State v. Marr

126 N.E.3d 333

2018 Ohio 5061

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Tyler D. MARR, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 15-18-09

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Van Wert County.

Date of Decision: December 17, 2018

Tyler W. Dunham for Appellant

Scott R. Gordon for Appellee

SHAW, J.

{¶ 1} The State of Ohio brings this appeal from the July 9, 2018, judgment of the Van Wert County Common Pleas Court granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendant-appellee, Tyler Marr ("Marr"). On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred by finding that Marr's handwritten letter filed with the trial court substantially complied with R.C. 2963.30, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), and that as a result of erroneously finding substantial compliance in this case, the trial court erred in finding that the State failed to bring Marr to trial within 180 days of the receipt of his letter.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 2, 2017, Marr was indicted for seven counts of Burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), all felonies of the second degree. Each count concerned a different burglary on a different date, ranging from May 19, 2016, to July 12, 2016.

{¶ 3} On April 3, 2017, a letter written by Marr was filed with the trial court in this case, reading as follows.

Dear Judge Burch[field]

My name is Tyler Derrick Marr. I am writing you today in the hope that I might be able to get some information on an open case filed against me in Van Wert. I am incarcerated at Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana on an unrelated charge. I have been notified of 7 Felony 2nd degree burglary charges that have been filed against me in Van Wert Ohio. My intention is to get transported to Van Wert to get arraigned on these chargers or have them dismissed. Could you provide me with any cause [sic] number pertaining to these charges? I have not been read warrants or been given any information on the seven charges. I would like to move forward with this case and bring about a resolution to it as soon as possible. Any information you can provide on the charges themselves and also what I may need to do to get a transport order to face the charges. I'll provide all of my personal information as well as my location in Indiana Dept. of Corrections. Thank you very much.

(Doc. No. 4). The letter was signed by Marr. On a second page it contained his date of birth, his social security number, his inmate number in the Indiana Department of Corrections, and his current location, specifying even the cell.

{¶ 4} The common pleas court provided a copy of the letter to the Van Wert County Prosecutor's Office in April of 2017.

{¶ 5} In July of 2017, the Van Wert County Prosecutor delivered forms requesting temporary custody of Marr pursuant to Article IV of the IAD. On November 17, 2017, Marr signed forms requesting, pursuant to Article III of the IAD, to be transferred to Van Wert for the purposes of bringing his untried indictment to final disposition.

{¶ 6} It is unclear in the record why, but Marr was not delivered to Van Wert until April 23, 2018.

{¶ 7} On April 25, 2018, Marr was arraigned and he pled not guilty to the charges. He also had counsel appointed for him at that time.

{¶ 8} On May 24, 2018, Marr filed a motion to dismiss arguing that pursuant to R.C. 2963.30, Article III of the IAD, he had not been brought to trial within 180 days of receipt of his April 3, 2017, letter.¹

{¶ 9} On June 7, 2018, the State filed a response to Marr's motion to dismiss, contending, inter alia , that Marr's letter had not substantially complied with provisions of the IAD such that the speedy trial time therein was invoked.

{¶ 10} On July 3, 2018, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts for the trial court to use in determining the motion to dismiss. They read as follows.

1. On March 28, 2017, Tyler Marr delivered a handwritten letter to the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas. The purpose of Mr. Marr's letter was to inform the Court that Mr. Marr was incarcerated at the Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana and to request transportation to Van Wert County for the purpose of resolving an untried indictment against him. * * *

2. In early April of 2017, Tyler Marr's letter was received by the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas. A copy of the letter was shortly thereafter provided to the Van Wert County Prosecutor.

3. In July 2017, the Van Wert County Prosecutor prepared and delivered forms requesting temporary custody of Tyler Marr pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. * * *

4. On November 17, 2017, Tyler Marr signed forms requesting pursuant to Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers that he be delivered to the custody of the Van Wert County Sheriff for purposes of bringing his untried indictment to final disposition. Tyler Marr's request was delivered to the Van Wert County Prosecuting Attorney on November 22, 2017 via fax. * * *

5. Tyler Marr's request described in paragraph 4 herein was not delivered to the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas either by Tyler Marr or by the Miami Correctional Facility in any matter.

6. On April 23, 2018, Tyler Marr was delivered to the Van Wert County Correctional Facility.

7. On April 25, 2018, Tyler Marr appeared in the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas for purposes of arraignment. Attorney Scott Gordon was appointed by the Court to represent Mr. Marr.

8. On May 9, 2018, this case appeared for an initial pre-trial conference. On this date, Tyler Marr delivered to the Court a handwritten letter requesting alternate counsel, citing as a basis his dissatisfaction with Attorney Gordon. * * * 9. On May 24, 2018, this case appeared for a second pre-trial conference. On this date, Mr. Marr appeared in open court and withdrew his request for new counsel. Also on this date, Attorney Gordon filed a Motion to Dismiss on Mr. Marr's behalf.

(Doc. No. 24). The stipulations were signed by both the State and defense counsel.

{¶ 11} On July 9, 2018, trial court filed its entry granting Marr's motion to dismiss. The trial court set forth the issue to be determined as follows.

The question then arises did the Defendant substantially comply with R.C. 2963.30 and the IAD by his initial handwritten letter in March/April 2017 or the November 17, 2017 facsimile to the prosecuting attorney.

If the April 2017 letter substantially complied then the Defendant is beyond time. If November 17, 2017 dated facsimile delivered November 22, 2017 is substantially compliant then 166 days had elapsed on May 9, 2018, when the request for new counsel was delivered to the Court .

(Doc. No. 26).

{¶ 12} After analyzing some case authority, the trial court conducted the following analysis.

In the present case the defendant caused a letter to be delivered to the Court by April 3, 2017 [that] requested timely disposition of the Defendant's case. That letter included the Defendant's location. The State acknowledges receiving that letter from the Court. The State demonstrates actual knowledge by the July 2017 request to the Indiana prison.

In this case the Court and the State had both received the Defendant's request in April 2017, thirteen months before the Defendant's motion to dismiss. Further the State made a request under the State section of the IAD for possession of the Defendant in July 2017. That request was nine months before the Defendant provided his letter requesting a new attorney May 9, 2018.

Whether the delay is the fault of the State or the prison authorities in Indiana is not relevant as over a year passed since the prisoner made his request and two lengthy delays ensued between July 2017 and November 2017 and also November 2017 and April 2018 over which the prisoner had no control.

* * *

In this case there is no reasonable excuse for the delay from both April 3, 2017 or July 2017 for this defendant to have made available for trial and therefore this case is dismissed.

(Doc. No. 26).

{¶ 13} It is from this judgment that the State appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial [court] erred in dismissing case number CR 17-02-021 for failure to bring the matter to trial within 180 days of the date that the court and prosecuting attorney received appellee's letter dated March 28, 2017.

{¶ 14} The State argues in its assignment of error that the trial court erred by finding that Marr's April 2017 letter substantially complied with the IAD.

Standard of Review

{¶ 15} Generally, we review a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Keenan , 143 Ohio St.3d 397, 2015-Ohio-2484, 38 N.E.3d 870 ; State v. Thompson , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-06, 2017-Ohio-8686, 2017 WL 5664758, ¶ 16. However, speedy trial issues present mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Hemingway , 8th Dist. Nos. 96699, 96700, 2012-Ohio-476, 2012 WL 424901, ¶ 8. Therefore, we apply a de novo standard of review to the legal issues but give deference to any factual findings made by the trial court. Id. citing Cleveland v. Adkins , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga, 156 Ohio App.3d 482, 2004-Ohio-1118, 806 N.E.2d 1007, ¶ 5.

The IAD

{¶ 16} The IAD is codified in R.C. 2963.30. Its provisions relevant to this case read as follows.

THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS

The contracting states solemnly agree that:

Article I

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that

...