State v. Johnson

544 P.3d 766

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Develin Lynn JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 50026

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, December 2023 Term.

Opinion Filed: February 29, 2024

Appeal front the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Roger B. Harris, District Judge. Thomas Kershaw, Magistrate Judge.

The district court’s decision is affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender, attorney for Appellant. Andrea Reynolds argued.

Raul R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, attorney for Respondent. Kenneth Jorgensen argued.

BEVAN, Chief Justice:

Develin Johnson appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision affirming his convictions for domestic battery and false imprisonment. On intermediate appeal to the district court, Johnson argued that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine him about a 2013 misdemeanor conviction for petit theft. While the district court initially vacated Johnson’s judgment of conviction, the court later granted a petition for rehearing from the State, and ultimately affirmed Johnson’s conviction. On appeal to this Court, Johnson argues that the district court erred in affirming his judgment of conviction because his misdemeanor conviction for theft was inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Evidence 608(b) and the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. For the reasons below, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Johnson was charged with domestic battery and false imprisonment following a fight with his girlfriend, K.C. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and K.C. was the first witness for the State. During her testimony, K.C. acknowledged she was in a romantic relationship with Johnson and living with him. Following a verbal argument at their home that escalated throughput the day, K.C. testified she tried to remove herself from the argument and leave the bedroom, but Johnson physically prevented her from doing so. Johnson then grabbed K.C., pinning her to the bed, which caused bruising and redness to K.C.’s arms. After K.C. testified, the State presented testimony from Officer Comeau, who testified to witnessing the bruises on K.C. Comeau interviewed Johnson, and Johnson admitted he grabbed "on to [K.C.’s] arms and put her down onto the bed" after K.C. slapped him.

After the State rested, outside the presence of the jury, the magistrate court asked if Johnson intended to testify on his own behalf. Johnson said he would testify. The State said it had "some [I.R.E.] 608 impeachment evidence about a prior incident from a few years ago where the defendant was using a credit card without permission and admitted it to police." Counsel for Johnson said he would object if the State attempted to introduce Johnson’s prior conviction. The State argued that "a theft case … squarely falls within credibility and squarely is impeachment evidence." In response to the magistrate, the State conceded it would not talk about Johnson’s conviction "unless, you know, the defendant denies it in some way."

Ultimately, the magistrate court concluded Johnson’s conduct during that crime "would be relevant to his character for truthfulness"; thus, admissibility was "just a 403 question." According to the magistrate, "whether it’s unfairly prejudicial, that is, if the prejudice outweighs its probative value, substantially outweighs, then it would still be inadmissible under Rule 403." The court elaborated, "it’s a close case, only because it’s so old," but "[i]n this situation I don’t think it does substantially outweigh," and so "I will allow that question to be asked."

Johnson took the stand to testify in his own defense, describing his version of events during the argument with K.C. On cross-examination, Johnson testified that he was "telling the truth" and was "a very honest man." During cross-examination, the following exchange took place between the State and Johnson:

[The State]: All right. And I’m assuming you’re telling the truth today?

[Johnson]: Yes, sir, I am telling the truth.

[The State]: Because you’re an honest man; fair to say?

[Johnson]: I’m a very honest man, sir.

[The State]: Okay. And telling the truth to Officer Cameau at the time about what happened because you’re an honest man; is that right?

[Johnson]: Yes.

[The State]: And isn’t it also true that in 2013 you had a case where you were investigated for using somebody’s debit card multiple occasions to withdraw money?

[Johnson]: Yes.

[The State]: And you did that without their permission?

[Johnson]: Yes.

[The State]: Withdrew about $450 over the course of about three days; is that right?

[Johnson]: Exactly $450, yes, sir.

[The State]: So you remember that very well?

[Johnson]: Yes, sir, I do. Would you like to know the cause or why I did it?

[The State]: Well, I know what you told the police. You said that there was an ex-girlfriend or someone that had kids that you wanted to pay for.

[Johnson]: No, it was my son allegedly. I thought that I was going to be a dad. I had just gotten back from basic training, and I didn’t have a job or anything. I was going through a tough time.

[The State]: But you’re an honest man?

[Johnson]: I have pride and I didn’t think that telling someone’s parents of a new girlfriend that you just had that you might be having a kid was a great idea. Once again, that was also eight years ago and I was very young.

[The State]: And that’s when you took the debit card and used it seven times to withdraw 450 bucks?

[Johnson]: Yes, and then I sent that money to my ex for our son after he was born. After both sides rested, the State argued in closing that "the defendant’s character for honesty is really important in this case." Counsel for Johnson countered during his closing arguments that "[t]he real question in front of [the jury] is one of credibility." The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The magistrate court sentenced Johnson to 180 days in jail for domestic battery, with 178 days suspended, and credit for two days served. For false imprisonment, Johnson was sentenced to 365 days in jail, with 360 days suspended and credit for two days served. Johnson was placed on probation for 24 months.

Johnson appealed his judgment of conviction to the district court, arguing that the magistrate court erred when it allowed the State to cross-examine him about his 2013 conviction. The district court initially reversed Johnson’s conviction, concluding:

In other words, if the State wants to attempt to attack a witness’ character for truthfulness, it can do so by bringing up evidence of past felony convictions, subject to the limitations and balancing tests required by I.R.E. Rule 609(a), or it may attempt to offer evidence about the witness’ reputation for truthfulness/untruthfulness in the form of opinion testimony as allowed by I.R.E. Rule 608(a). Disregarding the notice requirements of I.R.E. Rule 404(b) which should have been filed in advance of trial if the State intended to inquire about specific instances of past criminal conduct (which notice was not given), the State may not discuss a witness’ prior instances of specific conduct in an effort to attack that witness’ character for truthfulness, except by referencing the existence of prior felony convictions as allowed by I.R.E. Rule 609(a).

After the district court’s decision, the State petitioned for rehearing, relying, In part, on State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 316 P.3d 117 (Ct. App. 2013). In its amended petition for rehearing, the State emphasized that the prosecutor never referred to Johnson’s petit theft as a "conviction" before the jury. The district court ultimately agreed because, "although the connotation that Mr. Johnson might have been involved in a criminal case is present, the word ‘conviction’ [was] never used[.]" From this, the district court "agree[d] with the [m]agistrate’s conclusion that theft is typically the type of conduct that is associated with dishonesty, and that the line of questioning was therefore appropriate." Johnson timely appeals.

II. Standards of Review

[1, 2] When this Court reviews the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate capacity,

[t]he Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported

and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s decision, we affirm the district court’s decision as a matter of, procedure.

Houston v. Houston, 172 Idaho 264, 268, 531 P.3d 1161, 1165 (2023) (quoting Nelson v. Evans, 166 Idaho 815, 819, 464 P.3d 301, 305 (2020)). "Importantly, ‘this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court[,]…[r]ather, we are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.’" Id. (quoting Matter of Est. of Hirning, 167 Idaho 669, 675, 475 P.3d 1191, 1197 (2020)).

[3, 4] Separately, "whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Ogden, 171 Idaho 258, 266, 519 P.3d 1198, 1206 (2022) (quoting State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018)). When this Court reviews a lower court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, it must analyze "whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and, (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577, 591, 448 P.3d 1005, 1019 (2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

III. An...