State v. M.N.H.

495 P.3d 263

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.M.N.H., Appellant.

No. 37207-3-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2021

Jessica Constance Wolfe, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant.

Joseph Anthony Brusic, Bret Allen Roberts, Yakima County Prosecutor's Office, 128 N 2nd St. Rm. 329, Yakima, WA, 98901-2621, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Siddoway, J.

¶ 1 The appeal of this technically moot juvenile offender proceeding presents two issues of first impression that might often be raised in violation hearings conducted under RCW 13.40.200 and continually evade review.

¶ 2 The appellant, who uses the pseudonym Megan, contends that RCW 13.40.200 violates principles of due process established in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). This is because even after she had been detained for violating community supervision terms for more than the 30 days she contends was her standard range, RCW 13.40.200 authorized the juvenile court to impose additional confinement, based on proof of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. She contends the statute further violates due process by requiring her to disprove the willfulness of her violations, where willfulness is a fact essential to a sanctionable violation, relying on State v. W.R. , 181 Wash.2d 757, 762, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).

¶ 3 We reject Megan's challenges and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In March 2019, Megan, then 13 years old, pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault. The information identified the maximum sentence for the charge as 364 days. Her statement on plea of guilty and the disposition order identified her standard range sentence as local sanctions. The juvenile court entered a disposition order that imposed 3 days of confinement, 12 months of community supervision, and 16 hours of community service.

¶ 5 Megan repeatedly violated the conditions of her community supervision. By the end of summer 2019, this had resulted in four violation hearings and an additional 61 days of confinement.

¶ 6 On September 18, Megan was summoned to appear in juvenile court again, facing allegations of failing to attend school and failing to follow parental rules and curfew. This time, she contested the allegations. A hearing on the contested allegations was scheduled for October. In anticipation of the hearing, Megan filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of RCW 13.40.200, which dictates the standard and procedure for penalizing a juvenile offender's failure to comply with an order of restitution, community supervision, penalty assessment, or confinement. Megan argued that RCW 13.40.200(2) violates due process by placing the burden of disproving the willfulness of a violation on the juvenile. Relying on Apprendi and Blakely , she also argued that although RCW 13.40.200(3) allows confinement for violations proved by a preponderance standard to be imposed until the combined total number of days spent in detention reaches an adult's maximum term of confinement for the underlying offense, the federal and state constitutions do not. She argued that once the period of a juvenile offender's confinement exceeds the high end of the standard range, the State is required to prove all elements of a willful violation beyond a reasonable doubt. She argued that in her case, the high end of the standard range was 30 days, the high end for local sanctions.¹

¶ 7 The juvenile court rejected Megan's challenges to the constitutionality of RCW 13.40.200. It found that she violated the disposition order and that some but not all of her violations were willful. It imposed a sentence of 10 days’ additional confinement. At Megan's request, it suspended the sentence. When Megan was returned to court in early November accused of further violations, the court summarily revoked the suspension and ordered the 10 days to be served. Megan appeals the court's November order as well as a prior detention.

ANALYSIS

Two technically moot issues raised by the appeal are of continuing and substantial public interest and will be reviewed

¶ 8 Megan's opening brief acknowledges she has served the detention imposed, making her appeal technically moot. She nonetheless asks us to review five assignments of error, arguing that all involve matters of continuing and substantial public interest.

¶ 9 When an appeal is moot, meaning we can no longer provide the appellant with effective relief, we may retain it and decide if it "involves matters of continuing and substantial public interest." State v. Hunley , 175 Wash.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d 584 (2012). To determine whether the appeal presents issues of continuing and substantial public interest, we consider " ‘[1] the public or private nature of the question presented, [2] the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, and [3] the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.’ " Sorenson v . City of Bellingham , 80 Wash.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512 (1972) (quoting People ex rel. Wallace v . Labrenz , 411 Ill. 618, 622, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952) ). We may also consider "the likelihood that the issue will never be decided by a court due to the short-lived nature of the case." State v. B.O.J. , 194 Wash.2d 314, 321, 449 P.3d 1006 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Philadelphia II v. Gregoire , 128 Wash.2d 707, 712, 911 P.2d 389 (1996) ). Because of the relatively short length of most juvenile offender dispositions, appellate courts rarely have the opportunity to consider them before they become moot. Id.

¶ 10 Only two of Megan's assignments of error warrant review under these standards: her Apprendi - based assignment and her W.R. - based burden-shifting assignment.² We first review the procedure followed by the juvenile court and then review her constitutional challenges in the order stated.

Statutory burdens of proof and authorized penalties when juvenile offenders violate conditions of community supervision

¶ 11 RCW 13.40.200, part of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, authorizes the juvenile court to modify a disposition order when a youthful offender fails to comply with its terms, including its conditions of community supervision. At a hearing on the State's or the court's own motion to modify the order, "[t]he state shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the fact of the violation." RCW 13.40.200(2) (emphasis added). The juvenile court may impose a penalty of confinement "[i]f [it] finds that a respondent has willfully violated the terms of an order pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of [ RCW 13.40.200 ]." RCW 13.40.200(3) (emphasis added). "The respondent shall have the burden of showing that the violation was not a willful refusal to comply with the terms of the order." RCW 13.40.200(2) (emphasis added).

¶ 12 If the court finds that a respondent has willfully violated the terms of an order pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) of this section, "it may impose a penalty of up to thirty days’ confinement." RCW 13.40.200(3). "Penalties for multiple violations occurring prior to the hearing shall not be aggregated to exceed thirty days’ confinement." Id. " Regardless of the number of times a respondent is brought to court for violations of the terms of a single disposition order, the combined total number of days spent by the respondent in detention shall never exceed the maximum term to which an adult could be sentenced for the underlying offense." Id.

¶ 13 This court has construed the statute's plain language as providing that "[a]t a given violation hearing ... a juvenile may be punished for all prehearing violations of a single disposition order, regardless of the number and nature of such violations—provided that the aggregate punishment for those violations does not exceed 30 days, and provided further that the aggregate punishment then and previously imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum term for an adult." State v. Barker , 114 Wash. App. 504, 507-08, 58 P.3d 908 (2002) (emphasis omitted). The juvenile court never imposed more than 30 days’ confinement on Megan at any given violation hearing. The aggregate punishment the court imposed never came close to the 364 day maximum term to which an adult could be sentenced for fourth degree assault. Megan has no statutory basis for challenging the detention ordered by the court.

The State was not required by due process to prove Megan's violations beyond a reasonable doubt

¶ 14 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this due process guaranty as requiring the State to prove, even in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings, "beyond a reasonable doubt ... every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [a defendant ] is charged. " In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added).

¶ 15 Following Winship , the Supreme Court "ha[s] made clear beyond peradventure that Winship's due process and associated jury protections extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a defendant's guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.’ " Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (second alteration in original) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 251, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In Apprendi , the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Id. at 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (...