State v. Jackson

925 A.2d 1060

283 Conn. 111

STATE of Connecticut v. Jeffrey JACKSON.

No. 17646.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 13, 2007.

Decided July 10, 2007.

Proloy K. Das, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Stacey M. Haupt, assistant state's attorney, for the appellant (state).

Neal Cone, senior assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

KATZ, J.

The defendant, Jeffrey Jackson, appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a), raising as the sole claim that the trial court's jury instruction as to "reasonable doubt" improperly had diluted the state's burden of proof. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant's claim, reversing the judgment of the trial court and ordering a new trial. State v. Jackson, 93 Conn.App. 671, 672, 890 A.2d 586 (2006). Thereafter, we granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court's jury instruction regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt was constitutionally infirm?" State v. Jackson, 278 Conn. 902, 896 A.2d 105 (2006). We conclude that the Appellate Court's determination that the instruction on reasonable doubt impermissibly diluted the state's burden of proof was improper, and, accordingly, we reverse its judgment.

The Appellate Court's opinion sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "On May 3, 2002, while incarcerated at the New Haven correctional center, the defendant underwent two strip searches after a correctional officer received information from informants that the defendant was in possession of narcotics. A correctional officer, while searching the defendant a second time, found a substance in his sock that later tested positive for cocaine. At trial, the court instructed the jury regarding reasonable doubt as follows: `The state has the burden of proving each and every element necessary to constitute ... the crime charged. And I'll instruct on those elements later in my charge. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence in any way or present any evidence to disprove the charge against him. The state has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may be aware that in civil cases jurors are told that it's only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the state's proof must be more powerful than that: It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

"`Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in the world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal law cases, the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, based on the evidence or lack of evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, you must give him the benefit of that doubt and find him not guilty.'" State v. Jackson, supra, 93 Conn.App. at 673, 890 A.2d 586.

The record reveals the following additional facts and procedural history. After the trial court's instruction, the defendant took exception to the reasonable doubt charge on the ground that it "differ[ed] from the standard reasonable doubt charge that is routinely given by the court" because it did not describe a reasonable doubt as a "doubt which would cause you as reasonable and prudent men and women to hesitate to act in the more weighty and important matters relating to your affairs."

The trial court acknowledged that the charge differed from the standard instructions and made the following observation: "[Y]our exception is noted, sir. And I wish to make a brief statement for the record in the hypothetical event that my charge would be reviewed by either the Appellate or Connecticut Supreme Court or indeed any other court; that is, counsel is correct that the charge just given does differ in some respects from the charge, I would say, typically given on reasonable doubt in the Connecticut courts and designedly so.

"I am convinced, after [fourteen] years of being a judge and many years of practice before that, that the standard reasonable doubt charge in Connecticut is unsatisfactory. It is satisfactory only in the sense that it is routinely upheld by the appellate courts, which is a considerable advantage, to be sure. But over the years I've become convinced that jurors' eyes glaze over when it is given and it is not fully understood and, therefore, does not do adequate justice to the parties and I believe needs to be modernized, simplified, put into plain language but, obviously, appropriate language.

"The charge given by the court is a slight variation of the charge on reasonable doubt recommended by Justice Ginsburg of the Supreme Court of the United States in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, [27, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994)]. It is a charge proposed by the Federal Judicial Center in creating criminal jury instructions for the federal courts, and I believe that it is much superior to the charge given.

"I welcome appellate review of the charge and if it is wrong, it is for the Appellate Court to say. If they say that it is wrong, I will respect their judgment, but, respectfully, from a trial judge's perspective, the charge just given is a preferable charge. [A]nd based on my experience as a lawyer, as a trial judge, and based on my conversations with many other trial court judges over the years . . . those are my observations but your exception is noted, sir."

Thereafter, the jury found the defendant guilty, and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Following the sentencing, the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court's jury instruction on reasonable doubt improperly had diluted the state's burden of proof. Specifically, he claimed that "the court's instruction that the jury must be `firmly convinced' of the defendant's guilt, by failing to define further and properly the term `reasonable doubt,' misled the jury to a finding of guilt by a lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the court failed to distinguish the clear and convincing standard of proof from the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, he also claim[ed] the state's burden of proof was impermissibly diluted." State v. Jackson, supra, 93 Conn.App. at 673, 890 A.2d 586.

The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant and reversed the judgment of the trial court. Id., at 679, 890 A.2d 586. Specifically, the court noted that, "[i]n cases where the language `a firm conviction of the guilt of the accused' has been approved by our Supreme Court and this court, the charge also has included language defining reasonable doubt as opposed to possible doubt." Id., at 677, 890 A.2d 586. The Appellate Court observed that, unlike the federal instruction on which the trial court had modeled its instruction, the court's instruction here "did not point out that a possible doubt is not a reasonable doubt because a reasonable doubt involves a `real possibility that the defendant was not guilty' and failed to distinguish the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt from the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence." Id., at 678, 890 A.2d 586. The Appellate Court also expressed concern that the instruction had failed to define reasonable doubt as one "for which a valid reason can be assigned," a definition previously approved by both the United States Supreme Court and this court, which "points out the difference between a fanciful or speculative doubt, which the state's evidence need not overcome, and a real doubt that is based on reason, which the state's evidence must overcome." Id. For these reasons, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court's instruction had misled the jury into finding "guilt based on a degree of proof below what is constitutionally required" and that the defendant's conviction therefore must be reversed. Id., at 679, 890 A.2d 586. The state's certified appeal followed.

On appeal to this court, the state contends that the Appellate Court improperly determined that the instruction had diluted the state's burden of proof. We agree.

We begin with our well established jurisprudence. "It is fundamental that proof of guilt in a criminal case must be beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).... The [reasonable doubt concept] provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence— that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. . . . [Id.], at 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068. At the same time by impressing upon the [fact finder] the need to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the [reasonable doubt] standard symbolizes the significance that our society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself. Jackson v. Virginia, [443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)]. [Consequently, the defendant] in a criminal case [is] entitled to a clear and unequivocal charge by the court that the guilt of the [defendant] must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

"In determining whether a trial court's charge satisfies constitutional requirements, however, individual jury instructions should not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. . . . The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in its entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such...