State v. Johnson

173 Ohio St.3d 335

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Jordan, Appellant.

The State of Ohio, Appellee, v. Johnson, Appellant.

[Cite as State v. Jordan, 173 Ohio St.3d 335, 2023-Ohio-2666.]

Appeals dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

(Nos. 2022-0733 and 2022-0734—Submitted April 18, 2023—Decided August 3, 2023.)

Appeals from the Court of Appeals for Scioto County, Nos. 20CA3936, 2022-Ohio-1480, and 20CA3935, 2022-Ohio-1479.

Fischer, J., announcing the judgment of the court.

{¶1} We dismiss these causes as having been improvidently accepted.

{¶ 2} Under Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(e) of the Ohio Constitution, this court has discretionary jurisdiction over "cases of public or great general interest." After reviewing the briefing and oral arguments in these cases, we determine that this standard is not met in these appeals.

{¶ 3} We note that appellants fail to present us with a legal argument related to the sole proposition of law that we accepted for review in each case. Notably, the three propositions of law argued in appellants Sashia Johnson’s and Adrienne Jordan’s merit briefs differ from the single proposition of law over which we granted jurisdiction, see 167 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2022-Ohio-3214, 195 N.E.3d 138; 167 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2022-Ohio-3214, 195 N.E.3d 139, and appellants’ expansive arguments move beyond the scope of the issue over which we granted jurisdiction.

{¶ 4} We also briefly address the concerns raised in the dissenting opinion. The position taken in the dissenting opinion is premised on its analysis of the continuing viability of State v. Chambliss, 128 Ohio St.3d 507, 2011-Ohio-1785, 947 N.E.2d 651. See dissenting opinion, ¶ 35. After oral argument in these cases, we sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing on whether a final order exists in these cases within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02 and further asked the parties to address Chambliss. 169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 715; 169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 716. Notably, all the parties advocated for following Chambliss and concluding that the order is appealable.

{¶ 5} Chambliss was a unanimous decision announced by this court only 12 years ago. In Chambliss, the court considered the arguments for concluding that the denial of retained counsel of choice cannot be immediately appealed, and the court rejected those arguments. See Chambliss at ¶ 16-22. In these appeals, no party has argued that the Chambliss court erred or that in the 12 years since the Chambliss decision, the experience of the bench and bar has proved that Chambliss was wrongly decided. Nor did either of the lower courts have an opportunity to consider this issue.

{¶ 6} We conclude that these appeals do not function as a suitable vehicle for reevaluating Chambliss. The conclusion of the dissenting opinion may very well be correct; however, in these appeals, we opt to take what one might call a more "judicially conservative" approach. At this time, we reserve any reevaluation of Chambliss for a case that asks us to do so in the ordinary course, with the parties and lower courts having argued and considered the issue and having properly presented it to us in a way that allows us to fully consider the pros and cons of overruling Chambliss.

{¶ 7} We dismiss these causes as having been improvidently accepted.

Causes dismissed.

Donnelly and Stewart, JJ., concur.

Brunner, J., concurs in judgment only.

DeWine, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by Kennedy, C.J., and Deters, J.

DeWine, J., dissenting.

{¶ 8} These appeals arise from an interlocutory order issued in a criminal proceeding. The trial court removed a law firm representing two codefendants from the case, based on the judge’s assessment that the dual representation was likely to create a conflict of interest for the firm’s attorneys. The defendants immediately appealed the trial court’s order to the court of appeals, asserting that the judge’s decision violated their Sixth Amendment rights to be represented by the counsel of their choice. This court accepted the appeals to address that constitutional question.

{¶ 9} Of course, in any appeal, we must determine the threshold matter of whether we have jurisdiction over the cases. Most of the time, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to review decisions made by a trial court while the proceedings are still ongoing: the parties must wait to contest any errors made during the litigation until the trial court has issued a final determination on the merits. The same goes here. As I will explain, both this court and the court of appeals below lack jurisdiction over these appeals. I would therefore vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

{¶ 10} The majority, though, chooses to punt. Despite having accepted these cases, having entertained oral argument and briefing, and even having ordered postargument briefing on the jurisdictional issue, the majority dismisses the cases without ever answering the question whether there was appellate jurisdic- tion in the first place. Nor does the majority do what it rightfully ought to do if it is really convinced that there is jurisdiction: reach the constitutional issue for which it accepted these cases.

{¶ 11} By deciding not to decide, the majority squanders a prime opportunity to repair a troublesome glitch in our caselaw about the final-order doctrine. In the process, it has unnecessarily added another 11 months of delay to a trial that should have been completed years ago. Even worse, it leaves litigants in the lurch—not knowing when they should appeal a denial-of-chosen-counsel issue. I dissent.

I. A criminal trial is put on hold before it starts

{¶ 12} Back in June of 2020, Sashia Johnson and Adrienne Jordan were riding together in a Cadillac Escalade. It was Jordan’s vehicle, but Johnson was behind the wheel. Ohio state troopers stopped and searched the vehicle and discovered a large amount of cocaine. The pair was charged with felony drug trafficking and possession.

{¶ 13} The two women hired the same law firm to represent them. The prosecution raised the concern that the dual representation might create a conflict of interest as the case progressed. The firm’s attorneys insisted that the pair’s interests were aligned, and the two women signed waivers of any conflict. But in November 2020, after holding two hearings on the matter, the trial court determined that there was serious potential for a conflict of interest to develop. The court therefore removed the attorneys from the case and ordered the women to obtain new counsel.

{¶ 14} A few weeks later, Jordan and Johnson filed interlocutory appeals from that order, asserting that the trial court violated their Sixth Amendment rights to be represented by the counsel of their choice. See generally United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). The appeals halted all proceedings in the cases at the trial court. In April 2022, the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and remanded the cases for further proceedings. State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-1479, 187 N.E.3d 1071; State v. Jordan, 2022-Ohio-1480, 2022 WL 1416368. Jordan and Johnson then appealed to this court, raising the same proposition of law: "Conflicts of interest in multiple representation cases should be judged by a clear and understandable standard or test." In September 2022, this court accepted the appeals and consolidated them for briefing and argument. See Jordan, 167 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2022-Ohio-3214, 195 N.E.3d 138; Johnson, 167 Ohio St.3d 1516, 2022-Ohio-3214, 195 N.E.3d 139.

{¶ 15} During our review of the record, a question arose as to whether this court had jurisdiction. So, following oral arguments, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing "whether the common pleas court’s order disqualifying defense counsel constituted a final, appealable order within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02." Jordan, 169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 715; Johnson, 169 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2023-Ohio-1027, 206 N.E.3d 716.

II. Appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final orders

{¶ 16} Before we may exercise the power to review a case on appeal, we must first satisfy ourselves that we have been granted the jurisdiction to do so and that the lower courts also had jurisdiction to do so. See State v. Yontz, 169 Ohio St.3d 55, 2022-Ohio-2745, 201 N.E.3d 867, ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Sands v. Culotta, 165 Ohio St.3d 172, 2021-Ohio-1137, 176 N.E.3d 735, ¶ 7.

{¶ 17} The Ohio Constitution grants the courts of appeals "such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district." (Emphasis added.) Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). The "provided by law" part of the constitutional provision means that the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is set forth by statute. R.C. 2505.02 provides the requirements for a trial court’s decision to constitute a final order.

{¶ 18} The final-order requirement is consistent with the longstanding rule that a party generally must seek review of all errors in a case in a single appeal following a final adjudication of the case on the merits. See Anderson v. Richards, 173 Ohio St. 50, 55, 179 N.E.2d 918 (1962); Ashtabula v. Pub. Util. Comm., 139 Ohio St. 213, 215, 39 N.E.2d 144 (1942); see also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). This rule serves several important interests. It "minimiz[es] appellate-court interference" in the trial-court proceedings and "reduces the ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals." Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-264, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). And it promotes judicial economy "by forbidding piecemeal...