State v. Majors

1

State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Imagine Tera Sade Majors, Respondent.

No. A23-0315

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

September 11, 2023

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-22-13955

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kristyn M. Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Amy J. Tripp-Steiner Assistant City Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Drake D. Metzger, Jasmin Quiggle, Metzger Law Firm, LLC Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Hooten, Judge. ^[*]

OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court's order suppressing evidence and dismissing charges of driving while impaired (DWI) against respondent, arguing that (1) the district court clearly erred by discrediting the law-enforcement officer's testimony about physical indicia of intoxication, and (2) even without such indicia, the circumstances of the traffic stop justified an inquiry about alcohol consumption. We affirm.

FACTS

Around 12:30 a.m. on Sunday, July 12, 2022, a trooper with the Minnesota State Patrol was patrolling in downtown Minneapolis. As he drove in the left lane of one-way Second Avenue, a vehicle turned onto Second Avenue heading the wrong way and started to drive toward him. He immediately initiated a traffic stop.

The trooper approached the driver's side of the vehicle where he saw a female passenger and the driver, later identified as respondent Imagine Majors. He asked Majors, "What's going on?" She explained that she was on her way to work nearby and turned onto Second Avenue, despite knowing it is a one-way, because her usual path to her parking location was blocked. He requested her driver's license and insurance card, which she provided "without delay or difficulty" while reiterating that she was on her way to work. He then asked, one minute into their interaction, "What time was your last drink?" She said it was at midnight and, upon further questioning, acknowledged having two drinks. The trooper directed her to get out of the vehicle for field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test (PBT), which indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.15. He arrested Majors, and she was charged with two DWI offenses.

Majors moved to suppress evidence of her intoxication obtained after the trooper asked her about drinking, arguing that the inquiry impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop because the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. In support of the motion, Majors submitted the video recording from the trooper's body-worn camera. During the suppression hearing, the trooper testified that he asked Majors about alcohol consumption because she turned the wrong way on a one-way street, there was an "overwhelming" odor of alcohol coming from the car, and Majors had bloodshot, watery eyes and "heavily slurred" speech. He explained that slurring meant running words together, slow speech, garbled words, or "drawing words out louder." He also testified that the timing of the stop was "meaningful" because there tend to be more impaired drivers on the road at night and Saturday night is when "most people" go out drinking.

On cross-examination, the trooper acknowledged that the brief wrong-way driving was Majors's only concerning driving conduct; he did not observe swerving, speeding, or other traffic violations. When asked to identify where, in the recording, Majors's speech was heavily slurred, he pointed to several moments before and after he asked about alcohol consumption. He maintained that her speech was heavily slurred "[t]hroughout the entire time" he interacted with her but agreed that he had no difficulty understanding her. He also acknowledged that Majors's eyes did not look bloodshot in the recording. Regarding the accuracy of the recorded image, he testified that the body-worn camera captures "only a small snippet of what's actually happening" because it does not capture his full field of vision. But he agreed that the recording captures what was directly in front of him, including Majors's eyes. He also clarified that the fact Majors was driving shortly after midnight was "[n]ot at all" an indication of impairment.

The district court found that the trooper's testimony that Majors had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech was not credible because the recording showed neither. And because he was not credible on those points, the district court declined to "rely on" his testimony about smelling an odor of alcohol. The district court also found that the time of day did not create reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, pointing to Majors's work-related reason for being out at that time and the trooper's testimony that, while Saturday is a common time for people to drink, he did not consider the timing suspicious or indicative of impairment in this case. After concluding that there is no credible evidence to support expansion of the traffic stop, the district court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges.

The state appeals.

DECISION

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A law-enforcement officer may reasonably detain a motorist if the officer has a reasonable, articulable basis for suspecting the motorist of criminal activity. State v Taylor, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021). The stop must be reasonable in both scope and duration. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004). Consequently, each "incremental intrusion" during the stop, including police questioning, must be "strictly tied to" the initial basis for the stop or independent reasonable suspicion. Id. (quotation omitted). Any expansion of the stop must be justified by reasonable suspicion of "other criminal activity." State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).

Whether reasonable suspicion justifies a traffic stop, and any expansion of the stop, is a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 487 (Minn. 2016). We accept a district court's factual findings as to the circumstances of a stop unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. But whether those circumstances establish reasonable suspicion is a question of law that we review de novo. Id.

The state challenges both aspects of the district court's decision.^[1]

I. The district court did not clearly err by finding the trooper's testimony as to indicia of intoxication not credible.

As with a district court's other factual findings, we defer to a district court's credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn.App. 2012). "We will disturb a district court's credibility determinations only when, after a thorough review of the record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Andersen v. State, 940 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Minn. 2020).

In assessing credibility, a district court may weigh conflicting testimony and determine which witness to believe. State v. Kramer, 668 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Minn.App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 2003). It may accept part and reject part of a witness's testimony. Id. And it may determine the weight of any corroborating evidence. See State v. Harris, 405 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 1987). When there is video evidence of a traffic stop, the district court may make factual findings from its independent review of the video, including discrediting contrary testimony from the officer who conducted the stop. State v. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Minn.App. 1999).

The state challenges the district court's express findings discrediting the trooper's testimony that Majors had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and its implicit finding discrediting his testimony that she emitted an odor of alcohol. We address each in turn.

Bloodshot Eyes

The district court found that the trooper was not credible in testifying that Majors's eyes were bloodshot because the body-worn recording "did not support" the testimony. Review of the recording confirms that, during the one-minute interaction before the trooper asked about alcohol, Majors exhibited no redness in her eyes. Indeed, the trooper acknowledged in his testimony that her eyes do not appear red in the video. This evidence supports the district court's credibility determination.

Despite this evidence, the state argues that the district court clearly erred by rejecting the trooper's testimony because there is a moment later in the recording that shows a "red tint" in Majors's eyes, which corroborates the trooper's testimony. We are not persuaded. This single moment occurs several minutes after the trooper asked about alcohol consumption, at a time when the red lights of the squad car are flashing across Majors's face. Even if we agreed that this moment corroborates the trooper's testimony, the district court retained discretion to give greater weight to the remainder of the recording during which Majors's eyes appear clear. See Harris, 405 N.W.2d at 229.

The state also faults the district court for not explaining its determination that the trooper was not credible, such as findings addressing his experience or his demeanor while testifying. But it identifies no authority requiring a district court to do so. To the contrary, a finding that testimony conflicts with video evidence is sufficient justification for discrediting the testimony. Shellito, 594 N.W.2d at 186.^[2] Because the district court made such a finding here, and the body-worn recording supports it, the state has not demonstrated that the...