State v. Long

301 Conn. 216

19 A.3d 1242

STATE of Connecticut

v.Calvin LONG.

No. 18282.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 13, 2011.Decided June 21, 2011.

Monte P. Radler, public defender, for the appellant (defendant).Bruce R. Lockwood, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Vicki Melchiorre, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.PALMER, J.

In 1986, the defendant, Calvin Long, was committed to the jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board), following a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of assault in the second degree, and he has remained under the board's jurisdiction ever since. This appeal concerns the defendant's second attempt to challenge, on equal protection grounds, the state's most recent petition to continue his commitment under General Statutes § 17a–593 (c).¹ In a previous appeal, this court concluded, contrary to the determination of the trial court, Miano, J., that the legislature had a legitimate basis for providing review procedures for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees (acquittees) different from those afforded to convicted defendants who have been transferred to a mental health facility after their incarceration and thereafter are subject to statutory civil commitment procedures (civilly committed inmates).² See State v. Long, 268 Conn. 508, 536–37, 847 A.2d 862, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 969, 125 S.Ct. 424, 160 L.Ed.2d 340 (2004). Following our remand, the trial court, Blue, J., denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted the state's petition to continue the defendant's commitment. The defendant's principal claims in the present appeal are that the trial court improperly construed this court's decision in the previous appeal to preclude his equal protection challenge to § 17a–593 (c), and that a higher level of scrutiny of the statutory scheme should apply to this claim than we had applied to his claim in the previous appeal. We conclude that our decision in the previous appeal precludes the defendant's present claims. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because our resolution of the present appeal depends on the scope of the earlier proceedings, we first must set forth the undisputed facts and procedural history relative to those proceedings in some detail. In March, 1986, the defendant was charged by information with assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 53a–60, a class D felony, after striking a person in the head several times with a hammer. The defendant was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes § 53a–13 (a). Following an assessment of his mental health, the court ordered the defendant committed to the board's jurisdiction for a term of five years, a period equivalent to the maximum sentence that the defendant could have received if he had been convicted of the underlying offense. Prior to the expiration of that term, the state's attorney petitioned the Superior Court, pursuant to § 17a–593 (c), to continue the defendant's commitment on the ground that he remained mentally ill to the extent that his discharge would constitute a danger to himself or others. After a hearing, the trial court granted the state's petition and continued the defendant's commitment for a term of three years. On three subsequent occasions, the state successfully petitioned the Superior Court to continue the defendant's commitment.

In March, 2001, the state filed another petition to continue the defendant's commitment. In response, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition, claiming, inter alia, that, “[o]nce an acquittee reaches [his] maximum term of recommitment, the reasoning of Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473 [378 A.2d 553] (1977), State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400 [645 A.2d 965] (1994), and related cases, by extension, renders a state's petition for recommitment pursuant to ... [§] 17a–593 (c) unconstitutional in both procedure and effect.” ³ The trial court, Miano, J., granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the state's petition, concluding that § 17a–593 (c) violated the defendant's right to (1) due process under the state constitution because the commitment scheme improperly vests the board with authority to assess an acquittee's status and does not afford an acquittee periodic judicial review of his status, (2) equal protection under the federal constitution because there is no rational basis to treat differently acquittees who have served their maximum term of commitment and civilly committed inmates, and (3) equal protection under the state constitution because the lack of a rational basis for the disparate treatment dictated the conclusion that the statute also did not meet the strict scrutiny standard that applies to the constitutionally protected class of the mentally disabled.⁴ The trial court therefore declared § 17a–593 (c) unconstitutional and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.

Following the state's appeal, this court reversed the trial court's judgment. With respect to the due process issue, we agreed with the state that the question, “properly framed, is whether § 17a–593 (c), as applied to the defendant, deprived [him] of [his right] to procedural due process in the particular circumstances of [this] case, and not merely under some possible or hypothetical set of facts not proven to exist.” (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Long, supra, 268 Conn. at 523, 847 A.2d 862. In addressing that question, we outlined the statutory procedures and attendant protections applicable to the defendant during his term of commitment.⁵ See id., at 525–26, 847 A.2d 862. We explained the board's oversight role, which is reflected in (1) the board's receipt of a report, every six months, on the defendant's status from the mental health facility where he was confined; see General Statutes § 17a–586; (2) the requirement that the board hold a hearing on the defendant's mental status at least once every two years; see General Statutes § 17a–585; and (3) the board's option of recommending to the court that the defendant be discharged pursuant to § 17a–593 (a). State v. Long, supra, at 527, 847 A.2d 862. We underscored the fact that the defendant had obtained judicial review on the five occasions that the state petitioned for continued commitment; see id., at 526, 847 A.2d 862; and the fact that he never had invoked his statutory right to initiate judicial proceedings to obtain his release. Id. Accordingly, we concluded that there was no due process violation. Id., at 527, 847 A.2d 862.

With respect to the defendant's state and federal equal protection claims, we first contrasted the statutory procedures available to acquittees to challenge their continued commitment with those available to persons civilly committed, including civilly committed inmates. See id., at 528–30, 847 A.2d 862. With respect to the latter, we observed: “The [mental health facility] in which the individual is committed annually must notify [him] that he has a right to an additional hearing regarding his continued commitment. General Statutes § 17a–498 (g). That statute also provides that if the [committed individual] does not request such a hearing, or the hearing does not result in [the individual's] release, the Probate Court must hold a hearing at least once every two years to revisit the issue of continued commitment. It is this required biennial judicial review, which is not applicable to acquittees, that is the principal distinction in the recommitment processes for civil committees and acquittees.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Long, supra, 268 Conn. at 530, 847 A.2d 862.

This court determined that the proper level of scrutiny to examine these procedural differences under both the federal and state constitutions was rational basis review. Id., at 535, 540, 847 A.2d 862. Proceeding under that standard, we concluded that we had “no difficulty in ascertaining two rational reasons for the disparate treatment in statutory recommitment procedures for acquittees as compared to civilly committed inmates.

“First, under the acquittee statutory scheme, the board has general and specific familiarity with all acquittees beginning with their initial commitment and, therefore, is better equipped than courts to monitor their commitment. By placing oversight of these individuals in a single administrative agency, such as the board, which is comprised of laypersons and experts in relevant areas, including psychiatry, psychology, probation, and victim advocacy, the legislature reasonably could have believed that the board, with its expertise and familiarity with the mental status of each acquittee, would be better equipped than a court to monitor the [acquittee's] recommitment. This furthers the legislature's legitimate interest in efficiently managing the recommitment of acquittees....

“Second, the state clearly has an interest in ensuring that its citizens are not erroneously committed ... on [the basis of] harmless, idiosyncratic behavior. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–27, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). The legislature, however, reasonably could have concluded that the risk of erroneous commitment is far less for an acquittee and, therefore, [that] additional mandatory judicial review during the recommitment is unnecessary. Specifically, the legislature could have determined that the likelihood of an erroneous commitment is reduced in the case of an acquittee because an acquittee initiates the commitment process himself by pleading and proving the mental illness that led to his commission of a crime. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Jones [ v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983) ]:...