State v. Jones

900 S.E.2d 749

The STATE

v.JONES.

A24A0328

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

April 22, 2024

Carlton Todd Hayes, David Martin McElyea, for Appellant

Kimberly Keheley Frye, Jose Michael Namer, for Appellee.

Brown, Judge.

[1–5] Christopher Lee Jones was charged with DUI per se, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5), DUI less safe, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), reckless driving, OCGA § 40-6-390, and driving on the wrong side of the road, OCGA § 40-6-40. The State appeals from the grant of Jones’ motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case with direction.

When conducting an appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we follow three fundamental principles: First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State, 357 Ga. App. 396, 396-397, 850 S.E.2d 837 (2020). "To properly follow the first principle, we must focus on the facts found by the trial court in its order, as the trial court sits as the trier of fact." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Rouse, 309 Ga. App. 536, 710 S.E.2d 670 (2011). See also Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1), 770 S.E.2d 636 (2015) (on appeal from the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, appellate courts must "focus on the facts found by the trial court in its order") (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). "An appellate court may, however, consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such as facts indisputably discernible from a videotape." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Bly, 367 Ga. App. 786, 787, 888 S.E.2d 593 (2023).

So viewed, the evidence before the trial court consisted of testimony from the officer who conducted the traffic stop; a deputy who was called to the scene to conduct the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test; and video footage of the stop and subsequent investigation. That evidence showed that on September 27, 2022, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the officer was on his way to assist with an unrelated traffic stop when he observed Jones turn left into the exit lane of a divided entrance/roadway. The officer initiated a traffic stop at which point Jones stopped his vehicle, got out, and approached the officer’s patrol car. Jones told the officer that he could not see. After asking Jones for his driver’s license, the officer observed that Jones smelled of alcohol, and that his eyes were bloodshot and "glossed over." Jones admitted to drinking "a few" at which point the officer returned to his patrol car to run a check on Jones’ driver’s license and call for backup. After Jones explained to the officer that he was out driving because he had an argument with his wife — and approximately three minutes into the traffic stop — the officer advised Jones that he needed to run "a couple of evaluations to determine if [Jones was] safe to drive" and to "hang tight" while he waited for another unit.¹

After advising Jones to "hang tight," the officer got back in his patrol car for about three minutes and then moved it out of the roadway. Approximately seven minutes into the traffic stop, he exited his patrol car and waited with Jones for the other unit to arrive. While waiting, the officer and Jones made small talk, discussing Jones’ mother’s health, when the officer moved to Georgia, and other topics. Approximately eleven minutes after the officer called for a second unit, a deputy showed up and conducted the HGN evaluation.² After the deputy conducted the HGN evaluation, the officer conducted other field sobriety tests on Jones, including walk and turn and one-leg stand. Approximately 23 minutes into the traffic stop, the officer retrieved a portable breath test (PBT) from his patrol car and performed a breath test on Jones, which was positive for the presence of alcohol. At this point, Jones asked the officer, "why did we do all of that, when we could have just done this?" Jones was arrested for DUI. The officer held onto Jones’ driver’s license during the entire investigation.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress all evidence obtained after the officer began waiting for the second unit to arrive, ruling that the officer failed to diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions that Jones was driving under the influence, and that the detention was prolonged more than necessary. The court ruled, however, that the State can use any evidence gained before that time and found that the question of "whether [Jones’] arrest lacked probable cause is moot since the [c]ourt has suppressed all post-arrest evidence." In so ruling, the trial court found that the while the DUI investigation was initially valid, the officer pursued no investigation until the deputy arrived even though he was trained in conducting other field sobriety tests and had a PBT readily available in his patrol car, and that his standard procedure of waiting for backup was not a reasonable explanation for not undertaking some investigation. Indeed, the trial court found that it was the officer’s "personal preference" to wait for backup, implicitly rejecting his safety claim. This appeal followed.

[6] 1. The State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing all evidence obtained after the officer began waiting for the second unit to arrive because Jones’ detention was reasonable under the circumstances and supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. We disagree.

[7–12] The United States Supreme Court has held that ""an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time." Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (II), 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). See also Mullins v. State, 355 Ga. App. 452, 455 (1), 844 S.E.2d 519 (2020).

Claims that such a detention was unreasonably prolonged are of two sorts. In [the first sort], a detention is prolonged beyondthe conclusion of the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place, and in those cases, the courts generally have concluded that such a prolongation — even a short one — is unreasonable, unless, of course, good cause has appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention to pursue a different investigation. In [the second sort], the detention is not prolonged beyond the conclusion of the investigation that originally warranted the detention, but it is claimed that the investigation took too long, perhaps because the officer spent too much time inquiring about matters unrelated to the investigation. In these cases, the courts examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362, 369 (2) (b), 761 S.E.2d 19 (2014). The central question is "whether the detention was appreciably prolonged, considering the detention as a whole, and keeping in mind that the touchstone of our inquiry is reasonableness." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 370 (2) (b), 761 S.E.2d 19. It is the State’s burden of proving that the duration of the detention was reasonable. See Royer, 460 U. S. at 500 (II), 103 S.Ct. 1319. See also Mullins, 355 Ga. App. at 456 (1), 844 S.E.2d 519. "A trial court’s conclusion that a traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged may often be a fact-intensive determination, but it is ultimately a holding of constitutional law that we review de novo." State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 4 (2), 779 S.E.2d 248 (2015). See also Weaver v. State, 357 Ga. App. 488, 851 S.E.2d 125 (2020). Moreover, as our Supreme Court has recognized, while a police officer is "not constitutionally required to move at top speed or as fast as possible, … [the] officer [must] pursue[the] investigation with reasonable diligence" so as not to offend the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 371 (2) (b), 761 S.E.2d 19.

Jones alleged that this case presents the second sort of claim, arguing in his motion to suppress that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop because he could have conducted other field sobriety tests while waiting for the second unit to arrive to perform the HGN evaluation. The trial court agreed and we agree with the trial court that Jones’ detention was unreasonably prolonged. In particular, the State failed to establish why it was reasonable for the officer to detain Jones while waiting for a second unit without performing any field sobriety tests when the evidence showed that (1) the officer was certified to perform two of the field sobriety tests he eventually performed; (2) he had a PBT in his patrol car which he eventually used on Jones; and (3) the deputy never disclosed to the officer the results of the HGN test. Moreover, although the officer testified that it was his routine practice to wait for backup...