State v. Lafont

375 So.3d 1002

2023-0086 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/15/23)

STATE of Louisiana

v.Rickey J. LAFONT, Jr.

NO. 2023 KA 0086

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Judgment Rendered: September 15, 2023

Appealed from the 17th Judicial District Court, In and for the Parish of Lafourche, State of Louisiana, Docket No. 599618, The Honorable Marla M. Abel, Judge Presiding

Kristine M. Russell, District Attorney, Jason L. Chatagnier, Assistant District Attorney, Thibodaux, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana

Barry S. Ranshi, John J. Mason, Kenner, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Rickey J. Lafont, Jr.

BEFORE: McCLENDON, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

₂The defendant, Rickey J. Lafont, Jr., was charged by amended bill of information with indecent behavior with a juvenile (count I), a violation of La. R.S. 14:81(A)(1)(H)(2); and sexual battery (count II), a violation of La. R.S. 14:43.1(A)(2) & (C)(2).¹ He pled not guilty on both counts. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty on both counts by unanimous verdicts. On count I, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years at hard labor, two years without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On count II, he was sentenced to a concurrent term of forty years at hard labor, twenty-five years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals designating four assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

In July of 2020, S.M.,² the nine-year-old victim, confided in her mother, A.M., that the defendant touched her between her legs. The defendant was A.M.’s live-in boyfriend at that time. S.M. subsequently gave a statement to the Child Advocacy Center regarding those allegations. In that statement, S.M. recounted that the defendant began touching her when she was seven or eight years old. According to S.M., the first incident occurred when S.M. and the defendant were lying on the couch, covered by a blanket and watching anime.³ S.M. stated that the defendant ₃began to rub her private parts,⁴ and continued to do so after she told him to stop. She further stated that the rubbing continued to occur, both over her clothes and under her shorts and underwear. S.M. recalled that these incidents usually took place when everyone else in the house was sleeping, and often while the defendant watched anime or movies. The incidents allegedly occurred at the defendant’s residence in Galliano. S.M., who was age eleven at the time of trial, testified at trial. Her trial testimony was consistent with her statement given to the Child Advocacy Center.

The defendant testified at trial. He denied having sexual tendencies toward children, denied being sexually aroused by children, denied touching S.M.’s vagina, and denied rubbing her vagina under her clothes.

MOTION IN LIMINE

[1] In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of a 2019 conviction for indecent behavior with a juvenile and in failing to enforce its limiting instruction to the jury. He asks this court to analogize La. C.E. art. 412.2 to La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1) and reverse the conviction under State v. Taylor, 2016-1124, 2016-1183 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283, arguing that the minds of the jury were "unduly prejudiced" because the State presented graphic testimony concerning his 2019 conviction and turned the trial into a "mini-trial" of the prior offense. The defendant argues that the State could have proven the prior conviction without witness testimony, and the State presented more evidence than was necessary for the limited purpose allowed by the trial court.

Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence of other crimes, in particular, a June 12, 2019 conviction of the defendant for indecent behavior with another juvenile, M.N. The State contend- ed it wished to introduce evidence of the prior conviction in the instant case, pursuant to La. C.E. art. 412.2, as evidence of the ₄defendant’s character for sexually assaultive behavior and/or as having a lustful disposition towards children.

The defendant filed a motion in limine arguing the 2019 conviction⁵ had minimal probative value and would only serve to convince the jury he was a dangerous person where the prior conviction involved a fourteen-year-old girl, rather than a nine-year-old girl, and alleged a different type of assault. The State argued the instant offense and the prior offense both involved indecent behavior with a minor under the age of seventeen years old, and the earlier conviction demonstrated the defendant’s lustful disposition towards children because it showed he had committed more than one lewd and lascivious act with minors.

The trial court found La. C.E. art. 412.2 applied because the 2019 conviction for sexually assaultive behavior involved a minor child under the age of seventeen years old at the time of the offense. The court noted it was unable to locate any jurisprudence holding a different standard applied based on the age difference between the victim in the earlier ease and the victim in the instant case. The court further determined that the probative value of the evidence of the 2019 conviction was high and was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Additionally, the court noted the State’s notice complied with Article 412.2(B) by specifically articulating the previous acts⁶ and how they were similar to the allegations in the instant case. Accordingly, the court held that evidence related to the 2019 conviction would be admissible in the instant case, but it would give a limiting instruction regarding any evidence introduced in connection with the conviction. The defendant objected to the ruling of the court.

₅Louisiana Code of Evidence article 412.2, entitled, "Evidence of similar crimes, wrongs, or acts in sex offense cases," provides in pertinent part:

A. When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior, or with acts that constitute a sex offense involving a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense, evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful disposition toward children may be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the balancing test provided in Article 403.

B. In a case in which the state intends to offer evidence under the provisions of this Article, the prosecution shall, upon request of the accused, provide reasonable notice in advance of trial of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes.

…

Louisiana Code of Evidence article 412.2 was enacted to loosen restrictions on "other crimes" evidence, and to allow evidence of "lustful disposition" in cases involving sexual offenses. State v. Wright, 2011-0141 (La. 12/6/11), 79 So. 3d 309, 317. Following enactment of the law, the legislature amended the language of the article from allowing admission of "evidence of the ac- cused’s commission of another sexual offense" to allowing "evidence of the accused’s commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful disposition toward children." See La. Acts 2004, No. 465, § 1. This revised language significantly broadened the scope of evidence admissible under La. C.E. art. 412.2. State v. Layton, 2014-1910 (La. 3/17/15), 168 So. 3d 358, 360. However, tire balancing test set forth in La. C.E. art. 403, which insures the fundamental fairness of proceedings, specifically applies to La. C.E. art. 412.2. Layton, 168 So. 3d at 362.

[2–4] Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La. C.E. art. 403. Thus, in its vast discretion, the trial court may exclude relevant ₆evidence after finding that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Ultimately, questions of relevancy and admissibility of evidence are discretionary calls within the trial court’s "great gatekeeping discretion." Wright, 79 So. 3d at 317. Such determinations regarding relevancy and admissibility should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Tate, 2020-0523 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/16/21), 2021 WL 1478325 *6 (unpublished), writ denied, 2021-00690 (La. 9/27/21), 324 So. 3d 92.

At trial, M.N., the victim from the 2019 case, testified that her date of birth is January 24, 2003. M.N. stated that on July 21, 2017, she was at the defendant’s house, along with several members of her family. According to M.N., after everyone, except for M.N., the defendant, and the defendant’s three young children, left to go to the grocery store, the defendant insisted that she lay on her stomach and "hovered over" her with his knee between her legs and began massaging her back, shoulders, and thighs, M.N. testified that the defendant reached under her shirt to massage her back and shoulders and massaged her thighs over her pants. She further testified that later, as she stood in the kitchen cooking supper, the defendant tickled M.N. against her wishes, pulled her underwear up, and then reached into her pants and pulled her underwear out from between the cheeks of her buttocks. M.N. also testified about how she felt during and after the assault and how it affected her relationship with her family.

Following M.N.’s testimony, the court issued the following instruction to the jury:

[E]vidence that the defendant was involved in a commission of an offense other than the offense for which he is on trial is to be considered only for a limited purpose. The sole purpose for which such evidence may be considered is whether it

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