State v. Matthews

266 N.C.App. 558

832 S.E.2d 261

STATE of North Carolina

v.Samantha Meiaza MATTHEWS, Defendant.

No. COA18-1257

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 6, 2019

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Thomas J. Felling, for the State.

Office of the Appellate Defender, by Wyatt Orsbon and Glenn Gerding, for Defendant-Appellant.

INMAN, Judge.

Defendant Samantha Meiaza Matthews ("Defendant") appeals, by petition for writ of certiorari, the district court's revocation of her probation imposed under a conditional discharge. Defendant argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to conduct the probation revocation hearing, contending that she did not expressly consent to the district court's exercise of jurisdiction. After thorough review of the record and applicable law, we allow Defendant's petition but hold Defendant has failed to demonstrate error.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On 3 February 2017, Defendant was charged by magistrate's order with one count each of felony possession with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver ("PWIMSD") Percocet (Schedule II), Hydrocodone (Schedule II), and Diazepam (Schedule IV). On 5 May 2017, Defendant was charged by a bill of information with felony possession of a Schedule IV substance, a class I felony. Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement that same day. Per the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss the three PWIMSD charges and Defendant agreed to plead guilty to felony possession of a Schedule IV substance and receive supervised probation on a conditional discharge.

The district court accepted the plea agreement and entered a conditional discharge placing Defendant on 12 months of supervised probation. The court also ordered Defendant to pay court costs of $450 and a supervised probation fee, complete 225 hours of community service, and undergo a substance abuse evaluation.

On 4 March 2018, Defendant's probation terms were modified to allow her additional time to complete her community service hours. Defendant's probation officer later filed a violation report on 23 April 2018, asserting that Defendant had only completed 26.1 of her 225 court-ordered community service hours and had not yet paid in full her court costs and supervised probation fee.

On 4 May 2018, the district court held a hearing on the violation report. Defendant's counsel did not object to the district court's jurisdiction during the hearing and fully participated in the proceeding. After Defendant admitted the willfulness of her three violations, Defendant's probation officer testified that Defendant had completed 75 hours of community service at the time of the hearing. The court, in reliance on Defendant's admissions and the officer's testimony, found that Defendant willfully violated her probation and conditional discharge. While the trial court was reciting this finding, Defendant asked the court through counsel if she could speak; Defendant then addressed the court directly and asked for an additional 30 days to complete her community service requirement. The trial court denied Defendant's request.

The trial court entered judgment for felony possession of a Schedule IV substance following the above exchange. As punishment, the court ordered a suspended sentence of 4 to 14 months imprisonment and placed Defendant on supervised probation for 12 months. After sentencing and at the conclusion of the hearing, Defendant directly asked the trial court if a felony would appear on her record. The trial court answered the question "yes"—to which Defendant replied, "Okay"—and then the trial court asked counsel if there was anything further Defendant wished to present to the court; Defendant's counsel responded, "No, Your Honor[.]"

It does not appear from the hearing transcript that Defendant gave oral notice of appeal at the hearing; however, the trial judge checked a box on the "Disposition/Modification of Conditional Discharge" form that Defendant was appealing the order to superior court. The trial judge also checked and appears to have initialed a box on the judgment itself, stating "[t]he defendant gives notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Division[.]" Both the Disposition/Modification of Conditional Discharge and the judgment were entered on 4 May 2018, the day of the hearing revoking Defendant's probation.¹

Defendant, pro se , filed form notices of appeal designating her appeal to the superior court on 11 May 2018 and 17 May 2018; the first notice identified the original judgment entered on her guilty plea as the order appealed, while the second identified the order revoking her probation. Despite these forms designating Defendant's appeal to the superior court, a form judgment in the record signed by the trial court judge indicates that Defendant "[a]ppealed to [the] NC Court of Appeals" on 17 May 2018.²

On 18 May 2018, the trial court again called Defendant's case for hearing, and the judge made the following statement on the record:

[Defendant] came in yesterday and gave notice of appeal. Madam Clerk contacted her this morning to try to get her back in here so we could get this on the record that she did give notice of appeal from that revocation of that conditional discharge.

I just wanted to make sure we had this on the record. I think (inaudible) that she did give notice of appeal (inaudible) .

.... Also, that Madam Clerk did contact and left a message for her that we would try to do this on the record this morning. She has not called Madam Clerk back (inaudible) contact with her (inaudible) that she did give notice of appeal on May 7th.

The trial judge then completed and filed an appellate entries form, noting Defendant's appeal to this Court.

Defendant's appellate counsel filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court on 13 February 2019. In the petition's appendix, Defendant included an email between her appellate counsel and the assistant district attorney assigned to her case in which the district attorney acknowledged Defendant "appeared in court to provide notice of appeal" on 18 May 2018. The State filed a motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal on 12 March 2019, arguing that the actions of Defendant and the trial court recounted above failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

In its motion to dismiss, the State argues that Defendant's various notices and related attempts to appeal failed to comply with Rule 4(a)-(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a) requires an appealing party to either give oral notice of appeal at trial or file and serve a written notice of appeal within fourteen days of judgment; Rule 4(b) sets forth the requirements for a written notice of appeal, which include a mandate that the notice "designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken." N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)-(b) (2019).

Defendant concedes that her various attempts to appeal fail to comply with the above requirements, but she notes that the State has not shown surprise, confusion, or prejudice and requests that we allow her petition for writ of certiorari. Pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we may exercise our broad discretion to allow review "when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action[.]" N.C. R. App. P. 21 (2019); see also State v. Ledbetter , ––– N.C. ––––, ––––, 814 S.E.2d 39, 43 (2018) (holding that this Court possesses "the jurisdiction and the discretionary authority ... [a]bsent specific statutory language limiting the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction ... to issue the prerogative writs, including certiorari").

In our discretion, we allow Defendant's petition and deny the State's motion to dismiss, as: (1) Defendant, acting pro se , made clear her intent to appeal the revocation of probation within ten days of the order's entry; (2) her intent was frustrated only through use of form notices of appeal that appear to have been provided to her by the Wake County clerk's office; (3) the State appears to have understood Defendant's intent to appeal when she filed the defective notices, which the trial court later made clear on the record; and (4) Defendant's appeal presents an issue of first impression concerning a fundamental aspect of the trial court's authority, namely, the district court's subject matter jurisdiction to revoke her probation. See, e.g., State v. Hill , 227 N.C. App. 371, 374, 741 S.E.2d 911, 914 (2013) (allowing certiorari for failure to take timely action where the defendant filed, pro se , a form notice of appeal on the day after judgment that was provided to him by the jail, was not served on the State, incorrectly designated his appeal as one from district court to superior court, and did not correctly identify all orders appealed from); State v. Keller , 198 N.C. App. 639, 642, 680 S.E.2d 212, 214 (2009) (allowing certiorari "[d]ue to the fundamental nature of the errors asserted by defendant" (citation omitted)).

B. Standard of Review

We review challenges to a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction de novo . State v. Herman , 221 N.C. App. 204, 209, 726 S.E.2d 863, 866 (2012). We apply that same standard to questions of statutory interpretation. State v. Largent , 197 N.C. App. 614, 617, 677 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2009). Under this standard, we "consider[ ] the matter anew and freely substitute[ ] [our] own judgment for that of the lower tribunal."

State v. Williams , 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

C. District Court Jurisdiction Per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-271(e)

Under the statutory framework setting forth the jurisdiction of our district and superior courts over criminal matters, the superior court generally exercises exclusive jurisdiction over probation...