State v. Jandreau

288 A.3d 371

2022 ME 59

STATE of Maine

v.Jared D. JANDREAU

Docket: Ken-21-328

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: July 6, 2022

Decided: December 6, 2022

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Jared D. Jandreau

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Paul Rucha, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.

HORTON, J.

[¶1] Jared D. Jandreau appeals from a judgment convicting him of seventeen counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under the age of twelve (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(C) (2022), five counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1) (2022), and one count of solicitation to commit gross sexual assault (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 253(1)(C) (2022) ; see 17-A M.R.S. § 153(1)(B) (2022), entered by the trial court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J. ) after a jury trial. Jandreau raises several arguments on appeal: that (1) a search of his smartphone¹ authorized by a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the warrant was unconstitutionally broad and lacked particularity;² (2) the court violated his constitutional right to a public trial; (3) the court erred in admitting an exhibit because it violated the best evidence rule, M.R. Evid. 1002 ; and (4) several aspects of his sentence were illegal or improper. Of Jandreau's four contentions, only the first merits extended discussion.³ We affirm Jandreau's conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's order denying Jandreau's motion to suppress, the record supports the following facts. See State v. Sasso , 2016 ME 95, ¶¶ 2, 19, 143 A.3d 124 (explaining that when neither party moves for further findings of fact in the context of a motion to suppress, we "infer that the court found all the facts necessary to support its judgment if those inferred findings are supportable by evidence in the record." (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶3] A woman told police on August 29, 2017, that Jandreau had sexually assaulted her earlier that day. The police arrested Jandreau on August 30 and seized his Samsung Galaxy S8 smartphone. On September 8, 2017, the police applied for a warrant to search the cell phone. The affidavit supporting the warrant request included, in pertinent part, the following supporting information:

• The alleged victim of the sexual assault said that she had met Jandreau on match.com.

• The alleged victim said that she had met Jandreau in person once prior to August 29, 2017.

• The alleged victim said that she had spoken to Jandreau once over the phone but that their primary means of communication was via text message.

• The alleged victim showed the officers text messages between her and Jandreau, none of which was sexual in nature.

• The alleged victim said that after she arrived at Jandreau's home on August 29, 2017, he repeatedly and violently assaulted her and forced her to engage in sexual acts.

• When police spoke to Jandreau in the early morning of August 30, 2017, Jandreau initially denied knowing the alleged victim, but later stated that he "had sex with [her]," that "she came over looking for sex," and that the alleged victim had sent him text messages "repeatedly asking him to have sex with her."

[¶4] The same day, the court issued a warrant permitting a search of Jandreau's cell phone for the following:

Any files, documents, or software related to the crime of Gross Sexual [Assault], including but not limited to text messages, phone numbers, photographs, videos, emails, and contact information including but not limited to [the alleged victim].

Records in any form regarding searches for information regarding sexual assaults.

Communication in any form regarding sexual assault and/or [the alleged victim.]

Communication in any form between [the alleged victim] and Jandreau[.]

Records, images, videos and recording in any form regarding sexual assaults or [the alleged victim].

[¶5] After the warrant was issued, the police electronically extracted the cell phone's data and returned the cell phone to Jandreau in November 2017. In December 2017, a prosecutor reviewed the extracted material and found two images of a child, one of which he believed constituted child pornography.

[¶6] The prosecutor reported the images to the Maine State Police. In January 2018, a state police detective sought and obtained an additional warrant to search Jandreau's home and property for any electronic devices. When the detective executed the January 2018 warrant, Jandreau voluntarily gave the police access to the contents of his cell phone. The subsequent search of the cell phone did not uncover any sexually explicit depictions of minors.

[¶7] The detective then sought and obtained another warrant to reaccess the data that had been extracted pursuant to the September 2017 warrant. Upon execution of that warrant, police discovered additional photos and a video that were sexually explicit and depicted the same child as the photos identified by the prosecutor in December 2017.

[¶8] On January 24, 2020, the State charged Jandreau by indictment with twenty counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under the age of twelve, five counts of unlawful sexual contact, and one count of solicitation to commit gross sexual assault.⁴ Jandreau filed a motion to suppress evidence, a motion to dismiss, and a second motion to suppress that included a request for a Franks hearing.⁵ The court held a pre- Franks hearing on April 5, 2021, related to the September 2017 warrant, and then denied the request for a Franks hearing. The court (Cole, A.R.J. ) then held a hearing on both the motion to suppress and the motion to dismiss on May 28, 2021. The testimony presented at the hearing focused solely on the execution of the January 2018 search warrant, although the September 2017 search warrant and supporting affidavit were also admitted as exhibits. The court denied the motions to suppress and dismiss in a written order, determining that Jandreau had consented to the January 2018 search of his smartphone:

[Jandreau]’s arguments focus on his cell phone, which would not have any bearing on the first warrant issued in his [Gross Sexual Assault] [(GSA)] case, which sought only evidence of GSA and DNA in his home.

[Jandreau]’s arguments as to the warrants fail because he consented to the search. ... The evidence [Jandreau] seeks to suppress are the files police found on his cell phone. The recording of [Jandreau]’s conversation with Detective Armstrong satisfies the court that [Jandreau] freely and voluntarily gave police the password to his phone when asked, manifesting consent to a search of the phone's contents.

[¶9] The court's finding of consent plainly applies only to the execution of the January 2018 warrant, and the court's order did not address the validity of the September 2017 warrant specifically. However, in a footnote referring to Jandreau's overbreadth argument as to the four warrants generally, the court's order stated:

[Jandreau]’s motion also argues that the police exceeded the scope of the warrants, that the searches were unreasonable in light of the privacy implications of searching a cell phone, that the warrants did not establish that the defendant was committing a crime, that the warrants failed to establish a nexus between the place searched and the crime allegedly committed and that the warrants failed the inventory requirement of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure. These arguments are advanced in a conclusory manner, and [the] defendant does not connect the facts of this case to these arguments to explain why they should result in suppression of evidence. The court will therefore disregard these arguments and direct its attention to the arguments which were fully briefed.

[¶10] The court (Stokes, J. ) held a four-day jury trial between July 19 and 22, 2021. During the trial, Jandreau moved to suppress evidence of text messages exchanged between Jandreau and the mother of the child depicted in the photos and video. The court denied his motion. The State's evidence that was subsequently admitted included sexually explicit photos of the child, a sexually explicit video of the child, and the text messages between Jandreau and the mother of the child depicted in the photos and video. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges that went to trial.⁶

[¶11] After holding a sentencing hearing, the court entered a judgment on the verdict and sentenced Jandreau on one of the counts of sexual exploitation of a minor to eighteen years of incarceration with all but ten years suspended and ten years of probation. For the remaining counts, the court imposed sentences concurrent to the sentence for sexual exploitation of a minor. Jandreau timely appealed. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2022) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1). Jandreau also timely filed an application for leave to appeal his sentence, which the Sentence Review Panel granted. See 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2022) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(1), 20(b).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶12] On appeal, Jandreau contends that the court erred in declining to reach his argument that the September 2017 warrant was overbroad and violated the Fourth Amendment's⁷ particularity requirement and maintains that the court should have granted his motion to suppress. The scope of our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is limited to the record upon which the court decided the motion. See State v. Tribou , 488 A.2d 472, 475 (Me. 1985) ("Only evidence presented to the motion Justice is considered in deciding whether the record supports the motion Justice's determination.").⁸

[¶13] Our analysis begins with an overview of the law regarding warrants.

A. Legal Overview

[¶14] The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that warrants must be based on probable cause and must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or...