State v. Lopez-Cardona

903 S.E.2d 18

The STATE

v.LOPEZ-CARDONA et al.

S24A0104

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 11, 2024

Superior Court, Gwinnett County, Tamela Adkins, Judge

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint Christopher Malcolm, Assistant Attorney General, Meghan Hobbs Hill, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, 3.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334-1300, Patsy A. Austin-Gatson, District Attorney, Christopher Mark DeNeve, AD.A, Gwinnett County District Attorney’s Office, 75 Langley Drive, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046, for Appellant.

Robert Greenwald, David Leroy Whitman, Attorney at Law, 750 Longleaf Blvd., Suite A P.O. Box 1183 Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046, Richard Carter Armond, The Armond Firm, LLC, 260 Constitution Boulevard, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046, Lyle Kilvington Porter, 368 South Perry Street, Lawrenceville, Georgia 30046, for Appellee.

Warren, Justice.

Saturnino Andre Lopez-Cardona, Wilmer Mendez, and Gerson Suruy were charged with crimes related to the stabbing death of Lucas Andres Cruz-Guzman. They each filed pretrial motions to suppress statements that they made during separate interviews with the same police officer. The trial court issued orders granting each of their respective motions, concluding that the defendants did not voluntarily, knowingly, and Intelligently waive their rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before they made the statements. The State now appeals, contending that the trial court's conclusion with respect to Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements was incorrect and that we should therefore reverse those orders. The State concedes, however, that the trial court properly suppressed Suruy’s statement and that we should thus affirm that order.

As explained below, the trial court made express findings as to disputed questions of material fact in this case, but because those findings are not sufficiently detailed to permit us to meaningfully review its rulings suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements, we vacate the orders as to those two defendants and remand the case to the trial court with the direction that the court make further, specific findings. And as to Suruy, we defer to the State’s discretion to not challenge the order suppressing his statement, accept the State’s concession, and affirm that order.

[1, 2] 1. For purposes of this appeal, we will recount the undisputed evidence presented at the hearing on the motions to suppress and also note the existence and nature of disputed evidence pertinent to the trial court’s express findings regarding Lopez-Cardona and Mendez and to the additional findings that may be required on remand.¹ In June 2021, Lopez-Cardona and Mendez were indicted for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in connection with Cruz-Guzman’s death. They each filed pretrial motions to suppress statements that they separately made during interviews with a Gwinnett County police officer while they were in custody at police headquarters.

At a hearing on the motions, the officer testified that his primary language is Spanish and that he interviewed Lopez-Cardona and Mendez separately and conducted the interviews in Spanish, their primary language. The prosecutor tendered into evidence video recordings of the interviews, which he played for the trial court, and transcripts (in Spanish and translated into English) of the recordings.² The video recordings and transcripts show that as to each defendant, the officer read in Spanish the rights under Miranda.³ and the officer testified that he read from a "Spanish Advisement of Rights" form that the Gwinnett County Police Department typically used. The English translations of the transcripts of the recordings show that the officer told Lopez-Cardona and Mendez that they had the right to remain silent; anything they said could "be used against [them] before a court of law"; they had a right to an attorney during questioning; if they "want[ed] an attorney but [could]not afford one," an attorney would be appointed; and they could "exercise" those rights at any time.⁴ The video recordings of the interviews show that Lopez-Cardona was mostly still while the officer read the rights, whereas Mendez nodded after the officer recited each right. At the end of the reading, the officer asked each defendant if he understood, and each defendant nodded. The officer then asked questions about the crimes, and Lopez-Cardona and Mendez each answered his questions.

The officer testified that Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s nods when he asked if they understood, as well as their apparent willingness to answer his questions, indicated to him that they did in fact understand their rights under Miranda.⁵ The officer also testified that he did not show Lopez-Cardona or Mendez the advisement of rights form that was printed in Spanish; he did not ask them to sign the form; and he did not read to them the last paragraph just above the signature line on the form, which he translated into English during his hearing testimony as follows: "I have read this document of my rights, and I understand. I desire to speak with you and answer your questions. I do not desire an attorney at this time. I know and understand what I am doing. No promises or threats or pressure or coercion have been used against me."

The defendants presented testimony from Yvonne Machain, a Spanish-speaking interpreter and translator, who stated that she reviewed the video recordings and transcripts of the interviews and that there were several "inaccuracies" in the officer’s recitation of the rights under Miranda in Spanish to each defendant. First, as to his recitation in Spanish of the phrase "[a]nything you say can be used against you before a court of law," the transcripts of the recordings show that the word the officer used to represent the English word "before" (as in "before a court of law") was "antes," which, Machain testified, means "before" in the context of time (as in "prior to"). Machain testified that the correct word to express "before a court" (as in "in front of" the court) is "ante," not "antes." Second, with regard to the officer’s recitation in Spanish of the phrase "[i]f you want an attorney, but cannot afford one," Machain testified that the officer incorrectly used in each interview the word "contrar," which means "to oppose," rather than the word "contratar," which means "to hire."⁶ Finally, with respect to the officer’s recitation in Spanish of the phrase, "[y]ou may exercise these rights at any time," the transcripts of the recordings show that he used in each interview the word "ejercitar," and Machain testified that word means "physical exercise."⁷ Machain also testified that the officer "mumbled" and "sounded winded" when he recited the Miranda warnings in Spanish to each defendant, and that "he rushed through the reading." On cross-examination, Machain testified that depending on a listener’s educational background, the listener would be able to decipher what the officer meant when he used the words "antes" (instead of "ante") and "contrar" (instead of "contratar"), given the context.⁸

At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s motions to suppress. Noting that Machain testified that the officer "was fast[-]speaking and possibly mumbling" when he read the Miranda warnings, the trial court found that the officer "was very fast[-]spealdng … while he was giving testimony." The court then stated, without further explanation, that there was "evidence there may have been some mistakes in the translation." The trial court also found that neither Lopez-Cardona nor Mendez "answered audibly" when the officer asked if they understood the Miranda warnings; that Lopez-Cardona "slightly gave a nod after the one word understood"; and that Mendez "nodded throughout the reading of the Miranda [warnings], so his nod immediately after the word understood … had no meaning." The court then said that "neither one of these [d]efendants w[as] asked if they waive[d] their rights. Neither one of these [d]efendants w[as] asked if they want to talk to the police, and therefore, I find that they did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their Miranda rights and that they did not—there is not a preponderance of the evidence that they understood."

The trial court later issued separate, written orders granting Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s motions to suppress. Each said: "Having heard and considered the [d]efendant’s motion, evidence and argument of counsel and all applicable law, the [c]ourt finds the State failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant understood his Miranda rights and knowingly, voluntarily[,] and intelligently waived those rights before giving a statement." The State filed a timely notice of appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), contending that the trial court erred by suppressing Lopez-Cardona’s and Mendez’s statements.

[3] 2. (a) We begin with a review of the legal principles that apply in this case. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution "and set forth the now well-established rule that a defendant who is in custody and subject to interrogation "must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. To use a defendant’s custodial statements in its case-in-chief, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was advised of these rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived them. See, e.g., Hinkson v. State, 310 Ga. 388, 400, 850 S.E.2d 41 (2020); Pena v. State, 297...