State v. Lee

1

STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WILLIAM WAYNE LEE, JR.

No. 2022-KK-01827

Supreme Court of Louisiana

September 8, 2023

On Supervisory Writ to the 22nd Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Tammany

CRICHTON, J. ^[1]

We granted the writ application in this case to address an issue of constitutionality: whether Article 930.10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which governs post-conviction plea agreements, violates the state constitution's separation of powers provision, La. Const. art. II, § 2. More specifically, the question presented is whether Article 930.10 permits the judicial branch to exercise the governor's power under La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E) to pardon a final conviction. We hold that because Article 930.10 permits a court to overturn a final conviction without a finding of legal defect pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3 the article unconstitutionally allows the judicial branch to exercise the governor's exclusive pardon power, and therefore violates the doctrine of separation of powers as found in La. Const. art. II, § 2.

BACKGROUND

On October 20, 2003, the state charged defendant William Wayne Lee, Jr. with one count of second degree murder, La. R.S 14:30.1. Following a trial, on February 9, 2007, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Lee, 2007-1807 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08), 978 So.2d 1257, writ denied, 2008-0861 (La. 11/10/08), 996 So.2d 1066.

On October 5, 2021, defendant and the District Attorney for the 22nd Judicial District filed a "Joint Motion to Amend Conviction and Sentence Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.10." In the motion, the parties stipulated to certain facts relating to the cause of the victim's death. They agreed that new evidence obtained in May 2020 would have bolstered defendant's case at trial by supporting the defense theory that the victim's fatal injuries were caused by her falling on her own accord. Based on this new evidence, the parties agreed that "a fair and just resolution" of the case would be to amend defendant's conviction from second degree murder, La. R.S. 14:30.1, to manslaughter, La. R.S. 14:31, and for the court to vacate the life without parole sentence and impose a sentence of 35 years imprisonment at hard labor.

The motion was heard in the district court on January 19, 2022. At the hearing, the assistant district attorney announced his office was "submitting on what's contained in the joint motion," and then the defendant's lawyer summarized the pleading. The district court granted the joint motion and, without finding any legal defect in the conviction pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.3, vacated defendant's second degree murder conviction, La. R.S. 14:30.1, and the previously-imposed life without parole sentence. Thereafter, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea to manslaughter, La. R.S. 14:31, and imposed the agreed-upon 35-year sentence with credit for time served.

On March 9, 2022, the Attorney General filed a pleading entitled, "Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to Vacate Post-Conviction Plea Agreement as Unconstitutional." The Attorney General argued that Article 930.10 unconstitutionally permits courts to grant clemency to criminal defendants, a power that is expressly and exclusively granted to the governor. By signing the pleading, the District Attorney indicated he did not oppose the filing of the motion. From this, we infer that the District Attorney acquiesced in the Attorney General's entry into the proceedings to allow the district court to consider the issue.

On June 15, 2022, after a hearing on the merits, the district court denied the Attorney General's motion and found that Article 930.10 does not violate Louisiana's Constitution. In its reasons, the court found that the statute does not interfere with the separation of powers and does not infringe upon the governor's right to issue clemency. The court explained that it did not view the procedure as "tossing the jury's finding out." Rather, the court found, it is intended to be used in cases like this, where there is new evidence that could possibly result in a new trial. Importantly, the judge stated, "I'm not saying it would have, but [the new evidence] could result in a new trial, so the District Attorney has to make the decision, do they want to face a possible new trial or do they want to proceed under Article 930.10[?]" (emphasis added). The district court further found that safeguards were built into Article 930.10 because in order for a defendant to obtain relief, there must be agreement with the district attorney and approval by the court.

The Attorney General sought review in the court of appeal, which, in an unpublished ruling, denied the writ application without comment. State v. Lee, 2022-1060 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/21/22) (unpub'd), available at 2022 WL 17091941.^[2] This Court thereafter granted the Attorney General's writ application. State v. Lee, 2022-1827 (La. 2/24/23), 355 So.3d 1095.

DISCUSSION

The standard of review in determining the constitutionality of a statute, a question of law, is de novo. See State v. Eberhardt, 2013-2306, p. 4 (La. 7/1/14), 145 So.3d 377, 380. A de novo review means the court will decide the matter after considering the statute at issue, the relevant law, and the record without deference to the legal conclusions of the courts below. This court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the laws of this state. City of Bossier City v. Vernon, 2012-0078, p. 3 (La. 10/16/12), 100 So.3d 301, 303.

Louisiana's Constitution divides the state's governmental powers among three distinct branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. La. Const. art. II, § 1. The separation of powers provision in the Constitution declares: "Except as otherwise provided by this Constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise power belonging to either of the others." La Const. art. II, § 2. The Constitution then delineates the powers delegated to each branch. Specifically, "judicial power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts authorized by this Article." La. Const. art. V, § 1. District attorneys, members of the judicial branch, "have charge of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district," subject to the supervision of the attorney general. La. Const. art. V, § 26; La. C.Cr.P. art. 61. Relevant to this case, the Constitution provides that the governor, the chief executive officer of the state, has exclusive authority over matters of clemency pursuant to La. Const. art. IV, § 5.^[3]The power to grant reprieve, and, upon favorable recommendation of the Board of Pardons, commute sentences, pardon those convicted of offenses against the state, and remit fines and forfeitures imposed for such offenses rests exclusively with the governor. La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(1). Courts have no authority to pardon a defendant or to commute his sentence. See State ex rel. Esteen v. State, 2016-0949, p. 3 (La. 3/13/18), 239 So.3d 266, 267 (Weimer, J., would grant rehearing) (citing State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 212 La. 143, 151, 31 So.2d 697, 699 (1947)).

A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of establishing unconstitutionality rests upon the party who attacks the statute. State v. Guidry, 247 La. 631, 634, 173 So.2d 192, 193 (1965). In this case, the Attorney General is challenging the statute, arguing that Article 930.10 unconstitutionally "authorizes district courts to effectively pardon an offender by nullifying a final sentence and/or conviction . . . as long as the prosecutor joins the defendant in moving for such relief."^[4] In testing the constitutionality of a statute, the statute "shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision." La. R.S. 14:3.

With these principles in mind, we now consider whether Article 930.10 violates the doctrine of separation of powers by permitting the judicial branch to exercise the governor's exclusive power to grant pardons.^[5] Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.10 provides:

A. Upon joint motion of the petitioner and the district attorney, the district court may deviate from any of the provisions of this Title.

B. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 930.3 or any provision of law to the contrary, the district attorney and the petitioner may, with the approval of the district court jointly enter into any post conviction plea agreement for the purpose of amending the petitioner's conviction, sentence, or habitual offender status. The terms of any post conviction plea agreement pursuant to this Paragraph shall be in writing, shall be filed into the district court record, and shall be agreed to by the district attorney and the petitioner in open court. The court shall, prior to accepting the post conviction plea agreement, address the petitioner personally in open court, inform him of and determine that he understands the rights that he is waiving by entering into the post conviction plea agreement, and determine that the plea is voluntary and is not the result of force or threats, or of promises apart from the post conviction plea agreement.

A pardon is "[t]he act or an instance of officially nullifying punishment or other legal consequences of a crime." Pardon, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed 2019). In State v. Lee, 132 So. 219, 219-20 (La. 1931), this Court quoted Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866), in which the United States Supreme Court expla...