State v. Ish

166 Idaho 492

461 P.3d 774

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Martin Edmo ISH, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 45345

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, November 2019 Term.

Opinion Filed: April 13, 2020

Eric D. Frederickson, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Sally J. Cooley argued.

Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

Martin Edmo Ish appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him by the district court for one count of voluntary manslaughter. The State charged Ish with second-degree murder in November 2015 for the June 2009 killing of Eugene Lome Red Elk in Pocatello, Idaho. A trial was held in April 2017 after which the jury found Ish guilty of the lesser-included charge of voluntary manslaughter. Ish appeals and asserts error in the jury-selection process, evidentiary rulings, destruction of evidence, and jury instructions. For the reasons below, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for further proceedings.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the evening of June 14, 2009, Ish and some friends were barhopping in Pocatello, Idaho. At one point, the group patronized the Bourbon Barrel until the staff ordered Ish to leave after a confrontation with bar staff. Ish's friends took him a few blocks down the road to Duffy's Tavern. Ish's friends returned to the Bourbon Barrel. When Bourbon Barrel staff learned of Ish's whereabouts, they phoned Duffy's Tavern to inform them of Ish's actions earlier that evening. Upon receiving the call, Red Elk, who was working as a bouncer that night, asked Ish to leave the bar and he complied. A short time later, Red Elk left the bar to visit his girlfriend.

A patron drove up to Duffy's Tavern and found Red Elk lying in the parking lot gurgling blood. She alerted the bar, the police were called, and an investigation followed. Red Elk was taken to the local emergency room where it was determined that he had suffered a brain injury from blunt force trauma to the head. He was life-flighted to a medical center in Idaho Falls for surgery. He died three days later.

At Duffy's Tavern, police interviewed patrons and employees. They also obtained surveillance footage from the inside of the bar. In the weeks and months that followed, Ish was a suspect but the police also investigated the possibility that Red Elk was struck by an automobile. The police investigation into Red Elk's death went cold until almost six years later when, in 2015, two witnesses contacted police. One witness testified that the morning following Red Elk's injury, Ish admitted that he "blasted" Red Elk and he "was pretty sure he killed him because he was laying [sic] there gurgling." With the new witnesses, the State filed a complaint in June 2015 charging Ish with first-degree murder. The State later amended the charge to second-degree murder and alleged that Ish struck Red Elk in the head with a blunt object.

Before trial, Ish filed a motion to compel which sought an explanation for the "lost video" of surveillance footage from Duffy's Tavern. Ish had obtained a DVD copy of footage from Duffy's Tavern, but insisted on an explanation for the absence of the original and an overview of the circumstances that produced the copy. The State admitted that the tape should not have been destroyed during a police cleaning of its evidence room, but argued that its destruction was inadvertent, and thus, Ish could not show that it was done in bad faith. After a hearing, the district court treated Ish's motion as a motion to dismiss based on spoliation of evidence and ruled that Ish was unable to prove bad faith, and thus, there was no due-process violation requiring dismissal.

Ish's case received considerable attention in the local media. As a result, the district court ordered that the jury pool be selected from Twin Falls County, that the final jury be sequestered in Pocatello, and that juror names would not be used or released. Jury selection began on April 12, 2017, and continued for a full day. During voir dire, Juror 3 was questioned in chambers after she disclosed that she was familiar with the case from social media. In chambers, Ish challenged Juror 3 for cause, which the State opposed. The district court denied Ish's challenge for cause and Juror 3 resumed her place in the panel. After voir dire, each side exercised all 12 of their peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors from the pool. With the final 14 jurors selected but not sworn in, Ish raised a timely Batson challenge outside the presence of the jury pool alleging that the State had improperly used its peremptory challenges in order to eliminate all minorities from the jury. Ish argued that the prosecution used 6 of its peremptory challenges to strike the only 6 potential jurors who were minorities. The State stipulated that the jurors were members of a protected class.¹ The lead prosecutor offered his race-neutral reasons for striking each juror, at times consulting with other members of the prosecution team.

With five days remaining between the end of jury selection and opening statements, the district court took the matter under advisement. Ish filed a written memorandum in which he specifically pointed to Juror 1 to argue that the State's proffered reason for striking him was pretextual because other jurors had expressed concerns about work and childcare and they were not struck. The State filed a brief in opposition, expanding on its explanations for the strikes and including excerpts purportedly from its notes on the jury questionnaire and voir dire.

The district court denied Ish's Batson challenge. The district court found that the prosecutor did not strike the six jurors with discriminatory intent. In its analysis, the Court recited the prosecution's proffered reasons. Relevant here, the district court said the following regarding Juror 1 and Juror 3:

In relation to Juror 1, the State asserts that this individual is employed in the agricultural industry as well as being a volunteer firefighter and that while being questioned he had expressed these work related concerns as well as worrying about caring for his 4 year old daughter. Their conclusion was that he would be a distracted juror. The Court would also note that in his questionnaire he explained in detail the hardship serving on a jury would cause him in relation to work and his family situation.

In regards to Juror 3, the State reminded the Court that this was an individual who had been the subject of an in-camera voir dire interview as she had indicated some knowledge of the case due to media attention. Because media was the reason this case had to be removed from Bannock County to Twin Falls County for the purpose of selecting a jury in the first place, after discussing the matter with her, the State moved to dismiss Juror 3 for cause. The Court denied the Motion and the State used a peremptory challenge to excuse her.

The district court then looked to see how "similarly situated" jurors were treated to assess the State's proffered explanations. It began by noting that "Jurors 3, 21, 23, 37 were all dismissed for reasons unique to them, their demeanor, and their circumstances[,]" so a comparison was "not available." Nevertheless, it concluded that "the unique reasons make the assertion that they were challenged because of race less likely."

For Juror 3, the district court remarked that she had been challenged for cause because "of well-articulated concerns" based upon her "experiences in relation to this trial." Though it did not grant the for-cause challenge, the reasons for that challenge "were not racial, and ... are not under heightened scrutiny when done through valid peremptory challenges." Thus, the challenge directed at her "appear[ed] valid based upon the evidence."

In regards to Juror 1, the district court wrote:

Juror 1 and Juror 36 were dismissed, in part, for work related issues, and in part for family issues. These are both difficult questions because unless retired, every juror on the panel would presumably have a work issue, and depending on age and circumstance most people also have family issues.

In regards to employment however, certain people clearly and forcefully expressed work related stresses above and beyond other prospective jurors. Juror 17 for example opened a restaurant with his wife in the past month and stated that being away during this start-up phase would be very difficult. He was dismissed by the State. Juror 41 also works in the agriculture industry and indicated on his questionnaire that this is a busy time of year and that missing work would be an extreme hardship. He was dismissed by the State as well. It is not simply a pretext to say the State dismissed Juror 1 and Juror 36 for work issues, because it was clearly a true consideration as they released other prospective jurors (Caucasian jurors) for the same reasons.

In regards to family concerns, Juror 1 has a four year old child and Juror 36 has an 18 month old child. Both expressed concerns about being away from their young children during sequestration. Juror 18 was released by the State and is the parent to a 4 year old and a 6 month old. Juror 48 was also released by the State and he has three children, including a 6 year old. Again, it cannot be said that reasons related to family and small children are invalid and only a pretext for racial bias when the State challenged other similarly situated, non-minority jurors as well.

The district court concluded that, based on all the evidence provided to it, Ish had failed to show that the prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent:

Based upon all information before the Court, it appears that there were numerous reasons, all race-neutral, for which the six jurors in question were dismissed by peremptory challenge....

"The party asserting discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge bears the ultimate burden of persuasion and must

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