State v. Lawson

STATE OF LOUISIANA v. AHMAD LYNDELL LAWSON

NUMBER 2018 KA 0382

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT

November 8, 2018

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appealed from the 32^nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Terrebonne, Louisiana

Trial Court Number 710800

Honorable Juan W. Pickett, Judge

Joseph L. Waitz, Jr., D.A.

Ellen Daigle Doskey, A.D.A.

Houma, LA

Attorneys for Appellee

State of Louisiana

Jim Holt

Baton Rouge, LA

Attorney for Appellant

Defendant - Ahmad Lawson

BEFORE: PETTIGREW, WELCH, AND CHUTZ, JJ.

WELCH, J.

The defendant, Ahmad Lyndell Lawson, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1.¹ He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal or in the alternative motion for new trial, which was denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating four assignments of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On the night of October 21, 2015, Lakesha Clay rode with Willie Hart, Jr. to 322 Roselawn Avenue in Houma to buy drugs from Troy Nixon, who is known as "TJ." According to Lakesha, who testified at trial, Hart parked on the side of the street in front of the house and met TJ near the carport. Lakesha stayed in the car. Moments later, Lakesha saw the defendant and Joshua Swan come from around the back of the house and then shoot Hart multiple times. Hart was killed. The defendant and Joshua then shot at the car Lakesha was in. The defendant approached the car window and, despite Lakesha's supplication to not shoot her, the defendant shot her once in the stomach. Lakesha then saw the defendant and Joshua get in a black car and drive away. Lakesha, wounded, went to the neighbor's house across the street, for help. 911 was called, and Lakesha was taken to the hospital where she underwent surgery for her gunshot wound.

The defendant and Joshua were members of the FabBoys in the Houma area. The leader of the FabBoys was Robert Swan, Joshua's brother. A couple of weeks before Hart was killed, Robert Swan was killed. Rumors began circulating thatHart was involved in the murder of Robert Swan. Detectives investigating the case determined that Hart was not involved. According to Detective Lieutenant Glynn Prestenbach, Kyle Cedotal became the primary suspect and, on October 14, 2015, Cedotal confessed to killing Robert Swan. Before Hart was killed, Detective Lieutenant Prestenbach told Joshua that he had Robert Swan's killer in custody and that Hart's involvement in his murder was just a rumor.

The defendant did not testify at trial.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Specifically, the defendant contends that there was no forensic evidence to prove he killed Hart and that his identity as one of the perpetrators was not established by the State.²

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789,61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660; State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1988). The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in La. C.C.P. art. 821, is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144. Furthermore, when the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. State v. Hughes, 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1047, 1051; State v. Davis, 2001-3033 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 161, 163.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific intent is that state of mind that exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La. 1982). The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. McCue, 484 So.2d 889, 892 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 1986). Deliberately pointing and firing a deadly weapon at close range indicates specific intent to kill. See State v. Robinson, 2002-1869 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So.2d 66, 74, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1023, 125 S.Ct. 658, 160 L.Ed.2d 499 (2004); State v. Ducre, 596 So.2d 1372, 1382 (La. App. 1^st Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 637 (La. 1992).

The parties to crimes are classified as principals and accessories after the fact. La. R.S. 14:23. Principals are all persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime. La. R.S. 14:24. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals. An individual may be convicted as a principal only for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. See State v. Pierre, 93-0893 (La. 2/3/94), 631 So.2d 427, 428 (per curiam). The State may prove a defendant guilty by showing that he served as a principal to the crime by aiding and abetting another. State v. Huey, 2013-1227 (La. App. 1^st Cir. 2/18/14), 142 So.3d 27, 30, writ denied, 2014-0535 (La. 10/3/14), 149 So.3d 795, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1507, 191 L.Ed.2d 443 (2015). Further, when two or more persons embark on a concerted course of action, each person becomes responsible for not only his own acts but also for the acts of the other. See State v. Smith, 2007-2028 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 291, 296 (per curiam).

In his brief, the defendant avers the State's case against him was "riddled with evidentiary and legal holes that were never filled." According to the defendant, his conviction hinged solely upon statements from Lakesha Clay, who initially identified Joshua Swan as the shooter. The defendant also notes that almost a month after the shooting, Lakesha met with a detective and identified him (the defendant) as her assailant. The defendant also notes that Lakesha said the person who shot her was wearing a muscle shirt and shorts, did not have gold teeth, and had no visible tattoos. The defendant points out, however, that he has numerous gold teeth and "tattoos going up and down both of his arms, forearms and hands." The defendant further notes that a cigarette butt found near the scene was tested for DNA and that he and Joshua were both excluded as contributors.Also, the defendant's fingerprints were not found on any firearms retrieved or any of the bullet casings recovered at the scene. According to the defendant, no reasonable juror could have determined that he was the person responsible for shooting Lakesha or for killing Hart.

Lakesha Clay testified at trial that she had an on-and-off relationship with Hart since 2005. They remained friends and still dated. They had two children together. Lakesha gave the following account of what transpired the night Hart was killed. Hart picked Lakesha up from work in his sister's car and told her they were going to pick up "mollies" (drugs) from TJ. After he used Lakesha's phone to call TJ, Hart drove to Roselawn Avenue. Hart got out of the car and met TJ in the driveway, near the carport. They then walked under the carport while Lakesha stayed in the car. Two men came from around the back of the house and shot Hart several times. Lakesha identified the shooters as Joshua and as "BadAzz." She knew BadAzz from the street, and Joshua was her cousin. Lakesha also knew Joshua as "Ceno." She had known BadAzz for almost a year. In the following testimony on direct examination, Lakesha identified the defendant and Joshua Swan as the shooters of Hart:

Q. After they finished shooting Willie, what happened next?

A. Then they was shooting at me.

Q. In the car?

A. Yes.

Q. Both of them or just one?

A. Both of them was shooting at the car.

Q. And then what happened; did you get hit at that point?

A. No.

Q. What happened after that?

A. And then he walked up to the car, and he stuck his face in the window. And I begged, and I pleaded for him not to shoot me - because I didn't do anything. He still shot me.

Q. Okay, who was it that shot you, that popped his head in the window?

A. BadAzz.

Q. Who was it that was with BadAzz, that was shooting Willie?

A. Ceno.

Q. Do you know Ceno?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know his name?

A. Joshua Swan.

Q. Are you related to Joshua Swan?

A. Yes.

Q. How are you related to Joshua Swan?

A. He's my cousin.

Lakesha indicated there were a lot of shots fired. After shooting Hart, BadAzz (the defendant) and Joshua shot at the car Lakesha was in. When the defendant approached and put his face to the window, Lakesha begged him...