State v. A.M.W.

545 P.3d 394

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.A.M.W., Appellant.

No. 39113-2-III

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.

Filed March 28, 2024

Appeal from Spokane Superior Court, Docket No: 22-8-00037-2, Honorable Julie M. McKay, Judge.

Kevin Andrew March, Nielsen Koch & Grannis PLLC, 2200 6th Ave. Ste. 1250, Seattle, WA, 98121-1820, for Appellant.

Alexis Michelle Lundgren, Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, 1100 W. Mallon Ave., Spokane, WA, 99260-0270, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Pennell, J.

[1] ¶1 Policy decisions regarding what punishments may follow from violations of law are the province of the legislature, not the judiciary. Nevertheless, in 2020, the Supreme Court adopted JuCR 7.16 as part of an effort to curtail the use of incarceration as a penalty for juvenile offenders. Although the rule is technically about warrants, the effect of the rule is to limit enforcement of the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (Juvenile Justice Act or the Act), chapter 13.40 RCW, to juveniles who pose "a serious threat to public safety." JuCR 7.16(a), (b). This directly interferes with the legislature’s decision that the Juvenile Justice Act should be enforceable against all young people who commit crimes.

¶2 Because JuCR 7.16 conflicts with the substantive provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, a majority of this court deems it unenforceable as a violation of separation of powers. We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s decision to issue a warrant as to A.M.W.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On March 1, 2022, A.M.W. pleaded guilty in juvenile court to misdemeanor assault. The court entered a disposition order directing A.M.W. to spend 10 days in confinement (with 10 days of credit for time served), and submit to 10 hours of community service and 7 months of community supervision. Supervision conditions included refraining from committing new offenses, mandatory school attendance, reporting regularly to a probation counselor, keeping her probation coun- selor informed of her contact information, and attending "information classes and/or other educational programs, as directed by" her counselor. Clerk’s Papers at 20-21.

¶4 A.M.W. largely failed to comply with the terms of her supervision. The court addressed A.M.W.’s noncompliance by twice modifying her disposition without issuing any warrants. But in July 2022, the court granted the State’s motion for a bench warrant. By that time, A.M.W. had left her approved placement and was continuing to associate with an older boyfriend who was alleged to be abusive and involved in various forms of violent crime. On two occasions, A.M.W. voiced suicidal ideation and she had made at least one suicide attempt.

¶5 A.M.W.’s attorney objected to the issuance of a bench warrant, arguing A.M.W. did not pose "a serious threat to public safety" as required by JuCR 7.16(a). The juvenile court overruled this objection. According to the court, A.M.W.’s suicidal ideation risked necessitating the involvement of first responders who would be diverted from other community needs. The court also reasoned A.M.W.’s use of controlled substances and refusal to comply with treatment generally placed the community at risk.

¶6 A.M.W. appealed the issuance of the warrant. Although the issue of A.M.W.’s warrant is now technically moot, the parties agreed this court should grant discretionary review to address interpretation of JuCR 7.16. A commissioner of our court granted review, citing RAP 2.3(b)(4) and concluding this case presented issues of continuing and substantial public interest. See Commissioner’s Ruling, State v. A.M.W., No. 39113-2-III, at 9 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2022).

ANALYSIS

¶7 This appeal involves the application and constitutionality of JuCR 7.16. The rule provides, in pertinent part, that judges adjudicating juvenile offense proceedings may not issue warrants for violations of court orders or for a juvenile’s failure to appear at a court hearing, "unless a finding is made" that the circumstances giving rise to the warrant re- quest pose "a serious threat to public safety." JuCR 7.16(a), (b).

¶8 JuCR 7.16 is a relatively new court rule that has yet to become the subject of appellate review. We first review the background of JuCR 7.16, then analyze its application to A.M.W.’s case and the parties’ constitutional arguments.

Background of JuCR 7.16

¶9 The Washington Supreme Court adopted JuCR 7.16 in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which posed safety concerns for youth detained in congregate settings. See Br. of Resp’t, App. at 40. When JuCR 7.16 was published for public comment, law enforcement, judicial organizations, and other commenters voiced opposition to the rule. They noted local jurisdictions were already reducing detention rates in response to COVID-19. See id. at 41-42, 68, 81-83, 98-100, 103.¹ And they stressed that warrant authority was essential to enforcing court orders and engaging juveniles who pose a risk of self-harm. See id. at 100. But various advocacy organizations supported the adoption of JuCR 7.16. They emphasized not only the health risks posed by congregate detention during the height of the pandemic, but also the harms and racial inequities associated with youth incarceration in general. See id. at 59-67.

¶10 After the close of public comments, the Supreme Court issued an order adopting JuCR 7.16 as a permanent rule, effective February 1, 2021. Id. at 140.

¶11 Several months after the adoption of JuCR 7.16, the Superior Court Judges’ Association (SCJA) submitted a proposal suggesting amendments to JuCR 7.16. To summa- rize, the amendments would allow issuance of warrants based on a juvenile’s risk of self-harm, and also provided an avenue for the issuance of a warrant should a juvenile continually fail to respond to notices for court appearances. See id. at 42, 157, 162-63. The Supreme Court rejected the SCJA's proposed amendments without explanation or an opportunity for public comment. See id. at 42-43,164.

¶12 In 2022, the SCJA and the Washington Association of Juvenile Court Administrators (WAJCA) again requested changes to JuCR 7.16. See id. at 40. The organizations asked to either rescind JuCR 7.16 or adopt the amendments that had been proposed in 2021. See id. at 40, 47. In support of the proposed rule change, the organizations explained JuCR 7.16 "prevents judges and juvenile court partners from effectively performing their statutory responsibilities" under the Juvenile Justice Act. Id. at 44. The organizations noted that juvenile courts had been reducing youth detention rates for years, prior to the adoption of JuCR 7.16. See id. at 45. The organizations also challenged the idea that youth are necessarily traumatized by the type of short-term detention associated with execution of a bench warrant. See id. at 47.

¶13 The Supreme Court referred the proposed changes to JuCR 7.16 for public comment. Responses were similar to what had been submitted during consideration of the original rule in 2020. Numerous advocacy organizations and attorneys objected to changing JuCR 7.16, arguing detention is harmful to juveniles and the needs of juveniles are better addressed through family and community supports.² In support of changing JuCR 7.16, law enforcement, judicial organizations, and others argued that the rule was not helping youth or their families and it was undermining the substantive goals of the Juvenile Justice Act. See id. at 204-05, 221-23, 227, 235, 239, 241, 248, 250-51, 265, 271, 273-74, 292.

¶14 On September 26, 2023, the Supreme Court issued a letter to the SCJA and WAJ- CA, advising that it had decided against modifying JuCR 7.16. See Letter from Steven C. Gonzalez, C.J., Wash. Sup. Ct., to Samuel S. Chung, J., President, Superior Ct. Judges’ Ass’n, and David Reynolds, President, Wash. Ass’n of Juv. Ct. Adm’rs (Sept. 26. 2023) [https://perma.cc/4PVQ-LFZL].

Application of JuCR 7.16 to A.M.W.

[2] ¶15 The warrant issued in A.M.W.’s case purported to comply with JuCR 7.16. But the parties agree on review the terms of the rule were not satisfied. See Br. of Pet’r at 23; Br. of Resp’t at 17. Our review is de novo. See Walker v. Orkin, LLC, 10 Wash. App. 2d 565, 569, 448 P.3d 815 (2019).

[3] ¶16 We agree with the parties that the juvenile court’s issuance of a warrant did not satisfy the plain terms of JuCR 7.16. As has been stated, JuCR 7.16 prevents a court from issuing a bench warrant unless the court finds the circumstances giving rise to the warrant request involve "a serious threat to public safety." The juvenile court in this case reasoned A.M.W.’s suicidal ideation met the requirements of JuCR 7.16 because of the possible need for first responders to assist in her care. We find this concern too attenuated to qualify as a "serious" threat to public safety. JuCR 7.16(a). While it is theoretically conceivable that a community’s emergency response team could be spread so thin that it would not be able to handle multiple urgent calls for help, this outcome does not appear particularly likely. We agree with the parties that this attenuated risk of conceivable harm does not meet the rigorous language set forth in JuCR 7.16.

Constitutionality of JuCR 7.16

[4] ¶17 Rather than debate the application of JuCR 7.16 to A.M.W.’s case, the parties dispute the constitutionality of the rule. According to the State, JuCR 7.16 violates the separation of powers because the judicially adopted rule conflicts with the choices made by our legislature in the Juvenile Justice Act. We review this type of constitutional claim de novo. See Hanson v. Carmona, 1 Wash.3d 362, 369, 525 P.3d 940 (2023).

[5–7] ¶18 "The Washington State Constitution does not contain a formal separation of powers clause, but the division of government into branches has been presumed throughout our history." Id. at 387, 525 P.3d 940. "The doctrine of separation of powers divides power into three coequal branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial." Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med....