State v. Land (Ex parte Land)

346 So.3d 1027

EX PARTE David Anthony LAND

(In re: State of Alabama

v.David Anthony Land)

CR-19-0947

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

August 6, 2021

Donald W. Stewart and Edward McF. Johnson of Stewart & Stewart, P.C., Anniston, for petitioner.

Steve Marshall, att'y gen., and Michael Nunnelley, asst. att'y gen., for respondent.

McCOOL, Judge.

David Anthony Land petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Calhoun Circuit Court to dismiss the State's indictment against him. For the reasons set forth herein, we grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

In August 2018, a Calhoun County grand jury indicted Land for violating § 13A-10-11, Ala. Code 1975, which provides that "[a] person commits the crime of impersonating a peace officer if he falsely pretends to be a peace officer and does any act in that capacity." Specifically, the indictment alleged that Land "falsely pretend[ed] to be a peace officer ... by stating he had FBI undercover credentials." (Land's petition, Exhibit 1.)

Land subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment and, in support of his motion, argued that impersonating an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") does not violate § 13A-10-11. Rather, Land argued, § 13A-10-11 prohibits the impersonation of only "an employee of the State of Alabama, or a municipality or county within the State of Alabama, with the authority to maintain the public order or to make arrests." (Land's petition, Exhibit 2.) Thus, Land argued, even if the State could prove that he impersonated an FBI agent as alleged in the indictment, that impersonation would not violate § 13A-10-11, and, as a result, the indictment was due to be dismissed.

In response, the State argued that § 13A-10-11 prohibits the impersonation of "any public servant with the power to make arrests," which, according to the State, includes an FBI agent. (Land's petition, Exhibit 3.)

On July 8, 2020, the circuit court denied Land's motion to dismiss the indictment. In support of its ruling, the court stated that it had "reviewed the statute under which [Land] was indicted" and "agreed with the State's argument in interpreting the statute." (Land's petition, Exhibit 4.) Land timely petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.

Standard of Review

" ‘ "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will be ‘issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’

Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993). A writ of mandamus will issue only in situations where other relief is unavailable or is inadequate, and it cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv. Co., 590 So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1991)."

" ‘Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998).’ "

Ex parte Ward, 957 So. 2d 449, 451 (Ala. 2006).

Discussion

The sole issue in this case is whether a person violates § 13A-10-11 by impersonating an FBI agent. Answering that question requires this Court to apply well settled rules of statutory construction.

" ‘ "The touchstone of legislative construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature as expressed in the statute." Horn v. Citizens Hosp., 425 So. 2d 1065, 1070 (Ala. 1982) (emphasis added).’ " J.D.I. v. State, 77 So. 3d 610, 616 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Catlin, 72 So. 3d 606, 607-08 (Ala. 2011) (Cobb, C.J., concurring specially)). That is to say, in determining the legislature's intent in enacting a statute, " ‘ "this Court should gather the intent of the legislature from the language of the statute itself, if possible." ’ " State v. K.E.L., 315 So. 3d 1158, 1168 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting Carroll v. State, 599 So. 2d 1253, 1264 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), quoting in turn Pace v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 578 So. 2d 281, 283 (Ala. 1991) ). Thus, "[i]n any case involving statutory construction, our inquiry begins with the language of the statute, and if the meaning of the statutory language is plain, our analysis ends there." Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 132 (Ala. 2005). In other words,

" ‘ " ‘ "[i]t is this Court's responsibility in a case involving statutory construction to give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting a statute when that intent is manifested in the wording of the statute .... ‘ " ‘ "[I]f the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect." ’ " ’ ... In determining the intent of the legislature, we must examine the statute as a whole and, if possible, give effect to each section."

" ‘ " ‘Ex parte Exxon Mobil Corp., 926 So. 2d 303, 309 (Ala. 2005). Further,

" ‘ " ‘ "when determining legislative intent from the language used in a statute, a court may explain the language, but it may not detract from or add to the statute .... When the language is clear, there is no room for judicial construction ...."

" ‘ " ‘Water Works & Sewer Bd. Of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604, 607 (Ala. 2002).’ "

" ‘(Quoting Ex parte Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 45 So. 3d 764, 767 (Ala. 2009).) Similarly, in Lambert v. Wilcox County Commission, 623 So. 2d 727, 729 (Ala. 1993), the [Alabama Supreme] Court stated:

" ‘ " ‘The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that this Court is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent as expressed in the statute .... In this ascertainment, we must look to the entire Act instead of isolated phrases or clauses ... and words are given their plain and usual meaning .... Moreover, ... statutes dealing with the same subject are in pari materia and should be construed together ....’ "

" ‘(Quoting Darks Dairy, Inc. v. Alabama Dairy Comm'n, 367 So. 2d 1378, 1380-81 (Ala. 1979).)’

" First Union Nat'l Bank of Florida v. Lee County Comm'n, 75 So. 3d 105, 111-12 (Ala. 2011). [Furthermore,] " ‘ " ‘ " ‘[c]riminal statutes must be strictly construed, to avoid ensnaring behavior that is not clearly proscribed.’ " United States v. Bridges, 493 F.2d 918, 922 (5th Cir. 1974).

" ‘ " ‘ "In United States v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 380 U.S. 157, 85 S. Ct. 868, 870, 13 L.Ed. 2d 728 (1965), the Supreme Court stated:

" ‘ " ‘ " ‘A criminal statute is to be construed strictly, not loosely. Such are the teachings of our cases from United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37 [(1820)], down to this day. Chief Justice Marshall said in that case:

" ‘ " ‘ " ‘ "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is, perhaps, not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department." Id., p. 95.

" ‘ " ‘ " ‘The fact that a particular activity may be within the same general classification and policy of those covered does not necessarily bring it within the ambit of the criminal prohibition. United States v. Weitzel, 246 U.S. 533, 38 S. Ct. 381, 62 L.Ed. 872 [(1918)]. ’

" ‘ " ‘ "Moreover, ‘one "is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it[.]" Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362, 25 S. Ct. 443, 49 L.Ed. 790 [(1905)]. "[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222, 73 S. Ct. 227, 229-230, 97 L.Ed. 260 [(1952)].’ United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S. Ct. 471, 474, 30 L.Ed. 2d 457 (1971)."

" ‘ " ‘ Bridges, 493 F.2d at 923.’ "

" ‘ Crawford v. State, 100 So. 3d 610, 615 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).’

" J.D.I. v. State, 77 So. 3d 610, 616 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

" ‘ " ‘[A]mbiguous criminal statutes must be narrowly interpreted, in favor of the accused.’ United States v. Herring, 933 F.2d 932, 937 (11th Cir. 1991). ‘[I]t is well established that criminal statutes should not be "extended by construction." ’ Ex parte Evers, 434 So. 2d 813, 817 (Ala. 1983) ...." ’ D.A.D.O. v. State, 57 So. 3d 798, 802 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Carroll v. State, 599 So. 2d 1253, 1264 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aff'd, 627 So. 2d 874 (Ala. 1993) ). ‘ " ‘No person is to be made subject to penal statutes by implication and all doubts concerning their interpretation are to predominate in favor of the accused. Fuller v. State, [257 Ala. 502, 60 So. 2d 202 (1952) ].’ " ’ D.A.D.O., 57 So. 3d at 803 (quoting Hankins v. State, 989 So. 2d 610, 618 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) )."

Collier v. State, 212 So. 3d 268, 272-73 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). These rules of statutory construction exist to protect the sanctity of the separation-of-powers doctrine, which serves as the very foundation for our system of government. As the Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

" ‘ "[I]t is our job to say what the law is, not to say what it should be. Therefore, only if there is no rational way to interpret the words as stated [in a statute] will we look beyond those words to determine legislative intent. To apply a different policy would turn this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. SeeEx parte T.B., 698 So. 2d 127, 130 (Ala. 1997)." ’

"Thus, only when language in a statute is ambiguous will this Court engage in statutory construction. As we stated in Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532, 535 (Ala. 2001), ‘[p]rinciples of statutory construction instruct this Court to interpret the plain language of a statute to mean exactly what it says and to engage in judicial construction only if the language in the statute is ambiguous.’ "

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