State v. Lee-Seales

STATE of Connecticut v. Shaquan LEE-SEALES

No. KNLCR160333714T

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New London, New London

January 9, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Jongbloed, J.

In the present case, the state of Connecticut has charged the defendant in a single long form information with robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136(a) and murder in violation of § 53a-54a.^[1] On November 28, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to sever the robbery charge from the murder charge.^[2] The defendant maintains that the facts surrounding the two events are not cross admissible under the Code of Evidence. The defendant further asserts that, under the factors delineated in State v. Boscarino, 204 Conn. 714, 722-24, 529 A.2d 1260 (1987), the offenses are violent in nature and a jury would not be able to keep the two charges separate. Additionally, the defense claims that joinder would be unfairly prejudicial in that the defendant’s right to testify with respect to one charge but not the other would be impinged.

The state filed a memorandum in opposition on December 1, 2017 contending that a review of the evidence likely to be produced at trial establishes that the evidence on each charge is cross admissible, and that the defendant has not met his burden of showing that the charges are not of the same character. The court heard argument on the motion on December 21, 2017.

Practice Book § 41-18 provides: " If it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses, the judicial authority may, upon its own motion or the motion of the defendant, order separate trials of the counts or provide whatever other relief justice may require." " [W]hen multiple charges have already been joined in a single information by the state pursuant to [General Statutes] § 54-57, and the defendant has filed a motion to sever the charges for trial pursuant to Practice Book § 41-18, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the offenses are not of the same character ... and therefore that the charges should be tried separately." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Payne, 303 Conn 538, 549, 34 A.3d 370 (2012). To satisfy this burden, " the defendant must prove that the evidence of the separate charges would not be cross admissible if the cases were tried separately ... This is because [when] evidence of one incident would be admissible at the trial of the other incident, separate trials would provide the defendant no significant benefit ... Under such circumstances, the defendant would not ordinarily be substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for a single trial ... Accordingly [our Supreme Court] ha[s] found joinder to be proper [when] the evidence of other crimes or uncharged conduct [was] cross admissible at separate trials." (Citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Labarge, 164 Conn.App. 296, 305-06, 134 A.3d 259, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 915, 136 A.3d 646 (2016). Only if the defendant makes an initial showing that the evidence underlying the charges is not cross admissible does the court need to address the Boscarino factors. Id., 306. " The discretion of a court to order separate trials should be exercised only when a joint trial will be substantially prejudicial to the rights of the defendant, and this means something more than that a joint trial will be less than advantageous to the defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 304.

Accordingly, the court must first determine whether the evidence of each of the charged incidents would be admissible at the trial of the other. " As a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible to prove that a criminal defendant is guilty of the crime of which the defendant is accused ... Such evidence cannot be used to suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal behavior." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeJesus, 288 Conn. 418, 440, 953 A.2d 45 (2008). " [B]ecause of its prejudicial impact, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible merely to show a defendant’s bad character or tendency to commit criminal acts ... On the other hand, such evidence may be offered in proof of an issue in the case, such as intent, identity, malice, motive or a system of criminal activity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vaught, 157 Conn.App. 101, 115, 115 A.3d 64 (2015). " In order to determine whether [evidence of prior misconduct] is admissible, we use a two-part test. First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. Second, the probative value of [the prior misconduct] evidence must outweigh [its] prejudicial effect ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chyung, 325 Conn. 236, 262, 157 A.3d 628 (2017).

Based upon a proffer of the evidence provided at the hearing on December 21, 2017, and as set forth in the state’s memorandum in opposition to the motion, the state alleges that this case arises out of a feud between narcotics dealers Mark Looknanan (" Looknanan") and the defendant, Shaquan Lee-Seales. The state alleges that the defendant had an issue with one Jobsam Pena (Pena) who was selling heroin on Looknanan’s behalf. That dispute in turn led to the alleged robbery of Pena by the defendant in the afternoon of December 10, 2015, on State Pier Road in New London. Following that robbery, Looknanan allegedly threatened the defendant Lee-Seales who sought out Looknanan later that night. At approximately 10:50 p.m. on December 10, 2015, Looknanan was standing outside his residence on Grand Street in New London with his cousin Gilberto Olivencia when the defendant allegedly appeared at a nearby intersection, pulled out a nine millimeter gun and opened fire toward Looknanan from about 20-30 feet away. The defendant allegedly missed Looknanan and instead struck and killed Gilberto Olivencia.

Based upon the proffered facts, evidence of the alleged robbery of Pena would be admissible as to the murder charge to establish the defendant’s malice toward Pena’s alleged associate, Looknanan, as well as the defendant’s motive and intent with respect to the murder charge. See, e.g., State v. Crenshaw, 313 Conn. 69, 87, 95 A.3d 1113 (2014) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating two informations and affirming the trial court’s determination that evidence of assault and kidnapping would have been cross admissible as to the murder case to establish defendant’s intent and motive to kill); see also State v. Lopez, 280 Conn. 779, 795, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007) (stating that " evidence of prior misconduct that tends to show that the defendant harbored hostility toward the intended victim of a violent crime is admissible to establish motive"); Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5(c).^[3] Similarly, with respect to the admissibility of the murder in the robbery case, the evidence of the murder, which allegedly occurred just hours after the alleged robbery, would be relevant to establish the defendant’s identity as the person involved in the robbery, the existence of a feud between the defendant and Looknanan, and, thus, a motive to rob Pena. See Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5(c).

Thus, the evidence as to both charges would be relevant and material to one of the exceptions and the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. The defendant has not met his burden of establishing that the offenses are not of the same character. Rather, the state has established that the evidence is relevant and cross admissible, namely, the evidence of each alleged incident, the robbery and the murder, would be admissible at the trial of the other. The charged incidents are not attenuated, unrelated incidents as argued by the defendant, but rather each incident is part of a series of alleged events that culminated in the shooting of Gilberto Olivencia on the evening of December 10, 2015. Accordingly, the evidence is cross admissible and separate trials would provide the defendant no significant benefit. See State v. LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115, 155, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012).

Even if the evidence were not cross admissible, a review of the Boscarino factors leads to the conclusion that the defendant would not be unfairly prejudiced by denying the motion to sever the charges. in State v. Boscarino, supra, 204 Conn. 722-24, the Connecticut Supreme Court identified three factors that a trial court should consider in deciding whether charges should be severed to avoid substantial prejudice resulting from consolidation of multiple cases for trial. " These factors include: (1) whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguishable factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the duration and complexity of the trial." State v. Ellis, 270 Conn. 337, 375, 852 A.2d 676 (2004).

Here, with respect to the first factor, the charges involve discrete and easily distinguishable factual scenarios. The state alleges two separate incidents, which although linked as set forth above, involved different victims and different factual scenarios. Specifically, the state alleges that the defendant robbed Pena of a cell phone, drugs and cash during the afternoon of December 10, 2015, on State Pier Road in New London. With respect to the murder charge, the state alleges that later that same day, only hours after the robbery, the defendant shot and killed Olivencia in front of a residence located at 8 Grand Street in New London.

Second the crux of the defendant’s motion to sever the robbery and murder charges is that the allegations underlying the murder charge are so brutal or shocking as to impair the...