State v. Keeten

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. GREGERY KEETEN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 18-0525

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

September 24, 2019

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2016-149044-001

The Honorable Jay R. Adleman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Casey Ball

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Appellant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

JOHNSEN, Judge:

¶1 Gregery Keeten appeals his conviction and sentence for misconduct involving weapons. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mesa police detectives contacted Keeten during an undercover investigation into prostitution and sex trafficking.¹ They found Keeten in the driver's seat of his parked car, a handgun beside him. Keeten was on supervised probation for an armed robbery conviction at the time.

¶3 A grand jury indicted Keeten on one count of misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 felony. After a five-day trial, the jury found him guilty as charged, and the superior court sentenced him to a term of 10 years' imprisonment. Keeten timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2019), 13-4031 (2019), and -4033(A)(1) (2019).²

DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Suppress.

¶4 Before trial, Keeten moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop when they detained him in his parked car. Keeten argues on appeal that the superior court erred by denying his motion.

¶5 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained by a search and seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment is generally inadmissible in a criminal trial. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961); State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 10 (2016). We review the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mitchell, 234 Ariz. 410, 413, ¶ 11 (App. 2014). We review de novo, however, the superior court's legal determination whether a search "complied with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Valle, 196 Ariz. 324, 326, ¶ 6 (App. 2000). In doing so, we will uphold the superior court's ruling if it is legally correct for any reason. State v. Huez, 240 Ariz. 406, 412, ¶ 19 (App. 2016).

¶6 A police officer may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion based upon the totality of the circumstances that the suspect is involved or about to be involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968); State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22-23, ¶ 20 (App. 2007). "Although 'reasonable suspicion' must be more than an inchoate 'hunch,' the Fourth Amendment only requires that police articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory detention." Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 25. In applying this standard, "we accord deference to a trained law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions." Id. at 24, ¶ 26.

¶7 At an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the State presented evidence that undercover detectives responded to a sexually explicit advertisement in the "Female Escorts" section of the website "backpage.com," which commonly ran advertisements for prostitution. Through text messages, the detectives negotiated a price for some services and arranged to meet two females the next afternoon. At the designated time, detectives observed Keeten drive his car through the parking lot of the apartment complex at which they had agreed to meet.

¶8 Keeten parked the car, and two females got out and walked toward the apartment. Detectives intercepted them before they reached the apartment. Meanwhile, other detectives had obtained information that the parked car was registered to Keeten and that he was on supervised probation following an armed robbery conviction. They approached Keeten's car and found him in the driver's seat next to the handgun.

¶9 In response to the motion to suppress, the State argued that the officers' prior communications with the contact from the advertisement, along with their training and experience, caused them to reasonably suspectthat the driver of the car was transporting the two females to the apartment complex for prostitution. At the hearing, detectives recounted their exchange of text messages with the contact listed in the "backpage.com" advertisement. In the texts, the detectives solicited sexual services, once by using the abbreviation "FS" (by which they meant certain "full service" sex) and once by expressly using the word "sex." The reply to the solicitation was "we can discuss in person honey," and negotiation of price immediately followed. The recipient of the solicitation then offered the detectives a "two girl special." The detectives asked whether the second "girl" was "young"; the response was "[y]es she's young honey." At one point, the recipient of the solicitation asked, "[A]re you affiliated with law enforcement?" The detectives further testified that in prostitution activity, a "pimp" commonly will drive the prostitute to an appointment and wait until the conclusion of the appointment to drive her away.

¶10 The superior court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the State met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence to establish that the stop, the search and the seizure were lawful. We agree. Based upon the training and experience of the detectives, the nature of their undercover operation, the sexually explicit substance of the advertisement, its placement in "backpage.com," and the illicit content of the text messages, the detectives had reasonable suspicion that the person or persons who responded to their texts were engaging or about to engage in prostitution. When Keeten arrived with two females at the appointed place and time, the officers thus had reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was transporting the females for prostitution in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3210 (2019) or was acting as their "pimp" in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3203 (2019).

¶11 Given the totality of the circumstances, the superior court did not err by denying Keeten's motion to suppress.

B. Purported Disclosure and Brady Violations.

¶12 Keeten next argues the State violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15 by failing to disclose copies of the "backpage.com" advertisement and the text messages before the first evidentiary hearing. Keeten contends the superior court erred by denying his multiple motions for sanctions based on the alleged violations.

¶13 Rule 15.7 governs a superior court's duty and power to sanction a party for a discovery violation. The court maintains broad discretion to determine the nature of a sanction. See State v. Moody, 208 Ariz.424, 454, ¶ 114 (2004); State v. DeCamp, 197 Ariz. 36, 40, ¶ 22 (App. 1999). We review the imposition of a discovery sanction for an abuse of discretion. Moody, 208 Ariz. at 454, ¶ 114. The superior court abuses its discretion in ruling on a motion for a discovery sanction "only when 'no reasonable judge would have reached the same result under the circumstances.'" State v. Naranjo, 234 Ariz. 233, 242, ¶ 29 (2014) (quoting State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 345, 354, ¶ 40 (2004)). A sanction must be proportional to the discovery violation. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 518, ¶ 155 (2013). An appropriate sanction "should have a minimal effect on the evidence and merits of the case." State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 186 (1996).

¶14 We likewise review a superior court's ruling on an alleged Brady violation for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Arvallo, 232 Ariz. 200, 206, ¶ 36 (App. 2013). Under Brady, the State is required to disclose all exculpatory evidence in its possession that is material to the issue of guilt or punishment. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976), and Brady, 373 U.S. at 87); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b)(8), (f)(2), (3) (disclosure requirements). To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show: (1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable, i.e., exculpatory or impeaching, for the defendant; (2) the State failed to disclose the evidence, whether intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice resulted. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). If the State fails to timely disclose exculpatory evidence, the court may impose sanctions based on the degree of prejudice caused and the availability of sufficient, less stringent remedies. See State v. Ramos, 239 Ariz. 501, 504, ¶ 9 (App. 2016).

¶15 The disclosure issue arose at the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, after a detective had testified about the "backpage.com" advertisement and the text messages. The detective testified on cross-examination that copies of the advertisement and the texts may be available for review. According to the prosecutor, the items had not been impounded, and hence had not been disclosed, because no prostitution arrest was made.

¶16 Keeten requested disclosure of the items. The superior court ordered the State to make the disclosure and recessed the hearing in the meantime. After the State disclosed the items, Keeten filed several motions for sanctions, alleging discovery violations. The court granted Keeten a second evidentiary hearing and set the hearing for a date more than three months after the State disclosed the materials at issue.

¶17 In denying...