State v. Jonsgaard

949 N.W.2d 161

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Steven Paul JONSGAARD, Appellant.

A19-1612

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed August 10, 2020

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Karin L. Sonneman, Winona County Attorney, Stephanie E. Nuttall, Assistant County Attorney, Winona, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.

COCHRAN, Judge

In this appeal from the judgment of conviction, appellant Steven Paul Jonsgaard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of check forgery—falsely endorsing a check in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2). Because the evidence is insufficient to prove that appellant falsely "endorsed" a check within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2), we reverse.

FACTS

Over a period of less than two weeks, a person wrote 18 checks to pay for merchandise at Midtown Foods (Midtown) from a checkbook belonging to S.H. (the account holder). The person made the checks payable to Midtown and signed the account holder's name on the signature line on the front of the checks. When Midtown attempted to deposit the checks, the bank returned them as unpayable because the checking account had been closed. Midtown notified the police department about the person offering bad checks.

Midtown has a business practice that when it accepts a check, the cashier inserts the check into a register. The register prints information on the back, including a time-stamp showing when the check was inserted and the words "For Deposit Only." Using the time-stamps on the returned checks, a Midtown employee located surveillance footage of most of the check transactions. The surveillance footage, which was provided to police, showed the same person writing the checks.

The account holder did not write the checks and did not give anyone permission to write the checks. Police took an image from the surveillance footage and showed it to a person who was friends with both the account holder and Jonsgaard. The mutual friend told police, and testified at trial, that the person in the image was Jonsgaard.

Videos of the check transactions were introduced at trial. Jonsgaard testified that he was not the person in the videos writing the checks, but he acknowledged that he shopped at Midtown every other day. He also testified that police had mistaken him for a person named Jeremy on multiple occasions, including during a recent traffic stop. On rebuttal, the state introduced pictures of people named Jeremy who had been mentioned in police reports involving traffic stops within the time frame that Jonsgaard referenced. The state argued that Jonsgaard did not look similar to the men in the pictures. Jonsgaard argued that he did.

The jury found Jonsgaard guilty of check forgery by falsely endorsing a check. After trial, Jonsgaard brought a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that there was no evidence that he "endorsed" the checks because the word "endorse" means to "write something on the back of a document" and there was no evidence that he signed the backs of the checks. In a written order denying Jonsgaard's motion, the district court acknowledged that "[l]ong-held legal and commercial custom and practice" supported Jonsgaard's argument that endorsing a check means signing it on the back. But, the district court ultimately concluded that the commonly understood meaning of "endorse" could include a signature anywhere on a check, and that this broad definition of "endorse" applied to the term as used in the check-forgery statute. The district court sentenced Jonsgaard to 24 months in prison.

Jonsgaard appeals.

ISSUE

Is the evidence sufficient to prove that Jonsgaard falsely endorsed the checks at issue?

ANALYSIS

Jonsgaard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of check forgery under Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2(2). A person is guilty of check forgery if the person, with the intent to defraud, does any of the following:

(1) falsely makes or alters a check so that it purports to have been made by another or by the maker under an assumed or fictitious name, or at another time, or with different provisions, or by the authority of one who did not give authority; or

(2) falsely endorses or alters a check so that it purports to have been endorsed by another.

Minn. Stat. § 609.631, subd. 2 (2016). The state charged Jonsgaard with check forgery only under the second provision, alleging that he "falsely endorsed one or more checks so that they purported to have been endorsed by another."¹ The word "endorse" is not defined in the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 609.631 (2016).

"When we consider a claim of insufficient evidence, our review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did." State v. Bowen , 921 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). But "[w]hen a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the statute under which a defendant has been convicted, we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo." Id. (quotation omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction, the evidence is clearly sufficient to prove that Jonsgaard wrote the checks and signed the front of them. But Jonsgaard maintains that a false signature on the front of a check purporting to be that of the check's maker does not constitute a false endorsement. Because Jonsgaard's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the word "endorse" as used by the check-forgery statute, we review de novo the statutory interpretation question presented by this case.

The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2018) ; see also Bowen , 921 N.W.2d at 765. "[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning ... are construed according to such special meaning or their definition[.]" Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2018) ; see also Cocchiarella v. Driggs , 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016) ("In accordance with our cannons of interpretation, we construe technical words and phrases according to their special meaning, and other words and phrases according to their common and approved usage." (quotations omitted)). A statute must be interpreted as a whole, considering surrounding sections "to avoid conflicting interpretations." Cocchiarella , 884 N.W.2d at 624 (quotations omitted). And a statute must be construed in a manner that "give[s] effect to all its provisions." Minn. Stat. § 645.16. If the language of the statute is clear, "we apply the plain language of the statute and decline to explore its spirit or purpose." Cocchiarella , 884 N.W.2d at 624.

"A word has a special meaning if courts have ascribed a well-established and long-accepted meaning to it." Cox v. Mid-Minnesota Mut. Ins. Co. , 909 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). "In deciding whether words in a statute have a technical meaning or an ordinary meaning, we look at the context in which the phrase appears." Hous. & Rede. v. Auth. of Duluth v. Lee , 852 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 2014). "Whether to ascribe ‘a technical or special meaning [to a word or phrase] depends in part upon the context in which the word appears.’ " Bowen , 921 N.W.2d at 766 (quoting State v. Rick , 835 N.W.2d 478, 484 (Minn. 2013) ).

We first consider whether the word "endorse" has a special meaning in relation to checks. Concluding that it does, we next consider whether that special meaning is applicable to the check-forgery statute. Finally, we examine whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that Jonsgaard falsely endorsed a check.

A. The word "endorse" has a well-established and long-accepted meaning with respect to checks.

It is common knowledge that the word "endorse" has a special meaning with respect to checks. Contemporary and historical dictionary definitions of the word "endorse" reflect a technical meaning of the word as it applies to checks and other financial documents. See, e.g. , The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 589 (5th ed. 2011) (defining "endorse" as "2. To write one's signature on the back of (a check) to obtain the amount payable or to make the amount payable available to a third party or to the bearer," among other definitions); New Oxford American Dictionary 573 (3d ed. 2010) (defining "endorse" as "2. Sign (a check or bill of exchange) on the back to make it payable to someone other than the stated payee or to accept responsibility for paying it"); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 452-53 (2d ed. 1982) (defining endorse as "1. To write one's signature on the back of (a check, for example) as evidence of the legal transfer of its ownership, esp. in return for the cash or credit indicated on its face").

The existence of a technical definition of "endorse" is reflected in legal dictionaries as well. Black's Law Dictionary defines "indorse"² as "[t]o sign (a negotiable instrument) usu[ally] on the back, either to accept responsibility for paying an obligation memorialized by the instrument or to make the instrument payable to someone other than the payee." 925 (11th ed. 2019). Black's defines "indorser" as "[s]omeone who transfers a negotiable instrument by indorsement; specif[ically], one who signs a negotiable instrument other than as maker, drawer, or acceptor. " Id. at 926. Thus, according to Black's Law Dictionary , an endorser is, by definition, someone other than the person who made the check.

Consistent with the dictionary...