State v. Jones

686 S.W.3d 293

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Cyrez JONES, Appellant.

No. ED 111282

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION TWO.

FILED: March 5, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Honorable Katherine M. Fowler, Judge

For Appellant: David R. Angle, 920 E. Broadway, No. 205, Columbia, MO 65201.

For Respondent: Garrick F.D. Aplin, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, MO 65102.

KURT S. ODENWALD, Presiding Judge

Introduction

Cyrez Jones ("Jones") appeals from the trial court’s judgment following a jury conviction for unlawful use of a weapon. Jones raises three points on appeal. In Point One, Jones contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones did not act in self-defense or in defense of another. In Point Two, Jones alleges the trial court plainly erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on defense of another. Point Three similarly asserts the trial court plainly erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on self-defense. Point Two is dispositive of Jones’s appeal. Because the trial court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on use of force in defense of another, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.

Factual and Procedural History

This case arises out of a brief encounter in St. Louis City’s Bevo Mill neighborhood, after which the State charged Jones under Section 571.03 0.1(4)¹ for exhibiting, in the presence of one or more persons, a weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner. The case proceeded to jury trial, where Jones testified in his own defense. The following evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury instruction at issue, was adduced.²

On April 5, 2021, Jones was driving his car with two male passengers when he drove upon the scene of a homicide that had just occurred. A large crowd of onlookers had already gathered. Plain clothes officers, including Detective T.M. ("Detective"), were present at the scene, talking with people in the crowd and hoping to find witnesses to the homicide.

As Jones drove upon the scene, the front-seat passenger ("Passenger") unrolled the passenger-side window and leaned his body outside of the car. A verbal exchange ensued between Passenger and an unknown person in the crowd ("Bystander"). Initially, Passenger and Bystander were "talking back and forth," but the exchange escalated into a verbal altercation. Passenger told Jones that Bystander was pulling out a gun from behind his back. At that moment, there was not much distance between Jones’s car and Bystander; Jones testified that they were "close, close enough where anything could happen." Jones believed Bystander was "fixing to start firing," and that, had he kept driving, Bystander "would have just started shooting at the car." Passenger "ducked down," which caused Jones to believe that Bystander was going to start shooting into the car at Passenger. Jones testified that "[Passenger] was … in fear of his life" and that, to "[p]rotect [his] friends," Jones stopped driving and grabbed a gun from the backseat of the car.

Jones then got out of his car with his gun behind his back, pointed down. He stood near the back of his car, scanning the crowd for Bystander. Seeing neither a "threat" nor "anybody pointing [a] gun at [him or his passengers]," Jones returned to his car and drove away. Detective, who had observed Jones, testified that Jones got out of his car within "seconds" of the verbal altercation beginning and that the entire exchange was "real[ly] quick."

At some point, an unknown member of the crowd yelled out that "someone has a gun." Many onlookers fled, running in different directions. Detective and his partner returned to their car and followed Jones. A block or two from the scene, Detective and his partner activated their car lights and arrested Jones for unlawfully exhibiting a weapon.

At trial, the instruction conference took place after voir dire and before opening statements. The State proposed various instructions, including the verdict director. The trial court asked Jones if he had any objections to the State’s proposed instructions. Each time, Jones responded, "No, Your Honor." The trial court accepted a set of instructions that included neither a self-defense nor a defense of another instruction. Jones did not request a self-defense or defense of another instruction. At no point did the trial court sua sponte modify the instructions proposed by the State.

At various times during the trial, both the State and Jones raised the issues of self-defense and defense of another before the jury. For example, during Jones’s opening statement, counsel explained that Jones "got out of [his] car because [he] was standing [his] ground." During closing arguments, the State responded:

[Jones has] tried to explain it. He’s tried to say that, you know, he was standing his ground. But you don’t get to stand your ground when you’re driving by and someone yells at your friend. That’s not standing your ground. That’s injecting yourself into a situation, and that’s what [Jones] did here.

The State also argued that "[Jones] brought [the gun] out in the middle of the crowd in order to protect [Passenger]." In Jones’s closing argument, counsel stated that Jones "need[ed] to exit his vehicle because he [was] afraid there [was] a gun that [would] be shot at him and his occupants."

Approximately thirty minutes into the deliberations, the jury foreperson sent a question to the trial court, which the court read into the record:

[A]re there legal protections in the State of Missouri that would give [Jones] reasonable confidence that he could exhibit a weapon but keep it discreet/pointed down and not appear threatening? Stand your ground [?] and be within the letter of the law[?]

Jones asked the trial court to respond to the jury by explaining stand-your-ground law in Missouri, specifically that Jones had no duty to retreat. The trial court denied the request, admonishing Jones: "[T]here has been no evidence in this case, no stand-your-ground law. The jury’s not been instructed in any way on stand-your-ground law. That’s not been even an issue in the case, and the Court doesn’t feel that would be the appropriate response to this question." The trial court instructed the jurors that they should be guided by the evidence as they remembered it and by the reasonable inferences derived therefrom.

The jury found Jones guilty of unlawful use of a weapon. The trial court sentenced Jones to prison for two years but suspended the execution of the sentence and placed Jones on a two-year probation period. This appeal follows.

Points on Appeal

Jones raises three points on appeal. In Point One, Jones contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal at the close of all evidence because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones did not act in self-defense or defense of another. Points Two and Three concern instructional error. Jones maintains the trial court plainly erred in failing sua sponte to instruct the jury on justified use of force in defense of another (Point Two) and in self-defense (Point Three).

Standard of Review

Rule 28.03³ establishes counsel’s duty to make specific objections to jury instructions or verdict forms. Jones acknowledges he did not object to the instructions at trial and thus this point was not preserved for appeal. Jones asks that we use our discretion to review for plain error pursuant to Rule 30.20.

[1–3] "Generally, this Court does not review unpreserved claims of error." State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020). Rule 30.20 creates an exception and gives this Court discretion to review "plain errors affecting substantial rights … when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscamage of justice has resulted." Id. at 526 (quoting Rule 30.20). Our review under Rule 30.20 is a two-step process. State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 731 (Mo. banc 2022). "The first step requires a determination of whether the claim of error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted." Id. (quoting Grado v. State, 559 S.W.3d 888, 899 (Mo. banc 2018)). Manifest injustice must be established in connection to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. State v. Baxter, 204 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Mo. banc 2006).

[4–6] Only if the appellant meets this threshold burden do we proceed to the second step, where we initially determine whether the claimed error is "plain error," in that it is "evident, obvious, and clear." State v. Jackson-Kuofie, 646 S.W.3d 312, 315 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (citing State v. Baumruk, 280 S.W.3d 600, 607 (Mo. banc 2009)). If we find plain error, we determine whether it actually resulted in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 731 (quoting Grado, 559 S.W.3d at 899-900). Instructional error constitutes plain error when it is apparent that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury affected the jury’s verdict. State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150, 154 (Mo. banc 2011).

Discussion

I. Waiver of Instructional Error Claims

[7] As a preliminary matter, we address the issue of waiver. The State contends that Jones waived plain error review of his instructional error claims because Jones affirmatively stated he had no objection to the State’s instructions, including the verdict director. Because the Supreme Court of Missouri clearly has held to the contrary, we hold Jones has not waived plain error review.

[8–10] The State correctly identifies that, in certain contexts, counsel’s affirmative statement of "no objection" waives plain error review. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 582 (Mo. banc 2009) (finding defense counsel’s statement of "no objection" to the admission of an exhibit into the evidentiary record waives...