State v. Jackson

964 N.W.2d 659

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Rodney Donta JACKSON, Appellant.

A20-0779

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed July 19, 2021

Granted October 19, 2021

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith, Tracy M., Judge.

OPINION

ROSS, Judge

Rodney Jackson shot and killed a man at a gas station in north Minneapolis. During voir dire for jury selection in his murder trial, Jackson, a black man, unsuccessfully raised a Batson challenge to the state's peremptory strike to remove a black juror. After trial, he successfully moved for a Schwartz hearing to assess the impact of extraneous information that a juror purportedly introduced during deliberations. The district court closed the bifurcated Schwartz hearing to the public, citing concerns about media attention, and concluded that the purportedly extraneous information did not affect the verdict. On appeal, Jackson challenges the district court's Batson and Schwartz decisions on their merits, and he argues that closing the Schwartz hearing violated his right to a public trial and constituted a structural error entitling him to a new trial. We hold that Jackson's Batson challenge is not persuasive, that the district court improperly closed the Schwartz hearing, and that we will not now address any impact of the purportedly extraneous jury information. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a public Schwartz hearing.

FACTS

The state charged Rodney Jackson with second-degree intentional murder for shooting and killing a man at a gas station in north Minneapolis. The following facts derive from a ten-day trial at which 22 witnesses testified and after which the jury found Jackson guilty.

In November 2018 Jackson and his companion, whom we will anonymize by calling Girlfriend, parked at a gas pump of a Speedway convenience store. They entered the store briefly and returned to find a vehicle parked in front of their car, blocking their exit. Girlfriend asked the vehicle's driver, whom we will call Victim, to move his car. She testified that Victim and his passenger refused and began threatening her. Girlfriend and Jackson threatened Victim, and Girlfriend threw a bottle of lotion and water bottles at him. A bystander intervened, and Jackson and Girlfriend drove away. But Jackson stopped his car after Girlfriend told him that she had dropped something near the convenience store. Jackson parked across the street and Girlfriend approached on foot. She encountered Victim again, threw a can at his car, and began running back to Jackson's car. Victim retaliated, throwing rocks at Girlfriend. Girlfriend entered Jackson's car, and Jackson, still sitting inside, shot and killed Victim. Jackson and Girlfriend then drove away. They went out to dinner and attended a movie. Minneapolis police arrested them as they left the theater.

No witness reported seeing Victim holding a gun, and the record does not indicate that police found one at the scene. But Jackson claimed that he thought Victim had a gun.

During voir dire and jury selection, the prosecutor peremptorily removed Juror 34 after asking her to elaborate on some of her questionnaire responses about her reaction to Jackson's charges. She had stated that Jackson could be her family member or neighbor. She thought that it would be difficult for her to judge Jackson and believed that the justice system is unfair to black people. She acknowledged that, based on police encounters with people she knew, she had "some concern about being biased" against the state. She also indicated that she was currently taking a criminal-justice class and that receiving instructions from the court would "throw [her] off a bit" if they differed from what she had learned in class. She did say that she would follow the law that the court provided.

Jackson unsuccessfully raised a Batson challenge to the state's peremptory strike of Juror 34 who, like Jackson, is black. His attorney contended that the prosecutor struck her because of her race, evidenced by allegedly changing from questioning about how she would feel about judging the evidence to how she would feel about judging Jackson. The district court found that Jackson failed to make a prima facie case establishing the state's peremptory strike as racially motivated. It concluded that the strike was justified for nonracial reasons, emphasizing that Juror 34 had volunteered the notion that Jackson could have been her friend or neighbor and that she had implied that her own training on legal matters might make it difficult for her to follow instructions from the court.

The jury found Jackson guilty of second-degree murder. The district court received a posttrial evaluation form from a juror implying that the jury had possibly considered extraneous evidence during their deliberations. Specifically, the juror indicated that the state should have "[p]resented info on conceal + carry — responsibility of self-defense. Should have explained what [Jackson] would have learned in conceal and carry class regarding MN law about obligation to retreat. This jury was going for self-defense and not guilty before I shared [during deliberations] what's taught in permit class."

Jackson moved the district court to conduct a Schwartz hearing, citing the juror's introduction of extraneous evidence during deliberations. See Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co. , 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (1960). The district court agreed to conduct a Schwartz hearing, and it held a prehearing conference. During that conference the district court noticed a journalist in the gallery and reminded attendees of the importance of not disclosing the reason for the eventual Schwartz hearing, which was scheduled to occur about a month later. But the Star Tribune published direct quotes from the juror-evaluation form anyway, revealing the reason for the Schwartz hearing. Learning that two of the jurors had travel plans that would prevent them from attending the Schwartz hearing as scheduled, the district court decided to bifurcate the hearing to allow those two to attend an early session and the remaining ten to attend a second session on schedule. But believing that the newspaper would potentially "contaminate" the second session by reporting on what happens in the first, the district court ordered the first session closed to the public. The district court carried out that plan, deeming the closure justified and reasoning that it had considered and rejected as unsatisfactory various alternatives to closure, including admonishing the media, postponing the hearing, or ordering all jurors to forgo any travel plans and attend the hearing as scheduled. After both sessions of the Schwartz hearing, the district court concluded that the extraneous information did not affect the jury's verdict.

Jackson unsuccessfully moved the district court to order a new trial. The district court sentenced him to 280 months in prison. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court clearly err by denying Jackson's Batson challenge?

II. Did the district court violate Jackson's right to a public trial by closing the courtroom during the first half of the bifurcated Schwartz hearing?

III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Jackson's motion for a new trial based on the jury having received extraneous information during deliberations?

ANALYSIS

I

Jackson argues that he made a prima facie showing of jury-selection race discrimination. The challenge presents essentially fact issues, and we review the district court's findings on the issue for clear error. State v. Wilson , 900 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Minn. 2017). A party may peremptorily exclude a prospective juror for almost any reason, or for no reason at all, but a race-based peremptory strike violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ; State v. Reiners , 664 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn. 2003). The defendant accusing the state of a race-based peremptory strike triggers a three-step analysis. Batson , 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723 ; see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3). The objecting party must first establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, which is "evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." Wilson , 900 N.W.2d at 382 (quotation omitted). Second, the striking party then has the burden to provide a race-neutral explanation. Id. at 378. Third, the burden then shifts back to the objecting party, who may prevail in claiming an unconstitutionally race-based motive by establishing that the proffered race-neutral reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. We focus our attention on the first step, where the claim failed in the district court and fails here.

Jackson failed to point the district court to evidence supporting an inference that the prosecutor excluded Juror 34 because of her race. The district court invited Jackson's attorney to identify evidence that race motivated the prosecutor to exclude the juror. He responded by asserting only that he "saw a change in the nature of the questions" the prosecutor asked this juror, contending that the prosecutor altered his questioning to focus on fairly judging Jackson rather than fairly judging the evidence. The district court reasonably asked how this change might be construed as racially based, in that the line of questioning responded to Juror 34's statement that she saw Jackson with a degree of familiarity, like a relative or neighbor. Jackson's attorney did not make any connection between...