State v. Maldonado

1

STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff, v. DAVID MALDONADO Defendant

No. CR-20-1479

Superior Court of Maine, Kennebec

December 3, 2021

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Before the court is Defendant David Maldonado's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant containing a mistaken address in its no-knock provision. The Defendant's motion is based solely on article I, section 5 of the Maine State Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.^[1]

I. Facts

The parties have stipulated to the following facts:

On July 24, 2020 Detective Benjamin Murtiff applied for a no-knock warrant for 15 Middle Street, Apartment 4, in Augusta. Factual Stipulations in re Motion to Suppress ¶ 1. The magistrate issued the warrant requested with a no-knock provision, and Det. Murtiff and other officers executed the search warrant at 15 Middle Street, Apartment 4 on July 24. ¶¶ 1-2.

On August 12, 2020 Det. Murtiff drafted an affidavit in support of a search warrant for 85 Gage Street, Apartment 2, in Augusta. ¶ 3. The affidavit established probable cause and the magistrate issued the warrant with a requested no-knock provision. ¶¶ 3-4. The warrant contained adequate particularity and was executed, without knocking or announcing, on August 12 at 85 Gage Street, Apartment 2. ¶¶ 7, 10. Defendant Maldonado was inside the searched premises, and officers, relying on evidence obtained in the search, charged him with various crimes. ¶ 14.

The warrant contains a drafting error, originating from Det Murtiff. ¶ 15. The no-knock provision references an incorrect address: "Furthermore, [the magistrate] authorize[s] this to be a 'no-knock' warrant wherein law enforcement may execute this search warrant without prior notification to the occupants of 15 Middle Street Apartment 4 ...." ¶ 8. The affidavit had not contained this mistake, and the warrant makes no other reference to the incorrect address. ¶¶ 6, 9.

The parties also stipulate the following:

There was no bad faith by Det. Murtiff in making the error. ¶ 16. Det. Murtiff did not mislead the judge with false information or a reckless disregard for the truth. ¶ 17. The warrant was issued with probable cause and was not facially deficient. ¶¶ 20-21. Det. Murtiff reasonably believed he was in compliance with the relevant requirements of the federal and Maine constitutions. ¶ 22. The Court infers from the record that the judge did not notice the drafting error. However, the parties stipulated that he did not abandon his judicial role. ¶ 18.

IL Discussion

The parties agree that the face of the warrant authorized a search of 85 Gage Street, Apartment 2. It did not, however authorize a no-knock search of 85 Gage Street, Apartment 2.^[2]The parties further agree that under the Fourth Amendment there is no federal remedy excluding evidence obtained from an unannounced search. They focus their arguments on article I, § 5, a provision in the state constitution resembling the Fourth Amendment.^[3]

With respect to the motion to suppress, two issues arise: first, whether article I, § 5 requires that officers knock and announce themselves before entering an area to be searched, and second, if so, whether article I, § 5 requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of that knock-and-announce rule. The Defense argues that the Maine Constitution does protect against unannounced searches and offers exclusion of evidence as an appropriate remedy. The State counters that exclusion of evidence is not an available remedy under article I, § 5 ^[4]

This Court concludes that article I, § 5 does protect against unannounced searches such that officers must knock and announce before they execute a search warrant. The "knock-and-announce" rule has long existed in the federal common law, and in 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized it as flowing from the Fourth Amendment, Wilson v. Ark., 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). Before Wilson v. Arkansas, the Law Court declined to recognize such a provision flowing from article I, § 5. State v. Hider, 649 A.2d 14, 15 (Me. 1994). Since these cases were decided, the Law Court has had the opportunity to recognize a state knock-and-announce rule but declined to address it. See State v. Reynoso-Hernandez, 2003 ME 19, ¶ 6 n.2, 816 A.2d 826. However, the Law Court has also stated that article I, § 5 generally offers the same protection as the Fourth Amendment. E.g. State v. Patterson, 2005 ME 26, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 188; State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, ¶ 9 n.3, 759 A.2d 1085. Moreover, recent Law Court decisions have noted the possibility that article I, § 5 in fact offers greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. E.g. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, ¶ 18 n.9, 969 A.2d 923; State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077. Because article I, § 5 is at least coextensive with the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court recognized the Fourth Amendment knock-and-announce rule after the Law Court decided Hider, this Court concludes that a state knock-and-announce rule flows independently from article I, § 5.

Having recognized a state knock-and-announce rule, the Court now takes up the issue of whether exclusion of evidence is a remedy for its violation. The State points to the federal reasoning against suppressing evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce rule and Law Court precedent which has traditionally and generally adhered to federal Fourth Amendment precedent where article I, § 5 issues are raised. The Defendant argues that the state constitution supports suppression, despite federal caselaw.

Under the "primacy approach," when a state constitutional issue is properly raised and developed, Maine courts interpret the state constitution before relying on analogous federal constitutional law. State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (1984). Maine courts may use federal decisions as "helpful guides" for understanding our state constitution, but ultimately the state document controls. State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (1985). The State argues that the Law Court has adopted Fourth Amendment precedent for issues under article I, section 5, and highlights two cases-State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, 969 A.2d 923, and State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, 89 A.3d 1077-in which the Law Court has used federal caselaw in its analysis of unreasonable search and seizure. These cases did consider the state and federal protections in conjunction. However, in the Court's view, these cases should not be overread to support the State's position that the Law Court has determined that federal precedent shall be used for resolving all article I, § 5 claims. In addition, neither case considers the knock-and-announce rule, and, as noted above, both cases explicitly recognize that the Maine Constitution may offer additional protections not available under the federal constitution. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, ¶ 18 n.9, 969 A.2d 923; Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 1077. The Law Court has yet to suppress evidence based solely on article I, § 5. Presumably, however, where that provision and the Fourth Amendment offer at least coterminous protections, they also offer at least coterminous remedies.

The remedy for unlawful searches and other Fourth Amendment violations is generally suppression of evidence. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Akers, 2021 ME 43, ¶ 40, 259 A.3d 127; c.f M.R. Crim. P. 41 A(a); M.R. Crim. P. 41 (j). However, the relevant Fourth Amendment precedent holds that knock-and-announce violations do not warrant evidentiary suppression. The Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, deciding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was inadmissible at trial, explained, "[t]he efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 232 U.S. 383, 393. Since then, the Court has explained that the same reasoning does not hold true for the federal protection against knock-and-announce violations: "Until a valid warrant has issued, citizens are entitled to shield 'their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' U.S. Const., Arndt. 4, from the government's scrutiny. Exclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search vindicates that entitlement. The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different...." Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006).

In Hudson, the Court considered the benefits the knock-and-announce rule and the drawbacks of exclusion of evidence. For the former, it noted the "protection of human life and limb," the "opportunity to comply with the law and to avoid the destruction of property occasioned by a forcible entry," and protection of "privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance." Id. at 594 (internal quotations omitted). Il then stated that the exclusionary rule should not apply to knock-and-announce violations because exclusion of evidence does nothing to vindicate these privacy, property, or safety interests. Id. In addition, the Court was greatly concerned with the costs of evidentiary exclusion, including "the risk of releasing dangerous criminals," "a constant flood of alleged failures to observe the rule," and "officers' refraining from timely entry after knocking and announcing." Id. at 595.

Here the Prosecution's argument that courts must apply the federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence to the state constitution undervalues the primacy approach, which recognizes that the Maine Constitution operates independently of the federal constitution and that courts must examine Maine...