State v. Johnson

813 N.W.2d 1

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Randolph JOHNSON, Jr., Appellant.

No. A09–0247.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 25, 2012.

Syllabus by the Court

1. As applied to appellant, Minn.Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1) (2010), which requires a defendant charged with a felony and then convicted of a misdemeanor arising out of the same set of circumstances to provide a DNA sample for identification purposes, does not violate the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures in the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions.

2. As applied to appellant, Minn.Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1), which requires a defendant charged with a felony and then convicted of a misdemeanor arising out of the same set of circumstances to provide a DNA sample for identification purposes, does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

William M. Ward, Chief Hennepin County Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public Defender, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.

OPINION

DIETZEN, Justice.

This case presents the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1) (2010), violates the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, or the Equal Protection Clause in either the U.S. or Minnesota Constitutions. Subdivision 1(1) requires a defendant charged with a felony and then convicted of a misdemeanorarising out of the same set of circumstances “to provide a biological specimen” to determine the person's DNA profile for the limited purpose of criminal identification. Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test, we conclude that the State's legitimate governmental interests in conducting a search of Johnson to collect a biological specimen for criminal identification purposes outweigh appellant's reduced expectation of privacy following his misdemeanor conviction arising out of the same set of circumstances as his felony charge. Consequently, as applied to Johnson, Minn.Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1), does not violate the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures in the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. We also conclude that Johnson's equal protection claim fails. Accordingly, we affirm.

In September 2008, Johnson was charged with felony domestic assault in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2010) (prohibiting a person from assaulting a family or household member by strangulation), and misdemeanor fifth-degree assault in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.224, subd. 1(2) (2010) (prohibiting a person from intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm on another), arising out of an incident in which Johnson allegedly punched and strangled A.J. while Johnson was intoxicated.

Before trial, the State offered to dismiss the felony domestic assault charge in exchange for Johnson's guilty plea to an amended charge of misdemeanor domestic assault in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2010) (prohibiting a person from engaging in conduct with the intent to cause another to fear immediate bodily harm). Johnson accepted the offer. At the guilty plea hearing, the parties disagreed about whether Johnson was required to submit a DNA sample pursuant to section 609.117, subdivision 1(1). The district court allowed the parties to brief the DNA-sample issue, and indicated that if the court ruled against Johnson, he could withdraw his guilty plea. Johnson pleaded guilty to the amended charge, and the district court scheduled a sentencing hearing.

At the sentencing hearing, Johnson argued that the portion of section 609.117, subdivision 1(1), that requires a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor to submit a DNA sample violated the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures and was a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. The district court rejected Johnson's arguments and concluded the statute is constitutional. Johnson chose not to withdraw his guilty plea, and the court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed sentence. Johnson's 90–day sentence was stayed, and Johnson was placed on probation for two years. The conditions of Johnson's probation were, among other things: (1) that he not commit another assault, violate a protection order applicable to him, or interfere with a 911 call; (2) that he complete a domestic violence education program; (3) that he submit to random urinalysis; and (4) that he abstain from alcohol and non-prescribed drugs. The court also ordered the DNA sample, but stayed the order pending appeal.

In a published opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's conclusion that section 609.117, subdivision 1(1), is constitutional as applied to a defendant charged with a felony and then convicted of a misdemeanor arising out of the same set of circumstances. State v. Johnson, 777 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn.App.2010). The court also denied Johnson's equal protection challenge on the grounds that Johnson failed to identify the category of persons he considers to be similarly situatedto himself, and therefore failed to demonstrate that section 609.117, subdivision 1(1), results in a denial of equal protection of the laws. Id. Subsequently, Johnson filed a petition for review, which we granted.

I.

Johnson argues that Minn.Stat. § 609.117, subd. 1(1), is unconstitutional because it requires a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor to provide a DNA sample in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. The State argues that a defendant charged with a felony and then convicted of a misdemeanor arising out of the same set of circumstances has a reduced expectation of privacy, and that the State's interest in DNA collection outweighs that reduced expectation of privacy; therefore, collecting a DNA sample from that defendant is not an unreasonable search or seizure.

The constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Melde, 725 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.2006). We presume Minnesota statutes are constitutional and will strike down a statute as unconstitutional only if absolutely necessary. See State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn.1997). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a constitutional provision. State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 14 (Minn.2008).

To answer the question presented, we must examine the statutes that authorize the collection of a biological specimen and the provisions of the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions that prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures, and then apply the constitutional protections to the statutes at issue in this case.

Section 609.117, subdivision 1, provides that a

court shall order an offender to provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis as defined in section 299C.155 when: (1) the court sentences a person charged with committing or attempting to commit a felony offense and the person is convicted of that offense or of any offense arising out of the same set of circumstances.¹

It is undisputed that Johnson, who was charged with felony domestic assault by strangulation and then convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault “arising out of the same set of circumstances,” was convicted of a crime that satisfies the requirements of section 609.117, subdivision 1(1).

Section 609.117, subdivision 1, incorporates the definition of “DNA analysis” in section 299C.155, subdivision 1. DNA analysis means “the process through which deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) in a human biological specimen is analyzed and compared with DNA from another human biological specimen for identification purposes.” Minn.Stat. § 299C.155, subd. 1 (2010). Thus, the term “DNA analysis” is expressly limited to the collection and analysis of a biological sample for identification purposes. Id.; accordMinn.Stat. § 299C.09 (2010). Section 609.117, subdivision 1, does not authorize the collection of a biological sample for any other purpose.²

The DNA collection authorized by section 609.117, subdivision 1, is conducted using uniform procedures and protocols. Minn.Stat. § 299C.155 (2010). A biological specimen may be collected using a buccal swab, which involves “gently swab[bing] the inside of the cheek [with a sterile cotton swab].” Minn. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Guide to DNA Analysis 1 (2003). The DNA profile (which does not contain the person's full DNA sequence) is placed in a database that is linked to the National DNA Offender Database (CODIS). Id. at 3; Nat'l Inst. of Justice, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing 19–20 (2000). To ensure privacy, personal identifiers such as social security number and case-related information are not stored in the CODIS database. Nat'l Inst. of Justice, supra, at 20. The DNA profiles stored in the database may be accessed by authorized law enforcement personnel solely for law enforcement identification purposes. Minn.Stat. § 299C.155, subd. 3; see also42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3)(a) (2006).

The precise question we must decide is whether the collection of biological specimens for identification purposes authorized by section 609.117, subdivision 1(1), is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The language of Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution is identical. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness....” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). Generally, the reasonableness of a search depends...