State v. Lerma

1

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN LERMA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. S-1-SC-39751

Supreme Court of New Mexico

May 6, 2024

This decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Supreme Court.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF EDDY COUNTY Jane Shuler-Gray District Judge

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Kimberly Chavez Cook Appellate Defender Joelle N. Gonzales, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General Ellen Venegas, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

DECISION

DAVID K. THOMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE

{¶1} Defendant Juan Lerma appeals his conviction for intentional child abuse resulting in death of a child under twelve (Intentional Child Abuse). Defendant contends that (1) the jury instructions issued by the district court resulted in fundamental error because they conflated Intentional Child Abuse and reckless disregard resulting in the death of a child under twelve years of age (Reckless Child Abuse), (2) the district court infringed upon his right of confrontation and his right to a fair trial by unduly restricting cross-examination of the State's key witnesses, and (3) prosecutorial misconduct denied him his right to a fair trial.

{¶2}We affirm the findings of the district court by nonprecedential decision. See Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA (allowing for disposition by nonprecedential decision when the issues have already been decided by New Mexico's appellate courts).

I. BACKGROUND

{¶3} Eight-year-old S.R. and her brother, nine-year-old M.L., moved in with their father, Defendant, following their mother's death. A few months later, S.R. moved from Defendant's home and began living with her paternal grandmother, Esmeralda. One evening, S.R. spent the night at Defendant's home. When Esmeralda returned for her the next day, Defendant informed her that S.R. had died and that he put her body in trash bags. Esmeralda left Defendant's home and contacted Defendant's brother to explain what she had just been told, and together the two reported Defendant's statements to the police. Three hours later, the police recovered S.R.'s lifeless body, wrapped in trash bags and placed in a trash can behind his house.

{¶4} The Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) examined S.R.'s body at the scene and noted old bruising on S.R.'s arms and legs. Otherwise, they found no signs of trauma. The next day a board-certified forensic pathologist conducted S.R.'s autopsy and concluded that S.R.'s cause of death was blunt force trauma to the head, evidenced by both a subdural hematoma and diffuse axonal injury. The forensic pathologist ruled that the manner of S.R.'s death was homicide.

{¶5} Defendant was charged and convicted of Intentional Child Abuse, a first-degree felony, and Tampering with Evidence, a third-degree felony, and was sentenced to life in prison plus three years. Defendant now appeals his conviction for Intentional Child Abuse to this Court. See Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA (requiring this Court to decide "appeals from the district courts in which a sentence of death or life imprisonment has been imposed").

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Jury Instructions Were Not Erroneous and Did Not Result in Fundamental Error

1. Unpreserved Claims of Error

{¶6} At trial, the jury received separate instructions for Intentional Child Abuse and Reckless Child Abuse and step-down instructions for reaching a verdict. Because Defendant did not preserve his challenge to these instructions, we review the propriety of the issued jury instructions for fundamental error. State v. Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 21, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705. This Court will reverse a conviction for fundamental error "only if the defendant's guilt is so questionable that upholding a conviction would shock the conscience, or where, notwithstanding the apparent culpability of the defendant, substantial justice has not been served." State v. Silva, 2008-NMSC-051, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 815, 192 P.3d 1192 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As in this case where "the prejudicial effect is minimal and the evidence of the defendant's guilt is overwhelming, the error does not rise to the level of fundamental error." State v. McDowell, 2018-NMSC-008, ¶ 18, 411 P.3d 337.

2. Intentional Child Abuse Jury Instructions

{¶7} To determine whether jury instructions resulted in fundamental error, our review "begins with determining 'whether a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected' . . . ." State v. Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 27, 389 P.3d 1039 (quoting State v. Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633). We also consider whether the instructions "fairly and accurately state the applicable law." Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶8}"Uniform jury instructions are presumed to be correct," Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and "become the law of the case against which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be measured," State v. Arrendondo, 2012-NMSC-013, ¶ 18, 278 P.3d 517 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "When a uniform jury instruction is provided for the elements of a crime, generally that instruction must be used without substantive modification." Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{¶9} The jury instruction used at trial on the charge of Intentional Child Abuse reads,

For you to find Juan Lerma guilty of intentional child abuse resulting in death of a child under twelve (12) years of age, as charged in Count 1, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements of the crime:

1. Juan Lerma did grab, push, hit, throw on the ground, kick, and/or refused to seek medical or other care, when able to do so, necessary for the well-being of his daughter, [S.R.]

2. By engaging in the conduct described in Paragraph 1, Juan Lerma caused his daughter, [S.R.], to be placed in a situation that endangered the life or health of [S.R.] or caused [S.R.] to be tortured or cruelly punished.

3. Juan Lerma acted intentionally and without justification. To find that the defendant acted intentionally, you must find that it was the defendant's conscious objective to endanger, torture, or cruelly punish the child, [S.R.].

4. Juan Lerma's conduct resulted in the death of his daughter, [S.R.].

5. [S.R.] was under the age of twelve (12).

6. This happened in New Mexico on or about the 1st day of August 2020.

See UJI 14-623 NMRA.

{¶10} Defendant first argues that the instruction allowed the jury to find him guilty of Intentional Child Abuse solely for a "refusal to seek medical or other care," which he argues is a theory only permitted for reckless child abuse, citing this Court's holding in State v. Consaul, 2014-NMSC-030, ¶ 26, 332 P.3d 850 (requiring separate jury instructions for intentional and reckless child abuse). Defendant is incorrect.

{¶11} In State v. Garcia we established that refusal to seek medical care may be adequate legal grounds for a theory of Intentional Child Abuse, stating that "medical neglect[ under] a theory of child abuse by endangerment . . . [i]s viable so long as it is supported by the evidence presented at trial." 2021-NMSC-019, ¶ 19, 488 P.3d 585. The availability of this theory is further supported by the New Mexico Child Abuse Statute which provides:

Abuse of a child consists of a person knowingly, intentionally, or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be:

(1) placed in a situation that may endanger the child's life or health;

(2) tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished; or

(3) exposed to the inclemency of weather. NMSA 1978 § 30-6-1(D) (2009).

{¶12} A defendant's intentional refusal to seek medical care places a child in a "situation that may endanger the child's life or health," which the statute provides can be done "knowingly, intentionally, or negligently." Section 30-6-1(D)(1); see also UJI 14-626 NMRA comm. cmt. 1. ("[I]t is possible to commit any form of child abuse either recklessly or intentionally."). The jury instructions' elements tracked the elements of the child abuse statute and UJI 14-623 and therefore were presumptively valid. Lucero, 2017-NMSC-008, ¶ 30 (holding that the jury instructions "were presumptively valid" when they were in accordance with "the child abuse statute" and the uniform jury instructions). A reasonable juror would not have been confused or misdirected as the jury was instructed on an accurate statement of the law.

{¶13} Defendant next argues that even if the State could "pursue a theory of intentionally failing to seek medical care," it would have to prove that Defendant's intentional refusal to obtain medical care was the "but-for cause of death." Because there was sufficient evidence to support a theory of Intentional Child Abuse, on which the jury convicted Defendant, there is no need to examine Defendant's misplaced causation argument invoking medical neglect. See State v. Godoy, 2012-NMCA-084, ¶ 6, 284 P.3d 410 ("[W]here alternative theories of guilt are put forth under a single charge, jury unanimity is required only as to the verdict, not to any particular theory of guilt.").

{¶14} The evidence supporting Intentional Child Abuse begins with Defendant's own testimony. He told the jury that on the day before she was discovered deceased, he spanked S.R. to discipline her for misbehaving and that the spankings with a...