State v. J.H.P.

313 A.3d 112

478 N.J.Super. 262

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.J.H.P.,¹ Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NO. A-0467-23

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued March 5, 2024

Decided April 8, 2024

On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 20-12-0268.

Kevin Scott Finckenauer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Shannon Mae Dolan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Rory Alexander Eaton, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Rory Alexander Eaton and Bridgett Nichole Dudding, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

Alexander R. Shalom, Newark, argued the cause for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation (American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, attorneys; Alexander R. Shalom and Jeanne M. LoCicero, on the brief.)

Claude Caroline Heffron argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, PC, attorneys; Claude Caroline Heffron, on the brief).

Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia.

₂₆₇The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSE, J.A.D.

At issue in this interlocutory appeal is the propriety of a pretrial order compelling the administration of psychotropic medication in an attempt to restore competency, without a defendant’s consent, when the accused has not been deemed a danger to self or others. We also consider the appropriate standard of review of the State’s application to involuntarily medicate a defendant under these circumstances.

A Somerset County grand jury charged defendant J.H.P. with second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1) and (b)(1); second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(2); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(8); and third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4), for allegedly setting ablaze a six-story apartment building under construction in Bound Brook. The January 12, 2020 fire caused more than $50 million in property damage, injuries to a responding firefighter, and the evacuation of neighboring residences. Defendant was detained pretrial from January 12, 2020 to April 27, 2022, and thereafter transferred to Ann Klein Forensic Center (AKFC), where he remains civilly committed. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4.

On defense counsel’s application, the first motion judge ordered an initial competency evaluation while defendant was detained in ₂₆₈jail. Three additional evaluations were conducted after defendant was transferred to AKFC. The evaluators diagnosed defendant with mental illness, deemed him not competent to stand trial, and opined that psychotropic medication is necessary to restore competency. Because the evaluators determined defendant does not pose an immediate danger to self, others, or property - and refuses medication - the State sought court orders to involuntarily administer medication to restore competency.

By leave granted, defendant appeals from the August 24, 2023 Law Division order granting the State’s third motion to involuntarily medicate him pursuant to the four-pronged test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), as applied by this court in State v. R.G., 460 N.J. Super. 416, 215 A.3d 952 (App. Div. 2019). Defendant argues our state constitution affords broader protection than its federal counterpart and, as such, "New Jersey must reject the Sell standard as violating the well-established liberty interest to be free from unwanted medical treatment." See N.J. Const. art. I., ¶ 1. In the alternative, defendant contends the State failed to satisfy the first and second Sell prongs.

After granting defendant leave to appeal, we listed the matter for argument and invited the Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey (Attorney General) and the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to appear as amici curiae, focusing on the propriety of forced medication as an attempt to restore competency when a defendant has not been deemed a danger to self or others. The ACDL accepted our invitation; the Attorney General declined. Thereafter, we permitted the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of New Jersey (ACLU) to participate. Amici primarily argue the Sell standard violates the New Jersey Constitution.

During oral argument before us, the State acknowledged: defendant has a substantial interest in challenging the forced administration of antipsychotic medication; this court in R.G. did not expressly adopt the Sell standard but applied the factors in that ₂₆₉matter; and the State’s applications for involuntary medication to restore competency are sought and ordered sparingly. The State urges us to affirm the motion court’s order.

With defendant’s constitutional rights in view, we apply the Sell test and conclude the motion judge erroneously determined the State satisfied the second prong. We therefore reverse the order under review. In doing so, we hold our standard of review under the Sell test is mixed. We therefore review the motion court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error as to each Sell prong. Having resolved the issues by applying the Sell standard, we do not reach the constitutional arguments raised.

I. Governing Legal Principles

To give context to the issues presented on appeal, we begin by setting forth the guiding legal principles. In Sell, the federal high court held:

[T]he Constitution permits the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important government trial-related interests.

[539 U.S. at 179, 123 S.Ct. 2174.]

[1–3] Thus, the motion court must first find "important governmental interests" are at stake. Id. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174. The interest in bringing an individual charged with a serious crime, whether against person or property, to trial is such an interest. Ibid. Nonetheless, courts must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating that governmental interest. Ibid. "Special circumstances," such as lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill, would diminish the risks that the accused would go free without punishment and may affect the need for prosecution. Ibid. The same is true where the defendant has been confined in prison for a significant amount of time. Ibid.

₂₇₀[4] Second, the motion court must conclude that the involuntary medication will "significantly further" those interests. Id. at 181, 123 S.Ct. 2174. In so doing, the court

must find that administration of the drugs is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial. At the same time, it must find that administration of the drugs is substantially unlikely to have side effects that will interfere significantly with the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in conducting a trial defense, thereby rendering the trial unfair.

[Ibid.]

[5] "Third, the court must conclude that the involuntary medicine is necessary to further those interests." Ibid. The court "must find that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the same results." Ibid. In addition, the court "must consider less intrusive means for administering the drugs," such as a "court order to the defendant backed by the contempt power, before considering more intrusive methods." Ibid.

[6] Finally, the court must conclude that administration of the drugs is "medically appropriate"; that is, "in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical condition." Ibid. The Court noted "[d]ifferent kinds of antipsychotic drugs may produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success." Ibid.

Summarizing, the Court framed the issue in cases where the prosecution seeks to involuntarily medicate an accused as follows:

Has the Government, in light of the efficacy, the side effects, the possible alternatives, and the medical appropri-ateness of a particular course of antipsychotic drug treatment, shown a need for that treatment sufficiently important to overcome the individual’s protected interest in refusing it?

[Id. at 183, 123 S.Ct. 2174.]

"The Court made clear that the instances where [the Sell] factors would be met ‘may be rare.’ " R.G., 460 N.J. Super. at 429, 215 A.3d 952 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180, 123 S.Ct. 2174).

Applying the Sell test in R.G., we addressed for the first time "whether a defendant charged with a crime, who is not competent to stand trial but who is competent to make medical decisions and has refused to take antipsychotic medication, can be involuntarily medicated to restore competency to stand trial." Ibid. The defendant₂₇₁ in R.G. was charged with third-degree neglect of an elderly or disabled person, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-8(a). Id. at 420, 215 A.3d 952. At the request of defense counsel, the motion court ordered a competency evaluation, which was administered in a psychiatric hospital. Ibid.

Both doctors, who testified at the hearing on the State's motion to involuntarily medicate the defendant, found him not competent to stand trial. Id. at 421, 215 A.3d 952. They described the defendant as delusional and suffering from psychosis. Ibid. The psychiatrist recommended the administration of Prolixin to restore competency and treat the defendant’s mental health issues. Id. at 421-22, 215 A.3d 952. He testified Prolixin could cause "abnormal movement," such as shaking, tremors,...