State v. Lockhart

542 S.E.2d 443

208 W.Va. 622

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. Carl E. LOCKHART, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 27053.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 6, 2000.

Decided December 1, 2000.

Lee F. Benford, II, Ravenswood, West Virginia, Attorney for the Appellant.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Barbara H. Allen, Managing Deputy Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Appellee.

DAVIS, Justice:

Carl E. Lockhart appeals his convictions for the offenses of sexual assault in the first degree, battery, burglary, and assault during the commission of a felony. Mr. Lockhart argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony, offered by an expert witness in support of an insanity defense, that Mr. Lockhart suffered from Dissociative Identity Disorder. We find that expert testimony regarding Dissociative Identity Disorder may be admissible in connection with a defendant's assertion of an insanity defense. However, the admissibility of specific expert testimony regarding Dissociative Identity Disorder must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. In the instant case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding the expert testimony.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following a jury trial that commenced on November 6, 1995, Carl E. Lockhart, appellant and defendant below (hereinafter referred to as "Mr. Lockhart"), was convicted of the offenses of sexual assault in the first degree, battery, burglary, and assault during the commission of a felony. On a previous appeal of his conviction to this Court, Mr. Lockhart argued, in relevant part, that the Circuit Court of Wood County erred by refusing to permit him to present an insanity defense based upon the theory that he suffered from a mental impairment known as "Dissociative Identity Disorder" (also known as "Multiple Personality Disorder").¹See State v. Lockhart, 200 W.Va. 479, 490 S.E.2d 298 (1997) (hereinafter referred to as "Lockhart I ").² In a per curiam opinion rendered by this Court in Lockhart I, we observed that, in addition to refusing to allow Mr. Lockhart's insanity defense, the circuit court "failed to allow counsel for [Mr. Lockhart] to proffer into the record, through the testimony of his principal witness, [Dr. Harry J. Coffey, Ph.D., a psychologist,] evidence concerning the nature of Dissociative Identity Disorder and the relevance of that disorder to [Mr. Lockhart]." 200 W.Va. at 481,490 S.E.2d at 300. Instead, the circuit court had permitted Mr. Lockhart's counsel to "state for the record a profile or summary of Dr. Coffey's testimony." Id. at 483, 490 S.E.2d at 302. Due to the absence of a proffer from Mr. Lockhart's principal expert witness, the Lockhart I Court concluded that the record on appeal was wholly inadequate from which to determine whether Mr. Lockhart's "rather novel theory of insanity," based upon Dissociative Identity Disorder, should have been presented to the jury. Id. at 484, 490 S.E.2d at 303. Consequently, the Court remanded the case "to the circuit court to enable counsel for [Mr. Lockhart] to make a complete evidentiary proffer of Dr. Coffey's evidence concerning Dissociative Identity Disorder and its relevance to [Mr. Lockhart]." Id. at 485, 490 S.E.2d at 304. The Court went on to explain:

If, upon completion of the proffer, the circuit court is of the opinion that the appellant's insanity defense should not be presented to a jury, the circuit court shall make an appropriate disposition of the appellant in conformity with the above convictions, subject to a discretionary appeal to this Court. If, however, the circuit court is of the opinion that it committed error in not allowing such a defense to be presented, the circuit court shall award the appellant a new trial. See State v. Richards, 195 W.Va. 544, 466 S.E.2d 395 (1995). Id. In addition, the Lockhart I Court cautioned that "[t]he proffer of Dr. Coffey's specific testimony concerning Dissociative Identity Disorder, and its relevance to the appellant ... must be of sufficient quality and quantity to enable the circuit court, and this Court, to rule intelligently upon the issue." Id. (citations omitted).

On October 29, 1998, the circuit court conducted a hearing at which it received the proffered testimony of Dr. Coffey. Following this hearing, the circuit court again determined that Mr. Lockhart should not be permitted to present his proposed insanity defense to the jury. The circuit court commented:

There was never even an attempt to show that[ Mr. Lockhart] didn't have the ability to conduct his action, to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. There is no attempt, anywhere.

The only thing that it was based upon, this defense, is that he didn't appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, and there is no evidence of that in this case. All we have if it is even that, is a diagnosis of DID. It just doesn't even come close to meeting the standard for an insanity defense, not even close.

....

It makes no sense to say, or to hold in any case that I can conceive of, that DID is a defense to a criminal act. It makes no sense. It would be contrary to all logic, and I would urge our court to not venture into that quagmire.

The circuit court then rendered an order, which was entered on December 17, 1998, making the following findings:

1. Dr. Coffey does not assert that the criminal acts for which the defendant has been convicted were the result of a mental disease or defect which caused the accused to lack the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions, or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law.

2. To permit the defendant to offer a defense of insanity based upon Dissociative Identity Disorder would raise immaterial and irrelevant issues which would cloud the real issues.

3. The defendant's proposed insanity defense should not be presented to a jury.

Finally, the circuit court remanded Mr. Lockhart to the custody of the Department of Corrections to complete the sentences it had previously imposed for his various convictions.³ It is from the December 17, 1998, order of the Circuit Court of Wood County that Mr. Lockhart now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

There are two basic issues to be addressed in this case. One, whether West Virginia recognizes Dissociative Identity Disorder as a basis for an insanity defense, and, two, whether Dr. Coffey should have been permitted to testify regarding this condition in Mr. Lockhart's trial. The question of whether West Virginia recognizes Dissociative Identity Disorder as a basis for an insanity defense presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo by this Court. See Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). The circuit court's decision whether to allow expert witness testimony during a trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion:

"The admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly wrong." Syllabus Point 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W.Va. 269, 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 908, 112 S.Ct. 301, 116 L.Ed.2d 244 (1991).

Syl. pt. 1, West Virginia Div. of Highways v. Butler, 205 W.Va. 146, 516 S.E.2d 769 (1999). See also Syl. pt. 2, Morris v. Boppana, 182 W.Va. 248, 387 S.E.2d 302 (1989) (" `Under W. Va. R. Evid. 702, a trial judge has broad discretion to decide whether expert testimony should be admitted, and where the evidence is unnecessary, cumulative, confusing or misleading the trial judge may properly refuse to admit it.' Syllabus point 4, Rozas v. Rozas, 176 W.Va. 235, 342 S.E.2d 201 (1986)."). With due consideration for these standards, we now address the issues raised in this appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

Mr. Lockhart lists numerous assignments of error in his brief to this Court; however, he provides an argument only for the general proposition that the trial court erred by refusing to permit him to present an insanity defense based upon Dissociative Identity Disorder. We will address only the issue actually discussed in Mr. Lockhart's brief.⁴ To resolve the sole issue properly raised by Mr. Lockhart, we must answer two basic questions. First, whether expert opinion testimony on Dissociative Identity Disorder is generally admissible in West Virginia as a basis for an insanity defense, and, second, whether Dr. Coffey should have been permitted to offer his expert opinion regarding this condition in Mr. Lockhart's trial. We address each of these questions in turn.

A. Expert Opinion Testimony on Dissociative Identity Disorder as a Basis for an Insanity Defense

Mr. Lockhart first argues that this Court has not adopted a restrictive position with regard to the evidence that may be introduced on the insanity issue. Therefore, Mr. Lockhart reasons, a Dissociative Identity Disorder (hereinafter referred to as "DID")⁵ insanity defense should be permitted when there is ample documentation of the disorder and a link shown between the disorder and a defendant's behavior. Mr. Lockhart contends that the definition of DID contained in The American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (4th ed.1994) (hereinafter "DSM-IV"), is sufficient to establish such a link in the instant case.

The State responds that the implications of asserting DID for consideration in the evaluation of criminal responsibility are far from settled. The State asserts that the issue of whether an insanity defense based on DID should be accepted in West Virginia should first be addressed as an issue of foundational relevancy and should be considered on the basis of a record far more developed than the one presented in the instant case. The State argues that the DSM-IV itself cautions against its use to support legal conclusions.

Initially, we must determine the proper analysis for...