State v. Jefferson

1

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jordan Latrell Jefferson, Appellant.

No. A21-0694

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

July 18, 2022

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-20-13019

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Halbrooks, Judge. ^[*]

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges his convictions for felony murder and domestic assault, arguing that the district court erred by refusing to admit a witness's out-of-court statements either as substantive or impeachment evidence. Appellant also argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for two crimes that arose from a single behavioral incident and abused its discretion by imposing an upward durational sentencing departure. Because the district court's decision to exclude the out-of-court statements does not constitute reversible error, we affirm the convictions. We also affirm the basis for the upward durational sentencing departure. But because the record does not support imposition of separate sentences where it is unclear whether the underlying offenses arose from a single behavioral incident, we reverse and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

The state charged appellant Jordan Latrell Jefferson with second-degree intentional murder, second-degree unintentional murder during the commission of a felony, two counts of felony domestic assault, and aiding an accomplice after the fact. The charges were tried to a jury. The evidence at trial showed that in May 2020, Jefferson left a gathering with two women, BM and OB, after a night of drinking and that the trio got into OB's gray Pontiac. Despite being intoxicated Jefferson entered the driver's seat; OB was in the passenger seat and BM was in the back seat. Prior to driving away, Jefferson argued with OB and struck her with his hand. Jefferson and OB continued to argue and fight while Jefferson drove. At some point, Jefferson stopped the Pontiac, and OB got out of the car.

Jefferson tried to convince OB to return to the vehicle, but she refused. Jefferson then drove into OB as she walked on the sidewalk. Her body came to rest in the front yard of a residence.

Jefferson got out of the vehicle to assess OB's condition. BM remained in the back seat of the vehicle. Jefferson put OB's body into the back seat of the Pontiac and drove away. However, he quickly crashed the Pontiac, rendering it inoperable. BM and Jefferson left OB in the Pontiac and walked away.

Jefferson called another woman, AR, for a ride. AR arrived in a maroon car and picked up Jefferson and BM. They drove back to the Pontiac and checked on OB. After concluding that OB was deceased, Jefferson, BM, and AR left the scene and went to AR's house. During the drive, Jefferson got angry and struck AR with a closed fist. Jefferson told AR that OB had been hanging out the window, he got in an accident, and she "flew out the window." But he later told AR that he was going to "total" OB's car, OB jumped in front of the car, he was moving too fast to stop, and he hit OB.

BM testified against Jefferson. She said that Jefferson gets "out of character" when he drinks and was "acting crazy that night." She testified that Jefferson and OB got into a heated, violent argument before leaving the gathering in the Pontiac. Jefferson began driving recklessly, and he and OB continued to argue and fight. At some point, OB got out of the car. Jefferson was upset and told BM he was going to "hit the pole," referring to a street sign. He then "blanked out," drove the car "really fast," and "didn't turn." BM testified that Jefferson hit OB and that OB "went under the car." Jefferson told BM he had "f-cked up."

Jefferson testified in his own defense. He claimed that BM was driving the Pontiac when OB was struck and killed.

The defense called JW as a witness. JW lived near the location where OB was hit and gave a statement to police several hours after the crash. Although Jefferson, BM, and OB are Black, JW told the police that an intoxicated White female was driving the "little silver car" at the time of the crash, that she "passed out or something" after the accident, and that the passenger, a man, dragged her out of the car and put her in the back seat. According to JW, the car then drove off. JW told the police that she did not see the man because it was "really dark" outside, but she surmised that he was "probably" Black because of the way he spoke. JW told the police that the White woman's hair was "reddish" and that a maroon car containing the man's "friend" was nearby at the time of the crash.

Soon after her initial statement to the officer, JW provided another statement. She told the police that there was no one on the street or sidewalk at the time of the crash. She gave the police several inconsistent descriptions of the alleged White female driver, stating that the woman had "long white hair"; that the woman had "some red hair, like it was real dark"; and that the woman had white "brushy hair," but it was "real short and stylish."

At trial, JW testified that she did not recall telling the police that a White woman was driving the silver car. The defense did not attempt to impeach JW with her prior statements to the police while she was on the stand. Instead, the day after JW testified, Jefferson moved to introduce JW's prior statements to the police as substantive evidence and for impeachment purposes. Jefferson indicated that he would offer JW's statements through an officer who had interviewed her. The district court denied Jefferson's motion.

The jury found Jefferson not guilty of second-degree intentional murder, guilty of second-degree unintentional murder during the commission of a felony (assault with a dangerous weapon), guilty of both counts of felony domestic assault (against OB and AR), and not guilty of aiding an accomplice in a crime after the fact. By special verdict form, the jury found that Jefferson hit OB with a motor vehicle after she exited the vehicle and left her in a particularly vulnerable state after hitting her.^[1]

The district court sentenced Jefferson to 27 months in prison for domestic assault of OB, 360 months for felony murder of OB, and 33 months for domestic assault of AR, with the sentences to be served concurrently. The sentence for felony murder constituted an upward durational departure, which was based on "particular cruelty."

Jefferson appeals.

DECISION

I.

Jefferson contends that the district court violated his right to present a defense by refusing to admit, as substantive evidence under the residual hearsay exception, JW's prior statements that she saw a White woman driving the car involved in the crash.

Due process requires that a defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. State v Smith, 876 N.W.2d 310, 331 (Minn. 2016); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. But the right to present a complete defense is not unlimited; a defendant must comply with the rules of evidence. State v. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d 381, 384 (Minn. 2000); State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 102 (Minn. 2011).

A district court's evidentiary rulings are generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Davis, 864 N.W.2d 171, 179 (Minn. 2015); State v. Kelly, 435 N.W.2d 807, 813 (Minn. 1989). The abuse-of-discretion standard applies even if a "defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." State v. Zumberge, 888 N.W.2d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017). "A court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." State v. Thomas, 891 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

If evidence was erroneously excluded in violation of the defendant's right to present a defense, a reviewing court will reverse the resulting conviction unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. 1994). "[T]he reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized, an average jury (i.e., a reasonable jury) would have reached the same verdict." Id. (footnote omitted). "If, on the other hand, there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted, then the erroneous exclusion of the evidence is prejudicial." Id.

Jefferson's due-process argument raises a hearsay issue. Hearsay "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible unless permitted by an evidentiary rule or statutory exception. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). "If a statement is not covered under a specific hearsay exemption or exception, it still may be admitted under the 'residual exception' found in Minnesota Rule of Evidence 807." Id.

Under rule 807:

A statement not specifically covered by [r]ule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material

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