State v. Luthi

549 P.3d 712

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Cassandra Lee LUTHI, Appellant.

No. 101828-2

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued January 25, 2024

Filed: June 13, 2024

Appeal from Cowlitz County Superior Court, Docket No: 19-1-00063-2, Honorable Thad Scudder, Judge.

Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant.

Thomas A. Ladouceur, Cowlitz County Pros. Attorney’s Office, 312 Sw 1st Ave. Rm. 105, Kelso, WA, 98626-1799, for Respondent.

YU, J.

¶1 This case asks whether a criminal defendant may be required to appear for nonjury proceedings from an "in-court holding cell"¹ without an individualized inquiry justifying such a restraint. The answer is no. The in-court holding cell undermines the presumption of innocence, interferes with a defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel, and violates the dignity of the defendant and the judicial proceedings. Therefore, absent an individualized finding that such a restraint is necessary to protect "essential state interests such as physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum," the routine use of this in-court holding cell violates federal and state constitutional due process protections against " ‘inherently prejudicial’ " courtroom practices. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953 (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986)); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Wash. Const. art. I, § 22; State v. Jackson, 195 Wash.2d 841, 852-53, 467 P.3d 97 (2020).

¶2 Appellant Cassandra Luthi was required to appear for a nonjury hearing from an in-court holding cell at the Cowlitz County Jail courtroom. Despite Luthi’s timely objections, the superior court did not conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether such a restraint was justified, believing that it was unnecessary to do so. We hold that an individualized inquiry was required. The State fails to show this error was harmless. Therefore, we reverse the superior court, grant Luthi’s requested relief, and remand for a new hearing.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Cowlitz County Jail courtroom holding cell

¶3 In order to fully appreciate the particular restraint at issue in this case, we must first describe the in-court holding cell at the Cowlitz County Jail courtroom that was used for Luthi’s hearing. The parties do not dispute what the in-court holding cell looks like or the circumstances in which it is used.

¶4 The Cowlitz County Superior Court often employs a courtroom in the Cowlitz County Jail for short criminal proceedings without witnesses. When the defendant appears for such a hearing, they enter the incourt holding cell directly from a "secured area of the jail." Resp’t’s Br. at 1.

¶5 The holding cell appears to be located at the back or side of the Cowlitz County Jail courtroom, away from the table where counsel sits. The interior of the holding cell is roughly five feet wide, five feet deep, and eight feet long, with a "mesh window" on the right to allow defendants to speak with their attorneys, and a glass window on the left. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewed from the courtroom, the in-court holding cell looks like this:

549 P.3d 714.bmp

Id. at 2.

¶6 There is "[n]o recording device near [the] [d]efendant" inside the holding cell, although there is a small slit at the bottom of the mesh window to exchange paper work. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Feb. 3, 2023) at 14. There is also a chair or stool in the holding cell where the defendant may sit, but it is disputed whether a seated defendant can still easily view and participate in the proceedings. A corrections officer is typically inside the holding cell with the defendant during proceedings, and defendants are typically not shackled or handcuffed. There is no indication that Luthi’s hearing differed from the typical case.

B. Luthi’s appearance from the in-court holding cell

¶7 In 2021, Luthi pleaded guilty to delivery of heroin within a school zone and was given a mental health sentencing alternative (MHSA)² of 36 months’ community custody. Following two violation notices from Luthi’s community corrections officer in 2022, the State petitioned to revoke the MHSA. Luthi was taken into custody at the Cowlitz County Jail on December 20, 2022, where she was held without bail until her MHSA revocation hearing in February 2023.

¶8 Luthi’s defense counsel was already "very familiar" with the in-court holding cell, which counsel refers to as "a cage on the side of the [Cowlitz County Jail] courtroom." Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 27. According to defense counsel, the in-court holding cell was a "dehumanizing" restraint comparable to shackling, which could not be imposed "absent evident necessity determined on an individualized basis by the court." Id. at 27, 31. Through counsel, Luthi filed a motion before her MHSA revocation hearing "to appear in court without restraints," arguing that "[t]here [was] no reason to place Ms. Luthi inside of a cage and for her to be physically separated from the court proceedings" because she was "not a flight risk, [and] she [was] not going to harm herself or others." Id. at 25, 34.

¶9 The superior court did not decide Luthi’s motion before she was required to appear in court. As a result, Luthi appeared at the February hearing from the in-court holding cell, with a corrections officer standing next to her. Luthi again objected to the use of the "cage" at her hearing, and the superior court orally denied her motion. VRP (Feb. 3, 2023) at 9-10. The superior court explained that the in-court holding cell was not "the same" or "at the same level as shackling," and that the court did not "really see any prejudice to Ms. Luthi." Id. at 9. The superior court did not conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether Luthi presented any courtroom security concerns.

¶10 Luthi admitted the two violations. She asked for time served and to be released so that she could continue with her treatment as directed by her MHSA. Luthi also personally made a statement to the court but because the in-court holding cell had no recording device, several sections of the transcript are marked "inaudible" and "indiscernible." Id. at 14-15. It appears that Luthi attempted to convey her struggles with mental illness and substance abuse, and her desire to follow the treatment as directed.

¶11 After her hearing, Luthi wrote an e-mail to defense counsel, explaining how difficult it was to participate from the in-court holding cell because it was "almost impossible to speak" to her attorney. CP at 46. Luthi also described feeling as though she was "on display" in the holding cell and "not a part of [her] own court hearing " Id.

¶12 The superior court amended Luthi’s sentence to impose a 45-day sanction for time served. We granted direct review and now reverse.

ISSUES

¶13 A. Was the superior court required to conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether courtroom security concerns made it necessary for Luthi to attend her MHSA revocation hearing from the in-court holding cell?

¶14 B. If an individualized inquiry was required, is Luthi entitled to a new hearing?

ANALYSIS

A. The superior court was required to conduct an individualized inquiry before requiring Luthi to appear for her hearing from the in-court holding cell

¶15 It is undisputed that Luthi was compelled to attend her MHSA revocation hearing from the in-court holding cell and that the superior court declined to conduct an individualized inquiry into whether this restraint was justified for security reasons. The State urges this court to affirm, arguing that the in-court holding cell does not implicate the due process right " ‘to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraor- dinary circumstances.’ " Jackson, 195 Wash.2d at 852, 467 P.3d 97 (quoting State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 842, 975 P.2d 967 (1999) (plurality opinion)). Alternatively, the State argues that these due process protections do not apply to Luthi’s hearing because it was not a trial and there was no jury, The State is incorrect on both points. We reverse the superior court and hold that Luthi was entitled to an individualized inquiry before she could be required to appear from the incourt holding cell.

1. Due process requires an individualized inquiry before any defendant may be restrained at any court appearance

¶16 To provide context for the in-court holding cell used in this case, it is first necessary to review existing constitutional protections against the use of unjustified restraints on criminal defendants.

[1–3] ¶17 A defendant’s right to appear in court free from unjustified restraints is well established as a matter of federal and state due process law.³ Deck, 544 U.S. at 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007; Jackson, 195 Wash.2d at 852, 467 P.3d 97. Long-standing precedent holds that a defendant cannot be physically restrained at trial "unless some impelling necessity demands the restraint." State v. Williams, 18 Wash, 47, 51, 50 P. 580 (1897); see also State v. Damon, 144 Wash.2d 686, 690-91, 25 P.3d 418 (2001), The same protections apply to capital penalty proceedings and nonjury pretrial hearings. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007; Jackson, 195 Wash.2d at 852, 854, 467 P,3d 97. Therefore, "[a] trial court must engage in an individualized inquiry into the use of restraints prior to every court appearance" to determine whether the restraints are necessary for courtroom security. Jackson, 195 Wash.2d at 854, 467 P.3d 97 (emphasis omitted).

[4, 5] ¶18 Restraints are " ‘disfavor[ed]’ " because placing restrictions on a defendant’s "mental and physical faculties" when they appear in court " ‘may abridge important constitutional rights, including the presumption of innocence, privilege of testifying in one’s own behalf, and right to consult with counsel during trial.’ "⁴ Id. at 852, 467 P.3d 97 (quoting State v....