State v. Jackson

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAY AARON JACKSON

No. M2019-01128-CCA-R3-CD

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

February 12, 2020 Session

May 14, 2020

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2017-B-1249

Steve R. Dozier, Judge

Defendant, Jay Aaron Jackson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of coercion of a witness, two counts of domestic assault, and one count of domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact. The trial court sentenced Defendant, as a Range II multiple offender, to an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days' incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland; (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to elicit impermissible and prejudicial evidence in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's convictions for coercion of a witness and one count of domestic assault; (4) the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant as a Range II multiple offender; and (5) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. Following a thorough review, we affirm the convictions for coercion of a witness (Count 1), domestic assault (Count 3), and domestic assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact (Count 4) and reverse the conviction for domestic assault (Count 2). Because the sentence in Count 2 was ordered to be served concurrently with Count 1, we affirm the effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days' incarceration.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS T. WOODALL and ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined.

Manuel B. Russ (on appeal); Martesha L. Johnson (at trial), District Public Defender; and Mary Ruth Pate and Dave Kieley (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, Jay Aaron Jackson.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and J. Wesley King, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural HistoryIndictment

In May 2017, the Davidson County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging Defendant with the following offenses:

Count

Offense

Date

Classification

Victim

1

Coercion of a

Witness

8/29/16

Class D Felony

Sara Jackson

2

Domestic Assault

8/29/16

Class A Misdemeanor

Sara Jackson

3

Domestic Assault

7/17/16

Class A Misdemeanor

Sara Jackson

4

Domestic Assault

7/17/16

Class A Misdemeanor

C.J.1

Pretrial Motions

Rule 404(b)

Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), asserting that all witnesses should be prohibited from referring to a portion of an alleged threat Defendant made to his then-wife, Sara Jackson. Specifically, Defendant requested that the trial court exclude evidence that Defendant told Ms. Jackson that he "had been in jail and he knew people who could" place a bomb in her car. Defendant further asserted that witnesses should be prohibited from mentioning Defendant's pending charges in Cheatham County. In a separate motion in limine, Defendant requested that the trial court exclude evidence regarding his pending charges in Transylvania County, North Carolina, arguing that evidence of "other pending charges stemming from an incident that occurred prior to the offense date of this indictment [was] irrelevant to any question of [Defendant's] guilt or innocence" and was not admissible under Rules 401, 402, 403, and 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence.

At a hearing held before the start of Defendant's trial, defense counsel argued:

Your Honor, our position is that . . . all the State would need to have is the actual threat to place a bomb in the car, the follow-up statement that [Defendant] had been in jail and knew people who could do this is not necessary to prove the State's elements of coercion. He's already made the threat.

The State submitted that it did not intend to introduce evidence regarding Defendant's pending charges in Cheatham County but that Defendant's reference to having been in jail and to knowing people who could help him was an important part of the threat he made to Ms. Jackson.

The trial court granted Defendant's motion to exclude evidence regarding his charges in North Carolina. However, the trial court denied Defendant's motion regarding Defendant's reference to having been in jail. The trial court reasoned:

I can't sit here and pick and choose what the jury might find important in terms of proving the State's allegations in [C]ount [1]. So if that is occurring at the same time, it's not a prior bad act. It just goes to Ms. Jackson's perception in terms of whether this allegation that the State has brought in [C]ount [1] . . . could, and from her perspective would actually be carried out.

So -- I can't sanitize [D]efendant's statements just because they put them in some bad light. But they are not even going to hear any information as to whether that's true or not. The important thing is in terms of me deciding, but would the jury find . . . [that] she's feeling like he's pretty serious about this and claiming he knows people that do it. So -- but again, that's the jury's role in terms of deciding what they believe was said or evaluating testimony. But I don't think that falls in any kind of 404(b) situation.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. A copy of the motion to dismiss is not included in the appellate record. However, at the pretrial hearing, the trial court stated, "Now, I have before me a motion to dismiss for Brady violations." Defense counsel then explained that the basis of the motion was three jailhouse phone calls that the defense "came into possession of last week[.]" He stated that two of the calls were from September 2017 and that one call was from January 2018.Defense counsel said, "Last week as I was doing my preparation because I came onto this case late, I noticed something that I thought we needed to review the [jailhouse phone calls]." Counsel acknowledged that the defense was able to "get [the jailhouse phone calls] from the sheriff's department." Defense counsel argued:

For the Brady analysis, we just need to prove that there is something potentially exculpatory and material to the defense. I think the statement that I included in the motion is clearly that.

The woman that we believe is [Ms.] Jackson says they've gotten an innocent man in jail, talks about mental health issues, drug issues, talks about being threaten[ed] by the DA's office.

. . . .

Those statements are all arguably a form of recantation and otherwise would go to credibility. And whether or not [the prosecutor] or anyone who was working on this case with him had possession of that is also not relevant of this case law because [the sheriff's department] is a state actor. And so Brady requires the State affirmatively seek out exculpatory material.

Defense counsel explained that the jail call from January 2018 was "with the woman we believe to be [Defendant's daughter]."

The prosecutor stated that he did not know about any jailhouse phone calls until he received Defendant's motion to dismiss the night before trial, and defense counsel acknowledged that the prosecutor was unaware of the jailhouse phone calls prior to his filing the motion to dismiss. The prosecutor explained to the court that jailhouse phone calls "are equally available to both sides[.]"

The trial court questioned defense counsel, "[H]ow are you prejudiced since you now have them and potentially can cross examine the . . . witnesses about the statements?" Defense counsel responded, "It's the timing." Counsel acknowledged that, "even if we got [the jailhouse phone calls] late, we could still maybe use that to impeach [the witnesses]" but explained:

It raises multiple issues of the testimony. It raises issues with potentially getting mental health records. It raises issues where she makes this statement about her ex-husband telling her to say things, which involves another potential defense witness who we wouldn't have eventhought to interview[] until we heard that statement. So we never had the opportunity to try to track that guy down, to try to interview him about that.

The trial court then asked if Defendant wanted a continuance, but defense counsel responded that he did not. The prosecutor asserted:

Further, [defense counsel] and I had a conversation back in the fall, I've got specific notes about it, where Ms. Jackson and [defense counsel] had a conversation and Ms. Jackson was referencing a lot of this stuff that's referenced in this motion. So . . . they were very aware of from a very early time in this case. I can't help it that they decided to pull [jailhouse phone] calls, a week, two weeks ago[.]"

Reading from his file notes, the prosecutor said, "October 5th, 2017, [defense counsel] advises me that Ms. Jackson advised her that this did not happen. That she was not a willing prosecutor[,] that she had panic attack[s] and PTSD[,] and she was previous[ly] married. Those were my notes from that October 5th, 2017, conversation." Defense counsel then agreed that the defense was aware of the information referenced in the prosecutor's notes in October 2017 and acknowledged that the defense did not seek a subpoena for Ms. Jackson's medical records thereafter.

The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the hearing. The trial court found that Defendant failed to establish that it was Ms. Jackson and Defendant's daughter, C. J., speaking with him in the...