State v. Jones

316 A.3d 965

478 N.J.Super. 532

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Sean JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Richard Roche, Defendant-Appellant.

State of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Timothy Harris, Defendant-Appellant.

DOCKET NOS. A-3911-21, A-1264-22, A-1358-22

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued (A-3911-21) and Submitted (A-1264-22 and A-1358-22)

April 30, 2024

Decided May 31, 2024

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 88-07-2659 and 92-12-4339; and Camden County, Indictment No. 96-02-0526.

Peter Thomas Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Jones in A-3911-21 (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Peter Thomas Blum, of counsel and on the briefs).

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Roche in A-1264-22 and appellant Harris in A-1358-22 (Michael Timothy Denny and Morgan A. Birck, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, of counsel and on the briefs).

Hannah Faye Kurt, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent in A-3911-21 (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Hannah Faye Kurt, of counsel and on the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent in A-1264-22 (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent in A-1358-22 (Lucille M. Rosano, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Sumners, Rose and O’Connor.

₅₃₄The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSE, J.A.D.

These three appeals, calendared back-to-back and consolidated for purposes of our opinion, raise similar issues requiring us to decide whether: (1) our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 266 A.3d 374 (2022), should extend to youthful offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty when ₅₃₅they committed their offenses; and (2) the motion courts should have assigned counsel rather than denying defendants’ pro se applications without a hearing. After their direct appeals and post-conviction relief (PCR) applications were exhausted, defendants Sean Jones, Timothy Harris, and Richard Roche – all adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty when they committed murder in the late 1980s and early 1990s – filed pro se applications pursuant to Rule 3:21-10, arguing their lengthy sentences should receive the same constitutional protection as juvenile offenders prosecuted and convicted as adults. Because they served more than twenty years’ imprisonment, defendants claim entitlement to resentencing under the same rationale espoused by the Comer majority. Alternatively, defendants seek a remand for a plenary hearing with assignment of counsel.

Having considered defendants’ contentions in view of the governing law, we reject their constitutional arguments under Comer and conclude the motion courts properly decided their applications without assignment of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the orders under review.

I.

A.

We begin by summarizing the guiding legal principles to give context to defendants’ contentions. Commencing in 2005, the United States Supreme Court changed the landscape for juvenile offenders, that is, those individuals who were under the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes. Citing the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Court in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), eliminated the death penalty for juvenile offenders.

Five years later, the Court prohibited the sentencing of juvenile offenders to life imprisonment without parole for non-homicide crimes. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). In Graham, the Court determined a sentencing₅₃₆ court may not make the determination "at the outset" that the juvenile will forever pose a risk to society. Id. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Instead, the juvenile must have "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Ibid. The Court left the "means and mechanisms for compliance" with its decision to the States. Ibid.

In 2012, the Court prohibited sentencing schemes "mandat[ing] life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders," while leaving open the possibility that sentencing courts could impose such a sentence in homicide cases if the mitigating effect of the defendant’s age is properly considered. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). In Miller, both petitioners were fourteen years old when they committed murder. Id. at 465, 467, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

Referencing its decisions in Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller recognized, "the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes." Id. at 472, 132 S.Ct. 2455. The Court further stated, "the characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken rationales for punishment, can render a life-without-parole sentence disproportionate." Id. at 473, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

In 2016, the Court gave its decision in Miller retroactive application and held where a sentence was imposed contrary to Miller, the constitutional infirmity could be remedied by resentencing or consideration for parole. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016). The Court explained: "Allowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity – and who have since matured – will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Ibid.

In 2017, one year after Montgomery was decided, our Supreme Court considered the lengthy sentences imposed on two seventeen-year-old offenders, who were tried and convicted as adults in separate matters. State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 430, 433, 152 A.3d ₅₃₇197 (2017). Ricky Zuber was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 110 years’ imprisonment with a 55-year parole ineligibility term following his convictions for kidnapping, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, and related offenses for his participation in two gang rapes. Id. at 430-32, 152 A.3d 197. James Comer was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of seventy-five years with a parole ineligibility term of sixty-eight years and three months for his involvement in four armed robberies, resulting in the shooting death of the victim. Id. at 433, 152 A.3d 197. Both defendants, joined by amici curiae, challenged the constitutionality of their sentences, contending their lengthy prison terms did not reflect the mitigating effects of youth and amounted to life without parole. Id. at 434-37, 152 A.3d 197.

Persuaded by these contentions, the Zuber Court held judges must "take into account how children are different," and consider the factors enumerated in Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-80, 132 S.Ct. 2455, before sentencing juvenile offenders to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or its practical equivalent. Zuber, 227 N.J. at 451, 152 A.3d 197 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480, 132 S.Ct. 2455). These factors include "immaturity and ‘failure to appreciate risks and consequences’; ‘family and home environment’; family and peer pressures; ‘an inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors’ or the juvenile’s own attorney; and ‘the possibility of rehabilitation.’ " Id. at 429, 152 A.3d 197 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78, 132 S.Ct. 2455).

[1] In a narrow four-to-three decision issued five years after Zuber, our Supreme Court held juvenile offenders – prosecuted as adults and convicted of murder – are constitutionally entitled to reconsideration of their sentences after twenty years’ imprisonment. Comer, 249 N.J. at 369-70, 266 A.3d 374. In Comer, the Court considered the resentencing of James Comer to a mandatory minimum prison term of thirty years, following the Court’s remand instructions in Zuber, 227 N.J. at 453, 152 A.3d 197. The Court also considered James Zarate’s companion case. Id. at 374-81, 266 A.3d 374. Zarate committed murder when he was fourteen ₅₃₈years old and, following a remand by this court, was resentenced to life imprisonment, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Id. at 374, 376-77, 266 A.3d 374.

Generally citing the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller, Graham, and Roper, the Comer Court recognized: "[C]hildren are different. They lack maturity and are more vulnerable to outside pressures than adults." Id. at 394, 266 A.3d 374 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Further, "[t]hey can be impetuous and fail to appreciate risks and consequences." Ibid. (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 477, 132 S.Ct. 2455). "In the context of life without parole, the [United States] Supreme Court therefore observed that states ‘must … give [juveniles] some meaningful opportunity to’ demonstrate their ‘maturity and rehabilitation’ ‘to obtain release.’ " Id. at 395, 266 A.3d 374 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011) (second alteration in original).

In reaching its decision, the Court in Comer examined adolescent behavioral science articles, explaining many youths do not reach maturity until years after they turn eighteen. Id. at 399-400, 266 A.3d 374. The Court noted one scientist opined in a 2013 article, "adolescents and individuals in their early 20s are more likely than either children or somewhat older adults to engage in risky behaviour." Id. at 399 n.5, 266 A.3d 374 (quoting Laurence Steinberg, The Influence of Neuroscience on U.S. Supreme Court Decisions about Adolescents’ Criminal Culpability, 14 Nature Revs. Neuroscience 513, 515 (2013)). Generally citing authority referenced in Miller, the Court stated, "as to rehabilitation, a child’s brain matures as the child grows older, including parts of...