State v. McGuire

689 S.W.3d 596

The STATE of Texas, Appellant

v.Sean Michael MCGUIRE, Appellee

NO. PD-0984-19

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: February 21, 2024

ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS, FORT BEND COUNTY

Josh Barrett Schaffer, for Appellee.

Stacey M. Soule, Austin, for Appellant.

OPINION

Richardson, J., announced the judgment of the Court and filed an opinion in which Hervey, Newell, and Walker, JJ., joined.

Can a peace officer legally arrest a suspect, without a warrant, for killing another person while driving intoxicated, even though the accident did not occur in the officer’s presence? Yes. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 14.03(a)(1) has been interpreted to allow any peace officer to arrest a person found in a "suspicious place" and the circumstances of the case reasonably show that the person is guilty of a felony or breach of the peace. We find that the arrest met the requirements of this statute, and that the officer formed probable cause to believe that both a felony and breach of the peace had occurred. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and the trial court’s suppression of Appellee’s arrest and all evidence arising from it and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case has travelled a long and convoluted journey to reach this Court for the third time. Prior to our Court granting review, this case has been before both Houston courts of appeals on four separate occasions, petitions for discretionary review were filed and denied twice at our Court, and the State’s petition for writ of certiorari, was subsequently denied at the United States Supreme Court. Appellee was tried and convicted on two separate charges by a jury. The conviction for felony murder was reversed by the First Court of Appeals and remanded for a new trial. The conviction for failure to stop and render aid was affirmed by the First Court of Appeals and is not before this Court. This case has also been presided over by seven successive trial judges. The original judge on the case became ill prior to trial and another was recused in a contested motion to recuse. There was no live testimony presented on the current issue before this Court; the trial judge simply relied on the records and testimonies taken during prior pretrial proceedings and the jury trial. As a result, the transcripts of this proceeding had to be supplemented. The latest ruling now before this Court was made by Judge Brady Elliott who is no longer the judge of the 268th District Court. On remand, consequently, an eighth judge will continue with this case.

FACTS

On the date alleged in the indictment, at approximately 12:35 am, Appellee Sean Michael McGuire, with his wife as a passenger, drove his track into a motorcycle driven by David Stidman causing Stidman’s death.¹ McGuire made a U-turn and drove to a nearby Shell gas station a tenth of a mile from the accident scene. There, he called his mother and two law enforcement friends.² Police investigating the collision were also informed that McGuire was waiting at the gas station. One of the officers, Trooper Tomlin, who responded to the collision scene went to the gas station to investigate. There, he encountered McGuire and his wife. He also encountered McGuire’s mother—who had come to the gas station after McGuire called—standing outside of McGuire’s truck. Trooper Wiles also came to the gas station from the crash scene shortly after Trooper Tomlin. Trooper Tomlin observed a piece of metal from the back fender of the motorcycle wrapped

around the front of McGuire’s truck. Trooper Tomlin also observed McGuire to have "red glassy eyes" and "an odor of alcohol coming from his person."³ When he asked McGuire what happened, McGuire told him that he "hit something" while driving and that his wife, sitting in the passenger seat at the time, had told him he "hit a person." In order to continue the investigation and because both McGuire and his wife were showing signs of intoxication, McGuire’s mother was asked to bring the truck to the scene of the collision while McGuire and his wife were transported there by patrol car.⁴

Continuing the investigation at the scene of the accident, police found gouges on the road and other evidence indicating that after McGuire’s truck hit Stidman, the track continued to drag the motorcycle for 829 feet before coming to rest. Additionally, Stidman, himself, was thrown 214 feet from the point of impact and hit a guardrail. Concluding that McGuire was driving while intoxicated at the time of the collision leading to Stidman’s death, Trooper Wiles arrested McGuire on suspicion of causing Stidman’s death by reason of intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle and failure to stop and render aid, both felony offenses.

At a nearby hospital, McGuire’s blood was drawn without a warrant or consent to determine his blood alcohol content. Somewhere between 90 minutes and 2.5 hours had passed from the time of the collision to the moment his blood was drawn. The State charged McGuire with felony murder by causing Stidman’s death while driving intoxicated (enhanced to a first-degree felony by two prior out-of-state charges for driving while intoxicated), a second count of intoxication manslaughter with a vehicle, and failure to stop and render aid. The jury convicted him of felony murder and failure to stop and render aid. The felony murder conviction was reversed in light of Missouri v. McNeely⁵ however, McGuire’s conviction for failure to stop and render aid was affirmed by the First Court of Appeals.

On remand and before the second trial began, Appellee filed a new motion to suppress, this time to suppress the arrest. Specifically he argued that the "only exception to the warrant requirement which could possibly apply in this case" was under 14.01(b) which requires an "offense committed in [the officer’s] presence or within his view." Appellee, thus, requested suppression over the following items after his detention:

1. Photographs or video depictions of [Appellee].

2. Audio recordings of [Appellee].

3. Video recordings of [Appellee].

4. Statements of [Appellee].

5. Any other tangible items taken from [Appellee], his person or the vehicle he was allegedly operating not listed above;⁶

The State argued McGuire’s arrest was lawful because probable cause existed, and he was found in a suspicious place under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a)(1). The State did not mention exigency at all in its written response. Furthermore, no new evidence was submitted to the court during the suppression hearing, nor did anybody testify. The trial court did not hear any testimony and simply reviewed the pleadings, the 2012 suppression-hearing transcript, and testimony from the 2016 trial.⁷ The trial court ultimately granted the suppression motion pertaining to the warrantless arrest based on those records.

With regard to which evidence was to be suppressed, the trial court clarified the boundaries during the suppression hearing. The court stated:

THE COURT: Well, let’s clarify. Items taken from the vehicle, I’m not going to grant suppression as to that … .⁸

THE COURT: "Tangible items taken from the defendant," I’m striking that …. Any information they received from the defendant prior to that time is useable. He was being detained at that point in time ….⁹

THE COURT: From the time that he was placed in the car at the Shell station to the time that he was placed under arrest at the site of the dead body, that comes in ….¹⁰

THE COURT: [A]t that point in time where this officer says, "You’re under arrest," … is suppressed; and everything that arose from that -- the conversations that occurred therefrom is suppressed.¹¹

In short, the evidence to be suppressed did not include any physical evidence and was limited to what "arose" from his arrest. This would include such post-arrest evidence as McGuire’s statements after arrest, dashcam video and audio recordings with McGuire in the police vehicle after arrest, and McGuire’s booking photo.

This brings us to the present-day appeal by the State to this Court. Under the record brought before this Court, it is unclear what specific evidence Appellee sought to suppress. The record does not show whether such evidence would benefit or hurt either party’s case.

However, with the suppression of the arrest and its fruits in place, the admissible inculpatory evidence includes the following:

• McGuire was operating the vehicle.

• McGuire made three phone calls (his mother and two acquaintances in law enforcement) indicating he hit "something."

• McGuire’s wife, a passenger at the time of the collision, told him he hit a person.

• McGuire stopped his vehicle at a Shell station approximately 0.1 miles from the crash site instead of stopping at the scene and rendering aid.

• Physical evidence of a piece of motorcycle stuck in the grill of McGuire’s truck.

• McGuire states to Trooper Wiles, "My wife said I hit a person."

• McGuire cried, covered his face, crouched, and stated he was "sorry" multiple times when near the motorcycle at the crash scene.

• The motorcycle was dragged approximately 829 feet.

• McGuire didn’t notice the piece of motorcycle in the grill of his truck. He "didn’t seem to know where it came from."

• Trooper Wiles noticed a strong odor of alcohol on McGuire, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and a dazed look on his face.

• McGuire refused a field-sobriety test by Trooper Wiles.

Nevertheless, because some evidence is suppressed and assuming for the moment that it is indeed determinative to the case, we now address whether suppression was warranted.¹²

Standard of Review for Motions to Suppress

[1–4] An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion.¹³ Almost complete deference is given to the court’s determination of historical facts and its rulings on the application of law to those questions of fact.¹⁴ The same deference is...