State v. Jonas

900 S.E.2d 915

STATE of North Carolina

v.Daniel Raymond JONAS

No. 433PA21

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed May 23, 2024

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 280 N.C. App. 511, 867 S.E.2d 563 (2021), reversing and remanding an order entered on 17 December 2019 by Judge Athena Brooks in Cabarrus County Superior Court, Cabarrus County, and remanding the case. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 September 2023.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kristin Jo Uicker, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Amanda S. Zimmer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.

RIGGS, Justice.

Under the General Statutes of North Carolina, a defendant has the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress after the entry of a guilty plea. N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(b) (2023). However, to ensure fundamental fairness in the plea negotiation process, this Court ruled in State v. Reynolds that the statute did not apply in situations where the State and a defendant had negotiated a plea agreement, holding that a defendant must "give notice of his intention [to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress] to the prosecutor and the court before plea negotiations are finalized or he will waive the appeal of right provisions of the statute." 298 N.C. 380, 397, 259 S.E.2d 843 (1979). In this case, the State asks us to extend Reynolds to apply when a defendant pleads guilty without a plea agreement (sometimes referred to as an "open plea" or "straight plea"). Because open pleas do not necessitate the expansion of Reynolds we decline to apply the Reynolds rule to open pleas. We hold that when a defendant enters a guilty plea without a plea agreement, the defendant does not waive his or her right of appeal by pleading guilty without prior notice of intent to appeal.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Defendant Daniel Raymond Jonas was indicted for possession of a controlled substance after officers located 0.1 grams of methamphetamine in his car during a traffic stop. Mr. Jonas filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, in which he argued that the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop and subsequent search of Mr. Jonas’s vehicle. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence.

Subsequently, Mr. Jonas pleaded guilty as charged during a sentencing hearing. Before accepting Mr. Jonas’s guilty plea, the trial court asked Mr. Jonas if he had agreed to plead guilty as part of a plea arrangement, and Mr. Jonas confirmed that he had not. The State did not object or correct Mr. Jonas’s assertion. Mr. Jonas then pleaded guilty. Mr. Jonas did not give notice of his intent to appeal before the entry of his guilty plea, but minutes after sentencing, at the same hearing, Mr. Jonas’s counsel gave oral notice of appeal on the record. That is, the guilty plea and the notice of appeal occurred on the same day at the same hearing.

The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, held that Mr. Jonas was not required to give notice of intent to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress prior to entering his guilty plea because he did not plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. State v. Jonas, 280 N.C. App 511, 516, 867 S.E.2d 563 (2021). The Court of Appeals further held that the stop of Mr. Jonas’s vehicle was unconstitutional, and that the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Jonas’s motion to suppress. Id. at 525, 867 S.E.2d 563.

II. Analysis

[1] In this appeal, the State argues that a defendant who enters a guilty plea without a plea agreement is still obligated to comply with the rule established in Reynolds, in order to retain his or her right to appeal. Such defendant, according to the State, must advise the trial court and the prosecutor of the defendant’s intent to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress prior to the entry of his or her plea. Because the principles of fundamental fairness that dictated the outcome in Reynolds are not implicated when there is no plea agreement, we hold that defendants who plead guilty without a plea agreement are not obligated to provide notice of intent to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress prior to the entry of a guilty plea.

Broadly speaking, the General Assembly established a statutory right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress even when a defendant enters a guilty plea. N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(b). This Court in Reynolds ruled when the defendant enters a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement they must give notice of intent to appeal before entering the plea. Reynolds, 298 N.C. at 397, 259 S.E.2d 843. However, the reasoning that undergirds the Reynolds rule is not implicated when the defendant enters a guilty plea without a plea agreement.

[2] Generally, when a defendant enters a "guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily [and] with the aid of counsel, [the plea] bars the latter assertion of constitutional challenges to the plea negotiation proceeding." Id. at 394, 259 S.E.2d 843 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970)). However, in McMann, the Supreme Court identified an exception to this general rule holding that a plea is a waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence the State might have offered against the defendant "unless the applicable law otherwise provides." 397 U.S. at 766, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (emphasis added).

Here, similar to the New York statute in McMann, the General Assembly has provided the right for a defendant to seek appellate review of "[a]n order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, including a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty." N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(b) (emphasis added). The General Assembly enacted the statute with the intention of "prevent[ing] a defendant whose only real defense is the motion to suppress from going through a trial simply to preserve his right of appeal." N.C.G.S. § 15A-979, Official Commentary.

In Reynolds, this Court considered whether a defendant should be able to avail himself of the right of appeal under N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(b) after receiving the benefit of a negotiated plea agreement when he did not disclose his intent to appeal during the plea negotiations. 298 N.C. at 397, 259 S.E.2d 843. In the arena of plea bargaining, the Court noted that it was "entirely inappropriate for either side to keep secret any attempt to appeal the conviction." Id. The Court held that when a defendant intends to appeal from a suppression order, "he must give notice of his intention to the prosecutor and the court before plea negotiations are finalized or he will waive the appeal of right provisions of the statute." Id.

Both parties in Reynolds benefited from the negotiated plea. The State made a significant concession in the Reynolds plea agreement. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree rape, and first-degree burglary. Id. at 381, 259 S.E.2d 843. After the court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the State agreed to a plea arrangement where the defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of second-degree murder, in addition to first-degree rape, and first-degree burglary, and he received two consecutive life sentences. Id. at 381-82, 259 S.E.2d 843. Through the bargain, the defendant avoided conviction on more serious charges and the State avoided having to conduct a trial. Only after the court accepted the negotiated plea and several months later imposed the agreed-upon sentence did the defendant give notice of appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress. Id. at 388, 229 S.E.2d 843. In holding that the defendant had waived his right to appeal by failing to disclose his intent to appeal, this Court reasoned that neither "our statute, nor the holding in Lefkowitz¹ contemplates a factual pattern such as that disclosed here—one which would cause the State to be trapped into agreeing to a plea bargain in a case as gruesome as this and then have the defendant contest that bargain." Id. at 397, 259 S.E.2d 843. The Reynolds rule was necessary to advance the interest of fundamental fairness: both parties received a benefit of the bargain and the defendant’s nondisclosure of his intent to appeal upended one of the State’s benefits—an expectation of finality—after it made a concession on charges. See id at 396-97, 259 S.E.2d 843.

In contrast to Reynolds, this case turns on the significance of an open plea—a guilty plea entered without the benefit of an agreement with the State. In North Carolina, there is no system that tracks when charges are resolved through an open plea other than the plea transcript form (which includes a place where it can be designated there was no plea agreement) and the transcript of the plea hearing (including the colloquy). However, North Carolina does track the percentage of charges that are resolved through pleas rather than trials, which was 98% of all felony charges in 2022. N.C. Sent’g & Pol’y Advisory Comm’n, Structured Sentencing Statistical Report for Felonies and Misdemeanors: Fiscal Year 2022, at 4 (2023), https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/doeuments/publications/SPAC-FY-2022-Statistlcal-Report-web-v2.pdf?VersionId=5JR2.GZTlun 8tyouDZHNniXDWrmyM._w. The State has not advanced the argument that notwithstanding the plea transcript form and whatever answers a defendant may give in response to a plea colloquy, the State always engages in some form of plea negotiation.

While it appears that this Court has never addressed open pleas, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly acknowledged the existence of open pleas. See, e.g., State v. Frink, 158 N.C. App. 581, 588, 582 S.E.2d 617 (2003) ("[A coconspirator’s] guilty plea was an open plea of guilty, and not a plea agreement...