State v. Martinez

Page 1213

719 A.2d 1213

51 Conn.App. 59

STATE of Connecticut v. Luis MARTINEZ.

No. 18051.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 18, 1998.

Decided Nov. 17, 1998.

Suzanne Zitser, Assistant Public Defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Ronald G. Weller, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Eva Lenczewski, Assistant State's Attorney, for the appellee (state).

Before LAVERY, LANDAU and FRANCIS X. HENNESSY, JJ.

LANDAU, J.

The defendant, Luis Martinez, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), ¹ attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2) ² and 53a-134 (a)(2) ³ and felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c. ⁴ On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence because the affidavit in support of a search and seizure warrant failed to establish probable cause and (2) abused its discretion in admitting testimony that was irrelevant and prejudicial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On September 15, 1994, the trial court issued a search and seizure warrant to search the first floor apartment at 54 Crown Street in Waterbury after determining that probable cause existed. The defendant's arrest stemmed from the seizure of a handgun, ammunition, bloody clothing, photographs and a wallet from the apartment following the execution of the warrant.

The defendant filed a motion to suppress ⁵ a revolver, a brown blood-stained sweatshirt with the word "Browns" printed in orange letters, photographs of the interior of the apartment and a black wallet containing personal papers belonging to the defendant that the state argued was seized under the plain view doctrine. ⁶ The trial court denied the motion to suppress as to the gun, ammunition and bloody clothing, but granted it as to the wallet and its contents because the plain view doctrine was inapplicable. ⁷ The trial court concluded that "the affidavit by the police officers plus the reasonable inferences necessarily drawn by the magistrate furnished a substantial factual basis for the magistrate's conclusion that probable cause existed to search for the gun, ammunition and bloody clothing." Other facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues in the case.

I

The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the sweatshirt seized within the apartment. Specifically, the defendant claims that the affidavit in support of the search warrant (1) failed to establish probable cause and (2), in the alternative, was based on "stale" information.

The warrant application affidavit set forth the following facts. On September 14, 1994, an investigation led the police to the Crown Street apartment, the possible location of robbery suspects. After the police discovered that one of the residents, Demarise Williams, fit the description of one of the robbery suspects, Williams was arrested under a valid arrest warrant for a separate incident. When questioned, Williams told police that he had knowledge of a recent homicide and robbery and detailed the events that transpired on September 12, 1994.

Williams revealed that on September 12, at approximately 10 p.m., the defendant came into the apartment in Waterbury where Williams and his girlfriend, Darlene Saunders, were watching television. The defendant told Williams that he wanted Williams to go with him to rob a man who was sitting on the wall by a nearby church. Williams noticed that the defendant was in possession of a gun. The defendant and Williams walked to the church wall, which was located at the corner of Beacon and Crown Streets, a short distance from the apartment. Williams walked part of the way across the street with the defendant. The defendant walked up to the victim, stood directly in front of him and told him to take everything out of his pockets. When the victim failed to follow the directions, the defendant shot him twice. ⁸ Williams ran back to the apartment where he met Saunders. The defendant followed Williams to the apartment, where he talked and laughed about the shooting to Williams. The defendant then remained at the apartment.

The affidavit also contained information provided by Saunders regarding the defendant's presence in the apartment prior to and after the shooting. Saunders reported that, upon the defendant's return to the apartment after the shooting, the defendant told her that he had shot a man six times in the chest. Although the victim had claimed to have no money, the defendant told Saunders that he knew that the victim had money by the way he was patting his pockets. Saunders informed the defendant that she was going to see if anyone was hurt and then to contact the police. The defendant told Saunders that if she informed the police, she would not leave the apartment alive. The following morning, on September 13, 1994, Saunders notified the defendant that the man he had shot the night before had died. The defendant left the apartment in the early afternoon.

A

Initially, the defendant claims that the affidavit failed to set forth facts supporting a finding of probable cause for the seizure of the sweatshirt because there was no "credible or reliable information for the issuing magistrate to conclude there was a fair probability that bloody clothing would be found at that location." ⁹ Specifically, the defendant claims that the affidavit failed (1) to establish the defendant's relationship to the apartment, other than the fact that Williams lived there and the defendant went there after the shooting, and (2) to provide any information indicating that the defendant was so close to the victim when he shot the gun that blood would be found on his clothing. We disagree.

"In State v. Barton, [219 Conn. 529, 544, 594 A.2d 917 (1991) ], our Supreme Court adopted the 'totality of the circumstances' standard for determining probable cause used by the federal courts pursuant to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)." State v. Marsala, 42 Conn.App. 1, 5, 679 A.2d 367, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 912, 682 A.2d 1010 (1996). "Under this [standard], in determining the existence of probable cause to search, the issuing judge must make a 'practical nontechnical decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the warrant affidavit, including the "veracity" and the "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' State v. Johnson, 219 Conn. 557, 563, 594 A.2d 933 (1991)." State v. Rodriguez, 223 Conn. 127, 134-35, 613 A.2d 211 (1992). Therefore, " '[i]f the warrant affidavit fails to state in specific terms how the informant gained his knowledge or why the police believe the information to be trustworthy ... the magistrate can also consider all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit to determine whether, despite these deficiencies, other objective indicia of reliability reasonably establish that probable cause to search exists.' " State v. Marsala, supra, at 6, 679 A.2d 367, quoting State v. Barton, supra, at 544, 594 A.2d 917.

"[O]ne of the most common factors used to evaluate the reliability of an informant's information is the corroboration of the information by the police.... The theory of corroboration is that a statement [that] has been shown true in some respects is remarkably likely to be true in the remaining respects." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruscoe, 212 Conn. 223, 230-31, 563 A.2d 267 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990). " 'When a magistrate has determined that the warrant affidavit presents sufficient objective indicia of reliability to justify a search and has issued a warrant, a court reviewing that warrant at a subsequent suppression hearing should defer to the reasonable inferences drawn by the magistrate....' " State v. Marsala, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 6, 679 A.2d 367, quoting State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. at 544-45, 594 A.2d 917.

"Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred.... Probable cause to search exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity; and (2) there is probable cause to believe that the items named will be found in the place to be searched." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsala, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 6, 679 A.2d 367, quoting State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. at 547, 594 A.2d 917. "Furthermore, it is axiomatic that [a] significantly lower quantum of proof is required to establish probable cause than guilt.... State v. Vincent, 229 Conn. 164, , 640 A.2d 94 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 232, 690 A.2d 1370 (1997).

"This court's scope of review, in evaluating the existence of probable cause, is limited to the facts that appear [within] the four corners of the affidavit or facts that may be properly inferred from those facts. State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 536, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S.Ct. 967, 83 L.Ed.2d 971 (1985). In so doing, we must use common sense; State v. Castano, 25 Conn.App. 99, 101, 592 A.2d 977 (1991); and defer to the reasonable inferences drawn by the [issuing] magistrate. State v. Barton, supra, 219 Conn. at 544-45, 594 A.2d 917. Our role is to determine whether the affidavit at issue presented a substantial factual basis for the magistrate's conclusion that probable...