State v. Ian I.

127 A.D.3d 766

7 N.Y.S.3d 199

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 02771

In the Matter of STATE of New York, respondent

v.IAN I. (Anonymous), appellant.

2014-01304, Index No. 5800/11.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 1, 2015.

Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Mineola, N.Y. (Michael D. Neville, Timothy M. Riselvato, and Dennis B. Feld of counsel), for appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Anisha S. Dasgupta and Mark H. Shawhan of counsel), for respondent.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.

Opinion

In a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10 for the civil management of Ian I., an alleged sex offender requiring civil management, Ian I. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Forman, J.), dated October 21, 2013, which, upon a finding, made after a jury trial, that he suffers from a mental abnormality as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i), and upon a determination, made after a dispositional hearing, that he is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring civil confinement, in effect, granted the petition and directed that he be committed to a secure treatment facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he no longer requires confinement.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the finding of mental abnormality is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedings, including a new trial on the issue of mental abnormality, and, if necessary, a new dispositional hearing; and it is further,

ORDERED that the appellant shall not be released pending the completion of such trial (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06[k] ).

A court may set aside a jury verdict as legally insufficient and enter judgment as a matter of law only where “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145 ; see Matter of State of New York v. David M., 120 A.D.3d 1423, 1424, 992 N.Y.S.2d 582 ). A verdict that is supported by legally sufficient evidence may nonetheless be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence, and a new trial ordered, if the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Matter of State of New York v. David M.,

120 A.D.3d at 1424, 992 N.Y.S.2d 582 ). “Notably, [a] jury's determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to great deference given the jury's opportunity to evaluate the weight and credibility of conflicting expert testimony” (Matter of State of New York v. Edison G., 107 A.D.3d 723, 724, 966 N.Y.S.2d 510 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of State of New York v. Shawn X., 69 A.D.3d 165, 168, 887 N.Y.S.2d 692 ).

At trial, the petitioner, State of New York, presented the testimony of Dr. Ronald S. Field and Dr. Kostas A. Katsavdakis, both of whom diagnosed the appellant with bipolar disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and polysubstance disorder. In addition, Dr. Field diagnosed the appellant with sexual preoccupation and sexual interest in underage girls. Both experts testified that the appellant's disorders, together with his continuing sexually deviant preference for post-pubescent girls approximately 14 years of age, predisposed him to committing sex offenses and caused him to have serious difficulty controlling that behavior. While the diagnoses of sexual preoccupation and sexual interest in underage girls are not recognized diagnoses in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, it does not necessarily follow that those conditions were not relevant to the determination of mental abnormality (see Matter of State of New York v. Shannon S., 20 N.Y.3d 99, 106, 956 N.Y.S.2d 462, 980 N.E.2d 510 ). In considering the expert opinions, “the jury was free to make its own credibility determinations and weigh the competing expert testimonies accordingly” (Matter of State of New York v. James Z., 97 A.D.3d 1046, 1048, 948 N.Y.S.2d 772 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the evidence upon which the jury made its determination was legally sufficient to support the verdict, since there was a valid line of reasoning by which the jury could conclude that the appellant suffered from a mental abnormality based on the evidence presented at trial (see Matter of State of New York v. Derrick B., 68 A.D.3d at 1126–1127, 892 N.Y.S.2d 140 ).

Additionally, the jury's verdict that the appellant here suffered from a mental abnormality, as defined by Mental Hygiene Law § 10.03(i), was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 10.03[i], 10.07[a] ; Matter of State of New York v. Alfredo M., 96 A.D.3d 1068, 1069, 947 N.Y.S.2d 594 ; Matter of State of New York v. Derrick B., 68 A.D.3d 1124, 1126, 892 N.Y.S.2d 140 ).

Nevertheless, we agree with the appellant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial due to the cumulative prejudicial effect of several trial errors. Contrary to the State's contention, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the appellant's pretrial motion which was to conduct a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 concerning the admissibility of the Hare PCL–R Instrument (hereinafter the PCL–R), which measures psychopathy, during the mental abnormality phase of the trial (see Matter of State of New York v. Rosado, 25 Misc.3d 380, 889 N.Y.S.2d 369 ; see generally Matter of State of New York v. Andrew O., 68 A.D.3d 1161, 1163, 890 N.Y.S.2d 667, revd. on other grounds 16 N.Y.3d 841, 922 N.Y.S.2d 255, 947 N.E.2d 146 ; People v. Morales, 227 A.D.2d 648, 649, 643 N.Y.S.2d 217 ). While the use of actuarial risk assessment instruments is scientifically accepted as a means to measure the risk of recidivism, the use of such instruments to determine the existence of a mental abnormality is novel, and the State's bare statement to the contrary was insufficient to satisfy the “general acceptance” test of admissibility (see ...