State v. Jenkins

Page 969

672 A.2d 969

40 Conn.App. 601

STATE of Connecticut v. Lawaun JENKINS.

No. 13340.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 11, 1995.

Decided March 19, 1996.

Certification Denied May 28, 1996.

David M. Wallman, Stamford, for appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Attorney, and Margaret K. Luchansky, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before LAVERY, SCHALLER and FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN, JJ.

SCHALLER, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, ¹ rendered after a jury trial, of assault of a peace officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167c ² and interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. ³ The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) failed to instruct the jury on the elements of intent and causation as to the charge of assault of a peace officer, (2) failed to instruct the jury on the element of intent as to the charge of interference with an officer, and (3) violated his right not to be placed in double jeopardy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On August 14, 1992, at approximately 7 p.m., Officers Paul Nikola and Diane Pato were on patrol in Bridgeport. Ismaer Rivera and Eva Rivera approached the officers and reported that moments before they had stopped for a red light at the intersection of Noble and Barnum Avenues when an individual approached their car. The Riveras stated that the individual had tried to get in their car, to attack them and rob them, but that they had driven away when the light turned green, leaving the individual behind.

After the Riveras reported the incident, the officers and the Riveras returned to the intersection where they had encountered the defendant, whom the Riveras identified as the individual who had tried to get in their car. Officer David Riehl also arrived as backup. The officers, all wearing police uniforms, informed the defendant that he fit the description of an individual involved in an attempted robbery and that he would have to come with them to the police station.

The defendant pushed two officers away and attempted to flee. All three officers pursued the defendant until Riehl tackled the defendant. The defendant struggled with the three officers and attempted to grab Riehl's gun. During the struggle, Riehl sustained a painful cut on his elbow. At some point during the struggle, Nikola informed the defendant that he was under arrest. While being taken to a police vehicle, the defendant by wrapping his legs around a signpost, further hindered Nikola. Nikola and Riehl forcibly removed the defendant from the post and placed him in the police vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, the defendant repeatedly struck his head against a window.

I

The defendant claims the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the elements of intent and causation as to the charge of assault of a peace officer. The defendant argues that, by failing to instruct the jury on essential elements of the crime, the trial court misled the jury and deprived the him of his due process right. We find no merit in the defendant's claims.

A

The defendant did not preserve his claim in the trial court that that court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the element of intent and, therefore, seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). A defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only by satisfying the four conditions of Golding. ⁴ Id., at 239, 567 A.2d 823. " 'We are free, however, to dispose of the claim by focusing on the condition that appears most relevant under the circumstances of the case.' " State v. Krzywicki, 39 Conn.App. 832, 836, 668 A.2d 387 (1995) quoting State v. Andrews, 29 Conn.App. 533, 537, 616 A.2d 1148 (1992), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 924, 618 A.2d 531 (1993).

A "failure to instruct the jury adequately with regard to an essential element of the crime of assault of a peace officer may result in a due process violation implicating the fairness of the trial. State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 313-14, 630 A.2d 593 (1993). The issue is one of constitutional magnitude implicating a fundamental right." State v. Dunbar, 37 Conn.App. 338, 342, 656 A.2d 672, cert. denied, 233 Conn. 906, 657 A.2d 644 (1995). The defendant has failed to show, however, that a constitutional violation exists and that he was clearly deprived of a fair trial.

The defendant argues that the trial court misled the jury when it failed to define intent specifically as to the charge of assault of a peace officer. ⁵ We note, however, that the trial court first instructed the jury on the charges of attempt to commit robbery in the second degree and attempt to commit larceny in the second degree and, in so doing, specifically defined intent. ⁶ The trial court also stated: "I remind you that the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt is on the state."

"Under the third prong of Golding, a defendant may prevail on an unpreserved constitutional claim of instructional error only if from the substance of the charge rather than its form, it is reasonably possible that the jury was misled. State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 65, 630 A.2d 990 (1993). To be adequate, the charge must have provided the jurors with a clear understanding of the elements of the crime of assault of a police officer, and have afforded proper guidance for the determination of whether those elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Dunbar, supra, 37 Conn.App. at 343, 656 A.2d 672. The instruction to the jury must be considered as a whole in determining whether there is a reasonable possibility that the jury was misled. State v. Lemoine, 233 Conn. 502, 509, 659 A.2d 1194 (1995).

Having reviewed the charge as a whole, and noting the similarities between this case and State v. Dunbar, supra, 37 Conn.App. at 338, 656 A.2d 672, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled. See also State v. March, 39 Conn.App. 267, 664 A.2d 1157, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 930, 667 A.2d 801 (1995); State v. Jackson, 34 Conn.App. 599, 642 A.2d 738, cert. granted, 231 Conn. 917, 648 A.2d 165 (1994) (appeal withdrawn October 18, 1994). Although the trial court did not specifically define intent when instructing the jury on the charge of assault of a peace officer, the trial court conveyed to the jury that it must find intent beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant. Moreover, the trial court used the word in its ordinary meaning. " '[W]hen a word contained in an essential element carries it ordinary meaning, failure to give the statutory definition will not constitute error.' " State v. Dunbar, supra, 37 Conn.App. at 344, 656 A.2d 672, quoting State v. Sinclair, 197 Conn. 574, 581, 500 A.2d 539 (1985). The defendant's claim, therefore, fails under the third prong of Golding.

B

The defendant adequately preserved his claim at trial that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the element of causation. The trial court instructed the jury that General Statutes § 53a-167c requires the state to prove causation, but did not provide the jury with an expanded definition of causation. ⁷ The defendant argues that, because of the many definitions of causation, the instruction misled the jury and deprived him of a fair trial.

Riehl testified at trial that when he, Nikola and Pato approached the defendant, the defendant ran away. When Riehl tackled the defendant from behind, the defendant attempted to grab Riehl's gun and struggled to resist arrest. Riehl further testified that Nikola and Pato were also involved in the struggle, that he "was on the bottom of the whole pile," and that he received a painful cut on his elbow. The trial court instructed the jury to recall Riehl's testimony as well as the testimony of the other officers to determine whether the state had proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ⁸

As long as the jury charge provides the jury with a clear understanding of the elements of the crime and guidance for proper determination of whether those elements were present, the charge is constitutionally adequate. See State v. Lemoine, supra, 233 Conn. at 509, 659 A.2d 1194; State v. Sinclair, supra, 197 Conn. at 581, 500 A.2d 539. Our Supreme Court has discussed the requirements of proper jury instructions on causation in criminal prosecutions in several decisions. See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 659 A.2d 683 (1995); State v. Leroy, 232 Conn. 1, 653 A.2d 161 (1995); State v. Spates, 176 Conn. 227, 405 A.2d 656 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 1248, 59 L.Ed.2d 475 (1979). Most significantly, the Supreme Court recently stated in State v. Munoz, supra, at 121 n. 8, 659 A.2d 683: "We emphasize that, as State v. Leroy, supra, 232 Conn. [at] 13 [653 A.2d 161], suggests, the requirement of language in the jury instructions regarding an efficient, intervening cause is not ironclad. It arises in those cases in which the evidence supports a finding by the jury that the defendant's conduct was overcome by an efficient, intervening cause, or in which the evidence regarding proximate cause was such that, based on the doctrine of efficient, intervening cause, the jury could have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. Thus, in the general run of cases, in which the evidence is susceptible of a finding of only one cause of harm contemplated by the statute, a statement in the jury instruction referring to an efficient, intervening cause might well be unnecessary."

We conclude that because this case does not contain a complex issue of causation, the trial court did not improperly deny the defendant's request for an expanded definition of causation. The facts support the conclusion that, if the defendant had not resisted arrest...