency hearing on January 20, 2021, at which time the court found Hudkins competent to stand trial. On that date, the court ordered Hudkins released from treatment at SBH and placed him on electronically monitored house arrest. An entry journalizing the court's competency finding was filed on January 25, 2021.

{¶5} Hudkins subsequently filed a waiver of his speedy trial rights and entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury trial was set for July 12, 2021. However, on June 21, 2021, defense counsel filed a renewed motion for a competency and sanity evaluation, requesting the court order an evaluation of Hudkins’ current mental condition. Within his motion, defense counsel noted that his "recent communication" with Hudkins caused him concern for Hudkins’ competency as the communications were "similar to th[ose] prior to the initial Competency Evaluation." Defense counsel indicated he had contacted Dr. Dreyer for advice and she recommended a second competency evaluation be conducted to determine whether Hudkins had returned to a state of incompetency. On June 30, 2021, the trial court ordered the second competency evaluation.

{¶6} Dr. Dreyer conducted the second evaluation of Hudkins’ competency on July 2, 2021. In a report dated July 6, 2021, Dr. Dreyer opined that Hudkins was incompetent as he was not capable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings against him or of assisting counsel in his defense due to psychiatric instability. Dr. Dreyer had concerns about Hudkins’ ability to be restored to competency within the timeframe allowed under R.C. 2945.38. In her report, Dr. Dreyer stated that

[d]ue to prior competency restoration efforts related to the offenses charged, it is not clear how much time is now allowed by law to restore the defendant to a competent state. If the defendant has at least six months available for restoration, it is my opinion that the defendant can be restored to a competent state within the time allowed by law, with a proper course of treatment. In this scenario, it is my opinion that the least restrictive setting for competency restoration is SBH. However, if the Court determines the defendant has less than the six months outlined in the statute available for restoration, it is my opinion that the defendant cannot be restored to a competent state within the time allowed by law, even with a proper course of treatment.

{¶7} Both the state and defense counsel filed memoranda with the trial court addressing the court's ability to order additional treatment to restore Hudkins to competency. Defense counsel maintained that R.C. 2945.38(C) limited the duration of treatment that the court could order to restore Hudkins to competency to a total of six months and that the time period for treatment did not begin anew merely because Hudkins had a regained competency for a period of time before once again becoming incompetent. Relying on Hudkins prior commitment to SBH for treatment, defense counsel claimed R.C. 2945.38 only authorized the court to order treatment for the amount of time left under the original six months of treatment, which defense counsel noted was far less than six months given Hudkins’ commitment at SBH from August 13, 2020 until January 20, 2021. The state, however, argued that the trial court had the ability to order a new period of restorative treatment for up to six months. Specifically, the state argued that "if there is an interim period in which the defendant is found competent, and the general course of the case was that [Hudkins] was competent, a second incompetent ruling would ‘restart’ the restoration period." Therefore, in the state's view, Hudkins’ prior commitment at SBH for restorative treatment in no way limited the amount of time Hudkins could be treated following the court's second incompetency finding.

{¶8} A competency hearing was held by trial court on July 19, 2021, at which time the parties stipulated to the admissibility of Dr. Dreyer's July 6, 2021 report. The trial court found Hudkins incompetent to stand trial and ordered Hudkins to engage in treatment at SBH to restore his competency. In ordering Hudkins to return to SBH for treatment, the trial court specifically found that "upon the second finding of incompetency, where there had been a period of competency for [Hudkins], an entire new restoration period shall commence." An entry journalizing the court's competency finding was filed on July 19, 2021.

{¶9} Hudkins appealed from the trial court's July 19, 2021 entry finding him incompetent, setting forth the following as his sole assignment of error:

{¶10} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO BE COMMITTED TO UNDERGO AN ADDITIONAL SIX MONTHS OF COMPETENCY RESTORATION AS THOSE SIX MONTHS COMBINED WITH HIS PRIOR FIVE MONTHS WOULD TAKE HIM WELL BEYOND

THE MAXIMUM COMMITMENT DURATION ALLOWED BY STATUTE.

{¶11} Hudkins argues that because the most serious offense he was indicted for is a felony of the fourth degree, "a total of six months over the course of the case is the most [he] can be held in a behavioral health facility for the purpose of competency restoration." Relying on the language of R.C. 2945.38(C)(2), Hudkins contends that he could only be returned to treatment for "another 3 weeks and 4 days," that this amount of time was not sufficient to restore him to competency, and that pursuant to R.C. 2945.38(H), the trial court should have dismissed the indictment. The state maintains the trial court had the authority to "restart" the clock on restorative treatment after the second finding of incompetency. In support of its position, the state relies upon the Fifth Appellate District's decision State v. Henderson , 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 13-CA-61, 2014-Ohio-2991, 2014 WL 3031013.

{¶12} We begin by examining the language of R.C. 2945.38, the statute that applies after the issue of a defendant's competency to stand trial has been raised and the court has conducted a competency hearing in accordance with R.C. 2945.37. R.C. 2945.38(B)(1)(a) provides that where a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial and "there is a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to stand trial within one year if the defendant is provided with a course of treatment, the court shall order the defendant to undergo treatment."² However, pursuant to R.C. 2945.38(C),

[n]o defendant shall be required to undergo treatment, including any continuing evaluation and treatment, under division (B)(1) of this section for longer than whichever of the following periods is applicable:

(1) One year, if the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged is one of the following offenses:

(a) Aggravated murder, murder, or an offense of violence for which a sentence of death or life imprisonment may be imposed;

(b) An offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree;

(c) A conspiracy to commit, an attempt to commit, or complicity in the commission of an offense described in division (C)(1)(a) or (b) of this section if the conspiracy, attempt, or complicity is a felony of the first or second degree.

(2) Six months, if the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged is a felony other than a felony described in division (C)(1) of this section;

(3) Sixty days, if the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged is a misdemeanor of the first or second degree;

(4) Thirty days, if the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged is a misdemeanor of the third or fourth degree, a minor misdemeanor, or an unclassified misdemeanor.

As the most serious offense Hudkins faced was menacing by stalking, a felony of the fourth degree, Hudkins could only be required to undergo treatment for up to six months. See R.C. 2945.38(C)(2).

{¶13} When a defendant is ordered to undergo treatment, the person who supervises the treatment is ordered to...