State v. Jordan

871 S.E.2d 862

STATE of North Carolina

v.Rochein Fuquan JORDAN.

No. COA21-469

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed April 5, 2022

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General John A. Payne, for the State.

Benjamin J. Kull, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

HAMPSON, Judge.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 1 Defendant Rochein Fuquan Jordan (Defendant) appeals from a Judgment entered upon his guilty plea to Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and Possession of Cocaine, following the denial of his Motion to Suppress evidence obtained during a search of his residence. The Record before us—including evidence presented during the hearing on the Motion to Suppress—tends to reflect the following:

¶ 2 In July 2018, a confidential informant reported to the Greensboro Police Department Defendant was selling heroin and crack cocaine out of the apartment (Apartment) Defendant shared with his girlfriend, Harlena Whitworth (Whitworth). In early August 2018, the lead officer in the investigation, Officer Garrison, orchestrated a controlled drug buy at Defendant's Apartment. During the controlled buy, Officer Garrison observed the informant go into the Apartment and come back out. Afterwards, Officer Garrison followed the informant to a separate location, where the informant turned over the drugs—which Officer Garrison identified as heroin—and identified Defendant as the seller.

¶ 3 A few weeks after the controlled buy, on or about 20 August 2018, officers were surveilling the Apartment, when Defendant left the Apartment, riding in the front passenger seat of a white Lexus sedan driven by Whitworth. Officer Fisher of the Greensboro Police Department quickly caught up to the vehicle and followed it for approximately a quarter of a mile. While following the vehicle, Officer Fisher noticed the vehicle was traveling 47 miles-per-hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone. Officer Fisher activated his blue lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop. As Officer Fisher pulled over the vehicle, he noticed Defendant reaching towards the center console, and upon approaching the vehicle, smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Consequently, Officer Fisher requested Defendant and Whitworth exit the vehicle. Officer Fisher placed Defendant and Whitworth in handcuffs and took them to the rear of the vehicle so the second officer, Officer Childrey, could search the car. A search of the car revealed two partially burned blunts in the front passenger compartment ashtray and a small baggie of marijuana in the center console.

¶ 4 After Officer Childrey had searched the car, Officer Fisher called Officer Garrison to inquire into whether he should inform Defendant and Whitworth about the ongoing narcotics investigation. The call to Officer Garrison lasted five to seven minutes. Subsequently, Officer Fisher informed Whitworth and Defendant this was "not just a random traffic stop" and law enforcement officials were actually there to follow up on the informant's tip about the sales of heroin and crack cocaine from the Apartment, as well as the controlled buy. During the conversation, Whitworth and Defendant remained handcuffed, outside of their car. Officer Fisher explained:

that [he] felt like [the police] had probable cause to apply for a search warrant. And ... we could apply for a search warrant or we could search -- if [Whitworth] should be willing to provide consent, we could search her residence on consent.

After Whitworth learned of the scope of the investigation, she consented to the search of the Apartment.¹ The officers transported Defendant and Whitworth back to the Apartment where Whitworth signed a consent form. A search of the Apartment revealed, inter alia , a firearm found next to Defendant's driver's license and a quantity of cocaine.

¶ 5 On 3 September 2020, Defendant was indicted for Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and Felony Possession of Cocaine. Subsequently, on 27 February 2020, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search of the Apartment, alleging it was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. The trial court heard arguments on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the same day.

¶ 6 Defendant argued the search was unconstitutional because "[o]nce the traffic violation was addressed and once the search of the vehicle was completed, there was no other new probable cause or reasonable suspicion developed to detain [Defendant] or Ms. Whitworth any further beyond that." Thus, according to Defendant, once the purpose for the stop was complete, any action taken after the stop was illegal because it unlawfully extended the stop.

¶ 7 Following the hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress by Order entered on 23 March 2020. The trial court found, in relevant part:

8. The stop began as a traffic stop for speeding, but upon the officer's observation of the odor of marijuana when he approached the vehicle, probable cause to search the vehicle was developed, and officers were authorized to conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. This search was undertaken a produced a small quantity of what law enforcement officers determined by training and experience to be marijuana.

9. Possession of marijuana is at least a Class 3 misdemeanor in North Carolina as of the date of this stop and entry of this Order, and law enforcement officers were authorized to take defendant into custody based upon the discovery of marijuana in an area of the vehicle over which defendant had both actual and constructive possession.

10. Law enforcement officers were further authorized to take defendant into custody based upon the evidence of defendant's possession with intent to sell or deliver heroin generated during the controlled purchase of that controlled substance from the defendant on or about August 2, 2018.

11. The stop, detention, and arrest of the defendant in the case at bar do not implicate those Fourth Amendment violations which were at issue in Rodriguez. Consequently, the holding in Rodriguez does not require this Court to exclude the evidence recovered as a result of the consent search of defendant's residence on August 20, 2018.

¶ 8 Subsequently, on 12 April 2021, Defendant pled guilty to the charges of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon and Possession of Cocaine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress.² The trial court consolidated the two charges into one Judgment and imposed a suspended sentence of 15 to 27 months. Defendant gave oral Notice of Appeal in open court.

Issues

¶ 9 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the Motion to Suppress on the basis the consent given to search the Apartment during the traffic stop of Defendant and Whitworth was voluntarily given during the course of a valid traffic stop.

Analysis

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 "Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is strictly limited to a determination of whether [the trial court's] findings are supported by competent evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." State v. Reynolds , 161 N.C. App. 144, 146-47, 587 S.E.2d 456, 458 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. See State v. Fernandez , 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997) (citation omitted). "In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we examine the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the State[.]" State v. Moore , 152 N.C. App. 156, 159, 566 S.E.2d 713, 715 (2002) (citations omitted).

B. Duration of the Traffic Stop

¶ 11 Defendant concedes Officer Fisher had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on the speeding infraction, and based on the smell of marijuana, had reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. However, Defendant argues, the consent to search the Apartment was invalid because the consent was given after Officer Fisher extended an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to conduct an unrelated investigation into the sale of heroin and crack-cocaine.

¶ 12 "Upon timely motion, evidence must be suppressed if: (1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-974(a) (2021). The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. "A traffic stop is a seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." State v. Styles , 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) ). "Thus, a traffic stop is subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Reed , 373 N.C. 498, 507, 838 S.E.2d 414 (2020).

¶ 13 We evaluate the reasonableness of a traffic stop by examining "(1) whether the traffic stop was lawful at its inception and (2) whether the continued stop was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure." Id. (citation and quotation omitted). "[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop." Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492, 498 (2015). Nevertheless, "during the course of a traffic stop [the police] may question a vehicle's occupants on topics unrelated to the traffic infraction ... as long as the police do not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop in order to conduct these unrelated investigations." United States v. Bowman , 884 F.3d 200, 210 (4th Cir. 2018)....