State v. Idland

1

2024 MT 44N

STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JACOB JON IDLAND, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 22-0120

Supreme Court of Montana

March 5, 2024

Submitted on Briefs: December 13, 2023

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Custer, Cause No. DC-2021-32 Honorable Michael B. Hayworth, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Joshua James Thornton, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Wyatt Glade, Custer County Attorney, Sean A. Quinlan, Deputy County Attorney, Miles City, Montana

OPINION

MIKE MCGRATH CHIEF JUSTICE

¶l Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Jacob Jon Idland (Idland) appeals from a November 5, 2021 conviction and, in the alternative, certain fees imposed in a January 19, 2022 Sentencing Order in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court. A jury found Idland guilty of Driving While License Suspended or Revoked in violation of § 61-5-212(1)(a)(i), MCA, and Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (4th or Subsequent Offense) in violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA (2015).^[1]Idland challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him and argues that a prosecutorial remark prejudiced the jury against him. In the alternative Idland argues the District Court erred in assessing discretionary fines. We affirm.

¶3 At around 4:20 p.m. on May 8, 2021, Idland was driving on 1-94 towards Miles City when he passed a State Trooper (Cartwright), who was driving below the speed limit Cartwright ran a check on Idland's license plate and driver's license and pulled Idland over for a suspended license. When he approached Idland's vehicle, Cartwright observed multiple indicators of impairment: the smell of alcohol; a can of beer on the floor; and Idland's bloodshot, watery eyes, fixed gaze, slurred speech with delayed and confused responses, and fine motor skill issues. Cartwright told Idland about these observations and asked if he had been drinking. Idland stated he had only had one beer but declined to perform field sobriety tests because he was missing a toe. Idland also declined field sobriety tests that would not involve the use of his toe standing, or walking and a preliminary breath test. Cartwright arrested Idland for driving under the influence (DUI).

¶4 On the way to the detention center, Idland was repeatedly confused about why he was stopped and argued that Cartwright was not allowed to pull him over for a suspended license. His mood shifted several times from friendliness with Cartwright to outright anger at him. At the detention facility, Idland again refused both blood and breath samples.

¶5 Idland was charged with driving while license suspended and driving under the influence of alcohol. He went to trial on November 4 and 5, 2021, and a jury convicted him of both counts. At sentencing, the District Court made findings of fact as to Idland's ability to pay and imposed certain fees and costs as discussed more fully below. Idland appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for his DUI conviction, an allegedly improper comment by the prosecutor during closing, and his ability to pay certain fines imposed.

¶6 Idland argues there was not sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was "under the influence" of alcohol when he was pulled over, in violation of § 61-8-401(1)(a), MCA. Idland argues that there was not sufficient evidence in the record because, in the limited amount of time Cartwright observed Idland's driving before pulling him over, Cartwright did not observe any poor driving behavior or, when he was being escorted from his car to the police cruiser, any balance issues. Essentially, Idland argues that an officer must have observed poor driving performance to sustain a conviction for driving under the influence.

¶7" 'Under the influence' means that as a result of taking into the body alcohol. . ., a person's ability to safely operate a vehicle has been diminished," or" 'reduced or to a lesser degree.'" Section 61-8-40l(3)(a), MCA; State v. Pankhurst, 2022 MT 89, ¶ 7, 408 Mont. 309, 509 P.3d 15 (quoting State v. Olson, 2017 MT 101, ¶ 16, 387 Mont. 318, 400 P.3d 214). The State is not required to produce evidence of a quantifiable blood alcohol content to prove that a defendant was under the influence. City of Helena v. Kortum, 2003 MT 290, ¶ 22, 318 Mont. 77, 78 P.3d 882. Instead, the State can introduce "other competent evidence" of the fact that a person is under the effect of alcohol. Kortum, ¶ 22. In Kortum, we described that a standard field sobriety test is but one tool to show a person's diminished ability, and that we have "consistently upheld a full range of competent evidence" as sufficient evidence of driving under the influence. Kortum, ¶ 22 (emphasis added).

¶8 Idland relies on Kortum to argue that poor driving is a necessary factor to show that a defendant was under the influence. But Kortum does not stand for this proposition: "The maimer in which a vehicle is driven can be evidence of driving under the influence of alcohol." Kortum, ¶ 22 (emphasis added). Though some evidence is sufficient by itself, no single piece of evidence is necessary under our case law. Rather, the jury may deteimine from the full range of competent evidence that the defendant was under the influence.

¶9 Although the jury did not receive evidence of Idland's blood alcohol content, nor was Cartwright following Idland long enough to observe any instances of poor driving, the Jury heard sufficient evidence to support Idland's conviction for DUE We review whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a conviction by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McCarthy, 2004 MT 312, ¶ 46, 324 Mont. 1, 101 P.3d 288.

¶10 The jmy heard Cartwright's testimony, who observed the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and an unopened can of beer on the floor; that Idland had bloodshot, wateiy eyes and a fixed gaze during their conversation; that Idland had delayed and slurred speech; that Idland quickly vacillated between friendly and angrily swearing at Cartwright; and that Idland admitted to drinking that day. Additionally, the jury heard that Idland refused all field sobriety tests and breath and blood tests, which allowed the jury to infer that Idland was under the influence. Section 61-8-404(2), MCA; City of Missoula v. Robertson, 2000 MT 52, ¶ 40, 298 Mont. 419, 998 P.2d 144. The jury also watched video of the traffic stop and Idland's ride to the detention facility, which contained numerous instances of Idland's confusion about where he was, why he was stopped, and argument about whether it was legal to stop Idland for driving with a suspended license.^[2]

¶11 Idland also argues that, unlike in Robertson, Cartwright did not observe any balance or mobility issues with Idland. But, like Kortum, no single issue is dispositive or necessary for a jmy to conclude, among the State's showing of other competent evidence, that Idland was under the influence. See Robertson, ¶ 47 (noting that Robertson showed an obvious lack of balance in addition to slurred speech, the smell of alcohol, refusal to submit to a breathalyzer, and failure of two other field sobriety tests). When the evidence is taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational juror could have found Idland guilty of driving under the influence beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶12 Idland next argues that the prosecutor violated Idland's right to a fair trial with an improper remark during rebuttal closing. Idland argues that the prosecutor commented on facts not in evidence when he said:

[D]efense counsel keeps bringing up the search warrant requirement. Part of the testimony that she simply just asked whether it was yes or no, did he get the search warrant? And Trooper Cartwright testified, no, he did not get the search warrant.

The other question she asked was, did he know the prerequisites of what would allow him to get the search warrant? And he was allowed to say "yes" but not what those prerequisites are.

And defense counsel wants to hammer away at these prerequisites to a search warrant - telephonic search warrant for blood but wants to avoid what those pre -

Defense counsel objected at this point, and the District Court cautioned the jury that:

The Couit did make some rulings . . . and here the Court did make a ruling that so limited the evidence.

If you are to hold it against anyone, then you hold it against the Court. But the specific prerequisites are not relevant for your consideration here. Echoing what was said in the cautionary instruction, you are to be focused on the events of May 8th, 2021.

It doesn't matter what happened before. Doesn't matter what happened since. Only questions that are before you are questions related to May 8th, 2021.

After the jury was excused, the State renewed its objection to the defense opening the door to the requirements for a search warrant when the State would not be allowed through it. Despite the prosecutor's unfinished statement and the court's cautionary instruction to the jury, Idland argues that the prosecutor added a...