State v. Meacham

317 Or.App. 224

504 P.3d 1275

STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Zachariah Michael MEACHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

A173682 (Control), A173685

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and submitted December 3, 2021.

January 26, 2022

Nora Coon, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public Defense Services.

Christopher Page, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before James, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Kistler, Senior Judge.

KISTLER, S. J.

Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for felony driving while suspended (DWS) and a judgment finding him in violation of probation. He argues that an unconstitutional stop led to his DWS conviction, which in turn led to his being found in violation of probation. Because we conclude that the stop was constitutional, we affirm both judgments.

One afternoon, Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff Farmer was on patrol in a marked police car near NE 223rd and Glisan Streets, which he described as a "high vice area." While he was driving through a nearby Walgreens parking lot, he noticed an older silver Toyota Tercel enter the lot and drive towards him. As the two cars passed each other, the deputy and the other driver made eye contact. Once that occurred, the other driver "appeared to pick up speed and accelerate rapidly away from [the deputy] through the lot and then turn a corner * * * out of [the deputy's] sight."

The deputy found the driver's behavior suspicious, and he "ran" the Tercel's license plate. In doing so, he learned that the same Tercel had been involved in a recent drug arrest and that there was an outstanding felony warrant for a person (Robert Long) who had either been driving the Tercel or a passenger in it when the drug arrest occurred.¹ The deputy "pulled up [Long's] mug shot," which led him to conclude that Long's mug shot "matched the guy who was driving the car."

The deputy turned his car around to follow the Tercel. After he turned the corner, he saw the Tercel "parked right in front of the Walgreens[,] right around the corner as if [the driver had] come around the corner [and] parked real quick." No one was in the car. However, the deputy spotted the driver inside the store and went in to speak with him. The deputy testified:

"I walked into the Walgreens. [The driver] was moving down an aisle and I just verbally addressed him, told him what was going on, that I thought he was this Robert Long guy, I thought he had a warrant. And then he provided me an identification card to show me who he was."²

The state identification card that the driver gave the deputy identified the driver as Zachariah Meacham, not Robert Long. However, the deputy testified that the driver's use of a state identification card was a giveaway that he did not have a valid driver's license, which led to the driver's (defendant's) arrest and prosecution for felony DWS.

Before trial, defendant moved to suppress "all evidence * * * discovered pursuant to an illegal search and seizure."³ The next day, the state told the trial court that it was prepared to present evidence on defendant's motion, and the parties developed the record set out above. That record gave rise to three potential issues: (1) was the deputy's initial encounter with defendant in Walgreens a stop; (2) if it was, did the deputy reasonably suspect that defendant was Robert Long when he first spoke with him in Walgreens; and (3) if the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was Long, did the deputy's reasonable suspicion dissipate once defendant produced identification showing he was someone else?

After the record had been created, the state addressed two of those issues. It argued that the deputy's initial interaction with defendant in Walgreens did not constitute a stop and that, when defendant offered his state identification in response to the deputy's questions, the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant had been driving without a valid license. The state did not argue that the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was Long when he first approached him in Walgreens.⁴

Defense counsel addressed all three issues in her argument. She argued initially that, when the deputy went into Walgreens, "there [wa]s not sufficient information at this point to detain the person that was in the store based on how little information [the deputy had] gathered before deciding to go into the store and detain whoever this person was." She also argued that the deputy's initial interaction with defendant in Walgreens was sufficiently coercive that it constituted a stop without a sufficient justification. And she finally contended that, "even if there was reasonable suspicion" that defendant was Robert Long when the deputy first entered Walgreens, the deputy's suspicion "should have been diffused as soon as he saw [defendant's] work ID."⁵

The trial court agreed with the state that the deputy's initial interaction with defendant in Walgreens did not rise to the level of a stop and that a stop occurred only "after the officer learned that the Defendant—Defendant's license was suspended and then asked him to accompany the officer toward his patrol vehicle to check what level of suspension there was." At that point, the trial court reasoned, the deputy had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had been driving while suspended. The court accordingly denied defendant's motion to suppress. Afterwards, the court entered a judgment of conviction for felony DWS. Later, another judge relied on the felony DWS conviction to find that defendant had violated his probation on a separate offense.

On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress. He argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the deputy's initial encounter with him in Walgreens did not constitute a stop. See State v. Reyes-Herrera , 369 Or. 54, 67-68, 500 P.3d 1 (2021) (explaining when verbal statements will constitute a stop). The state responds that the trial court's conclusion was correct. See State v. Backstrand , 354 Or. 392, 413-14, 313 P.3d 1084 (2013) (explaining when requests for identification will not rise to the level of a stop). It argues alternatively that, even if the deputy's initial statements were sufficiently coercive to constitute a stop, the trial court's ruling can be sustained on another ground—namely, when the deputy first spoke with defendant in Walgreens, he reasonably suspected that defendant was Robert Long, who was subject to an outstanding felony warrant. See Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon , 331 Or. 634, 659-60, 20 P.3d 180 (2001) (explaining when a respondent can rely on the right-for-the-wrong-reason doctrine to uphold a trial court's ruling). Defendant replies that, as a procedural matter, the state may not rely on the right-for-the-wrong-reason doctrine because the record could have developed differently if the state had argued at the suppression hearing that the initial encounter was supported by reasonable suspicion. Alternatively, defendant contends that the deputy's belief that defendant was Long was not objectively reasonable.

We need not decide the first issue that divides the parties—whether the deputy's initial encounter with defendant in Walgreens constituted a stop—to resolve this case. Even if that encounter was a stop, the deputy reasonably suspected that defendant was Robert Long, who was subject to an outstanding felony warrant. In explaining why we reach that conclusion, we begin with defendant's procedural argument that the state may not rely on the right-for-the-wrong reason doctrine because the record could have developed differently if the state had argued at the suppression hearing that the deputy reasonably suspected defendant was Long. See id. at 659-60, 20 P.3d 180 (explaining that the doctrine may be invoked when, among other things, "the record materially [is] the same one that would have been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for affirmance below").

In this case, the record does not show that the state took any action before the parties developed the evidentiary record at the suppression hearing that took the question whether the initial encounter was based on reasonable suspicion off the table. Rather, that question remained in play when the parties developed the evidentiary record. Consistently, defense counsel cross-examined the deputy on that issue.⁶ To be sure, after the parties had developed the evidentiary record, the state did not argue that the deputy reasonably...